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Abstract
My dissertation investigates the interaction between macroeconomics and finance.
It contains three chapters.
Chapter 1 studies the private information explanation for the time-series pre-FOMC
drift through risk reduction. Using transaction-level data, I document the informed
trading is in the same direction of the realized returns in the 24-hour window before
FOMC announcements, coinciding with the pre-FOMC uncertainty reduction. I inte-
grate Kyle’s (1985) model into a standard consumption-based asset pricing framework
where the market makers are compensated for the risk of assets’ fundamentals. Ob-
serving aggregate order flow, they update the belief about the marginal utility-weighted
asset value, which resolves uncertainty gradually and results in an upward drift in market
prices before announcements. I demonstrate that there is a strictly positive pre-FOMC
drift if and only if the market makers require risk compensation.
Chapter 2 is co-authored with Colin Ward. We develop an equilibrium model where
cash holdings, costly refinancing policies, and managerial incentives are jointly deter-
mined to quantify the market’s influence on management’s ex ante behavior. We also
derive a general formula that shows how agency and financing distortions shape pay-
outs and compensation, two easily measured quantities. Our calibrated model estimates
agency conflicts are nearly 10 times more severe than financial frictions for US public
firms. Our analysis suggests that cutting corporate income taxes while introducing a
tax on refinancing can reduce the relative severity of agency.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Luca Benzoni, Lorenzo Garlappi, Robert S. Goldstein,
and Julien Hugonnier. We investigate the optimal dynamic debt policy of a firm that
issues non-callable debt subject to a fixed cost when shareholders cannot commit to
future restructuring policies. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the ex-
istence of no-commitment Markov perfect equilibria. For a given debt issuance cost
parameter, we identify a range of maturities for which equilibria exists and tax benefits
are positive. In particular, for realistic values of issuance costs and debt maturity, our
no-commitment framework generates equity and debt prices that are only slightly lower
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Drift and Private Information:
Kyle Meets Macro-Finance
Lucca and Moench (2015) document the substantial stock market returns before the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements. They find that the pre-
FOMC drift of the S&P 500 index is on average 49 basis points during the 24-hour
window preceding FOMC announcements, which corresponds to about 80% of the an-
nual realized excess returns in the stock market. However, the hours and days before
FOMC meetings fall into the “blackout period,” a time when policymakers and Fed staff
refrain from discussions of monetary policy information.1 It provides a notable chal-
lenge to standard asset pricing theory, which predicts equity returns should be earned
at the announcements when uncertainty is resolved from the public news, rather than
ahead.
Some papers have shown suggestive evidence that the pre-FOMC drift may come
from private information before announcements. Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2019) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2020) provide a history of leak discussions in FOMC doc-
uments and argue that systematic information leakage drives the pre-FOMC announce-
ment drift. In addition to information leakage, market participants may generate their
1 The blackout period begins at the start of the second Saturday (midnight) Eastern Time before
the beginning of the meeting and ends at midnight Eastern Time on the next day after the meeting.
1
2
proprietary information by collecting data related to FOMC announcements.2 In this
paper, I study the private information explanation for the time-series pre-FOMC drift
through risk reduction.
Empirically, I provide asset-market-based evidence that supports the presence of
private information and insider trading before FOMC announcements. First, Hu, Pan,
Wang, and Zhu (2020) find the significant and systematic reduction of market uncer-
tainty (measured by the CBOE VIX index) during the same 24-hour window before
FOMC announcements. Second, sorting the FOMC days via 24-hour uncertainty re-
duction before announcements into terciles, I find that only the group with substantial
uncertainty reduction preceding announcements are associated with the positive pre-
FOMC drift. Third, to measure informed trading, I calculate the order imbalances,
defined as the difference between buyer- and seller- initiated trading volumes divided by
total trading volume. When the uncertainty reduces before FOMC, the abnormal order
imbalances are 1.85-2.17% higher in the direction of the realized return in the 24-hour
window before FOMC announcements.
To understand the above features of the financial markets, I build a model that the
pre-FOMC announcement drift is earned as risk reduces through insider trading. I inte-
grate Kyle’s (1985) model into a standard consumption-based asset pricing framework
such that the market makers are compensated for the risk of assets’ fundamentals. The
equity premium is realized with uncertainty reduction prior to announcements since
insider trading reveals private information. Characterizing the equilibrium price and
insider trading by closed-form, I establish a strictly positive pre-FOMC announcement
drift if and only if the market makers are risk-compensated.
Since FOMC announcements provide information about the macro-economy, the
market makers require risk compensation in assets’ fundamentals before the announce-
ments. To provide macroeconomic conditions for the market makers’ pricing decisions,
I develop a continuous-time equilibrium model in which the aggregate economic growth
is driven by a latent state variable and an i.i.d. component (short-run shocks). The in-
vestors cannot observe the latent variable directly and update the belief by observing the
aggregate endowment when there is no announcement. The competitive market makers
2 For example, Kurov, Sancetta, Strasser, and Wolfe (2017) show that proprietary information
permits forecasting announcement surprises in some cases.
3
set the price, which equals the marginal utility weighted payoffs through the stochastic
discount factor (SDF) determined from the above economy. The counter-cyclical SDF
applies extra discounting to payoffs positively correlated with utility. Thus, the asset
market requires a premium for such payoffs relative to risk-free returns.
The Fed has some extra knowledge regarding the economy, which should be revealed
through periodic FOMC announcements. However, the insider knows the underlying
information before announcements and trades to maximize the expected terminal profit,
understanding the order affects the price. Meanwhile, the liquidity traders have random,
price-inelastic demands as in the standard Kyle model. By observing aggregate order
flow, the market markers update the estimation of asset payoffs as well as the SDF
simultaneously such that their uncertainty is resolved.
Here are some implications of the equilibrium with the risk-compensated market
makers. First, the equilibrium price is a submartingale, instead of a martingale in the
standard continuous-time Kyle-type models.3 The intuition is as follows. Because
of risk compensation, on average, the price of risky assets increases as uncertainty is
resolved through insider trading before announcements. The slope of the expected pre-
FOMC drift is the negative variance between the innovation of the SDF and the asset
value. I prove a strictly positive pre-FOMC drift if and only if the market makers are
compensated for the risk of assets’ fundamentals. The positive excess return leads to
positive average order imbalances before announcements. In the meantime, to entice
the insider to trade and release information early, the market makers have incentives
to set the price impact that increases on average, implying the submartingale property
of the price impact. Second, due to the average upward drift in market prices, the
market makers rationally anticipate that the insider would trade positively on average
to chase that premium. The insider also has to consider the additional price impact
from uncertainty resolution via her trading, which is unique in this model. In the
equilibrium, instead of being zero, the expected order rate is determined by the ratio
of the pre-FOMC drift’s slope to Kyle’s lambda. Additionally, as the market makers
converge to be risk-neutral, the limit of the equilibrium is well defined and converges
to the traditional Kyle model. The equilibrium implications indicate that this paper
provides a microfoundation of how private news diffuses drive positive pre-FOMC drift
3 See Back (1992), Back and Pedersen (1998), Li (2013), and Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016), etc.
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in a standard microstructure framework.
Since uncertainty is not always reduced before FOMC meetings, I generalize the
benchmark model so that the insider may not be better informed, and the market mak-
ers assess whether the insider has private information or not. In addition to updating
their belief of asset payoffs and the SDF, the market makers estimate the probability that
insiders have private information simultaneously, which are solved by a nonlinear filter-
ing technique. Conditional on the insider being informed, the closed-form equilibrium
price is a submartingale as the benchmark when the maker makers are risk-compensated.
The growth rate of the expected pre-FOMC announcement drift and the expected in-
sider’s order rate are time-varying, caused by the dynamics of the probability estimate.
The pricing rule is nonlinear and stochastic, which drives price volatility, market depth,
and price response to be stochastic. I calibrate the model so that stochastic pricing
dynamics are consistent with both the level and the trend of the time-varying 24-hour
pre-FOMC announcement drift in the data.
Before concluding, I demonstrate that other asset market evidence around FOMC
announcements is consistent with the model’s predictions. First, empirically the pre-
FOMC drift is stronger when the uncertainty reduces more before announcements, co-
inciding with the risk-based explanation. Second, to maximize her profits, the insider
faces a tradeoff between uncertainty and liquidity. She wants to trade later such that
the market uncertainty is higher. However, she can not trade too late since she needs
substantial liquidity trading to hide her position. It explains the pre-FOMC drift’s tim-
ing that occurs 24 hours before announcements when private information is probably
known way before. Third, I document the market uncertainty decreases significantly
only before announcements with press conferences since April 2011, which explains the
two distinctive patterns to equity returns found in Boguth, Gregoire, and Martineau
(2019) and agrees with my model. Fourth, the sign of the pre-FOMC drift in the model
depends on whether the asset is risky or a hedge. The average of time-varying betas
of nominal bond is close to zero from 1996 to 2019, resulting in the absence of the
pre-FOMC drift in fixed income instruments.
5
Related literature
The paper relates to several strands of the literature. First is the large body of work
investigating the impact of asymmetric information on asset prices and price impacts,
seminal examples of which include Kyle (1985) and Back (1992).4 I build on this liter-
ature by exploring the implications of the risk-compensated market makers, which have
been largely ignored in the literature.5 The equilibrium price in this model is a sub-
martingale instead of a martingale since the resolution of uncertainty is associated with
the realizations of the premium. Meanwhile, the market makers rationally anticipate
that the insider would trade positively on average to chase that premium. The insider
also has to consider this additional price impact from uncertainty resolution when she
trades, which is unique in my model. The dynamic game between the market makers
and the insider results in a positive expected order rate from the insider that contrasts
this model to the literature. The limit of the equilibrium is the traditional Kyle model
as the market makers converge to be risk-neutral, establishing the link between this
paper and the literature.6
This paper exploits the main insight in macro-finance literature, which addresses
the importance of macroeconomic conditions to account for asset prices. Starting from
the equity premium puzzle in Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Hansen and Jagannathan
(1991), the literature has explored a wide range of alternative preferences and market
structures to account for the equity market dynamics.7 However, very little attention
has been paid to the pre-FOMC drift, which corresponds to about 80% of the annual
realized excess returns in the stock market.8 Integrating Kyle’s (1985) model into
4 A short list is Foster and Viswanathan (1996), Back and Pedersen (1998), Back, Cao, and Willard
(2000), Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010), Li (2013), Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016), Back, Crotty, and
Li (2018), Drechsler, Moreira, and Savov (2018), Dai, Wang, and Yang (2019), Crego (2020).
5 While Subrahmanyam (1991) considers risk-averse market makers under CARA utility in a one-
period Kyle model, there is no pre-announcement drift since the fundamental risk in the news is not
priced due to CARA utility.
6 This paper is also connected to inventory models, such as Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981).
They consider a risk-averse market maker that holds undesired positions and requires the compensation
in terms of a bid-ask spread. However, these papers abstract from information asymmetries. Vayanos
(2001) studies a model with risk-averse market makers that the large trader’s private information is
about her endowment shocks rather than the fundamental value of asset.
7 See reviews in Cochrane (2017).
8 Section 1.6 talks about the details of other explanations, including Hu, Pan, Wang, and Zhu
(2020), Laarits (2019), and Cocoma (2020).
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a standard consumption-based asset pricing framework, I establish a strictly positive
pre-announcement drift if and only if the market makers are risk-compensated in the
presence of insider trading. Therefore, this paper also fills the gap between macro-
finance literature and microstructure literature related to Kyle (1985).
My paper contributes to the broader literature on the premium around FOMC an-
nouncements.9 Savor and Wilson (2013) find a significant equity market return
on days with major macroeconomic announcements.10 Lucca and Moench (2015)
document the substantial stock market return during the 24-hour period preceding
FOMC announcements. Theoretically, Ai and Bansal (2018) provide a revealed prefer-
ence theory for the macroeconomic announcement premium in a representative agent
economy.11 Given the market microstructure in Kyle’s model, this paper accounts
for both the level and the trend of the pre-FOMC drift in the presence of private in-
formation when the market makers are risk-compensated. The endogenous uncertainty
reduction before announcements through insider trading agrees with the evidence doc-
umented in Hu, Pan, Wang, and Zhu (2019). This paper can be extended to study
other pre-event drifts documented in the literature. A large group of papers treats av-
erage abnormal positive excess returns before events as evidence of insider trading and
tests the market liquidity implications inspired by Kyle (1985), such as other macroeco-
nomic announcements (Kurov, Wolfe, and Gilbert (2020)), mergers and acquisitions or
earnings announcements (Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Penman (1982), and Meulbroek
9 See more discussions in section 1.1.1, section 1.5, and section 1.6.
10 Ernst, Gilbert, and Hrdlicka (2019) find the FOMC appears to stand out from the other macroeco-
nomic announcements in all their results, which has the largest point estimates for the concentration of
the equity premium. Giacoletti, Ramcharan, and Yu (2020) study the impact of FOMC announcements
on the mortgage market.
11 To account for the pre-FOMC announcement drift, Ai and Bansal (2018) assume the contents of
announcements are communicated to the public a few hours before the pre-scheduled announcements,
which leads all investors to receive informative signals before FOMC announcements. However, FOMC
members refrain from discussions of monetary policy during this period, which implies that it is almost
impossible that the public systemically receives information before announcements. Besides, the im-
plication of this assumption is not consistent with other empirical facts upon FOMC announcements.
For example, there are still monetary policy surprises (see Nakamura and Steinsson (2018)), huge trad-
ing volume as well as significant realized volatility (see Lucca and Moench (2015), Bollerslev, Li, and
Xue (2018), and Ying (2020)) after FOMC announcements. None of these can happen if all investors
know the information before announcements. Based on the generalized risk sensitivity in Ai and Bansal
(2018), Ai, Bansal, Im, and Ying (2018) and Wachter and Zhu (2018) develop quantitative models of
the announcement premium under a representative agent. Ying (2020) measures the impact of FOMC
announcements on disagreement in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous beliefs.
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(1992)), and other events (Sinha and Gadarowski (2010), Agapova and Madura (2011),
Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015)). However, in the standard Kyle-type model, the ex-
pected average excess return before announcements is zero since the market makers are
risk-neutral. Therefore, this paper provides a general theoretical framework for other
pre-event drifts out of private information as long as the risk of the event is priced in
the pricing kernel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 provides empirical evi-
dence that indicates the presence of private information before FOMC news. To provide
macroeconomic conditions for the market makers’ pricing decisions, I present the stan-
dard consumption-based asset pricing framework in section 1.2. Section 1.3 extends
Kyle’s (1985) model to the case where the market makers are risk-compensated and
characterizes the equilibrium price and insider trading. In section 1.4, I generalize the
benchmark model that the insider may not be informed, and the market makers assess
whether the insider has private information or not. Section 1.5 tests the further impli-
cations of the model. I discuss the challenges of the private information explanation
mentioned in the literature and talk about other explanations in section 1.6. Section
1.7 concludes. The Appendix contains additional details on the empirical analysis and
the proof.
1.1 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I summarize the potential sources of private information before FOMC
announcements and discuss the suggestive evidence shown in the literature. After that,
I provide asset-market-based evidence that supports the presence of private information
before FOMC news. First, I present that the market uncertainty (measured by the VIX
index) decreases significantly and systematically during the same window as the pre-
FOMC drift, as documented in Hu, Pan, Wang, and Zhu (2020). Second, sorting the
FOMC days via 24-hour uncertainty reduction before announcements into terciles, I find
that only the group with substantial uncertainty reduction preceding announcements
are associated with the positive pre-FOMC drift. Third, I document there is only
significant insider trading (measured by order imbalances) when uncertainty decreases
before announcements, which is consistent with the private information explanation.
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1.1.1 Sources of private information before FOMC meetings
The literature has provided suggestive evidence of private information before announce-
ments. The private information may be obtained by leakage. Cieslak, Morse, and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2019) propose that information about the Federal Reserve’s unex-
pected accommodating monetary policy is leaked ahead of the FOMC announcement,
which causes a pre-announcement equity market rally. Vissing-Jorgensen (2020) pro-
vides a history of leak discussions in FOMC documents to show that the FOMC itself
expresses frequent concerns about leaks. For example, the leakage led to the resignation
of Richmond Fed President Lacker following admission of her involvement in the leak
of confidential FOMC information to Medley Global Advisers in 2012. Finer (2018)
documents an abnormal number of NYC taxi rides to the district of liberty street cer-
tain times before FOMC announcements. Besides, the private information may come
from the accidental information leakage—“word-of-mouth” interpretation of informa-
tion diffusion, which has been well studied in the literature of takeovers (see Keown
and Pinkerton (1981), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Meulbroek (1992), and Augustin,
Brenner, and Subrahmanyam (2015)).
The other potential source of private information is through proprietary data col-
lection related to FOMC announcements. Given the huge market attention to FOMC
announcements, to infer what the Fed knows, institutional investors have strong motiva-
tions to obtain the information that the Fed observed and keep updating the prediction
model of monetary policy from historical data.12 Kurov, Sancetta, Strasser, and
Wolfe (2017) support this explanation by finding that proprietary information permits
forecasting announcement surprises in some cases.
1.1.2 The average cumulative VIX change and return before FOMC
announcements
To capture the changes of market expectations in a timely manner, I use the CBOE VIX
index, which is a model-free measure of implied volatility computed from the S&P 500
index option prices. For the intraday returns, I obtain transaction-level data on S&P
12 For example, institutional investors can hire the talented, well-trained economists who help the
Fed process and interpret all the information being released, as discussed in Nakamura and Steinsson
(2018).
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500 index (SPX). The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2019. During
this period, there are in total 187 schuduled releases of FOMC statements. Except 9 of
them, other releases are either around 2:15 p.m. ET (before April 2011) or 2:00 p.m.
ET (after April 2011).13 Therefore, I follow Lucca and Moench (2015) and focus on
the 2 p.m.-to-2 p.m. pre-FOMC window, which should not contain any announcement
information if there is no private information revealing.
Figure 1.1 shows the average cumulative VIX change and average cumulative return
on the S&P 500 index around FOMC announcements. The solid line of the right panel
represents the mean pointwise cumulative intraday percentage return of the SPX over a
four-day window from the market open of the day ahead of scheduled FOMC meetings
to the day after. Over the window from Day -3 through the beginning of Day -1, the
average VIX increases due to the huge uncertainty of the upcoming FOMC news. While
as shown in Table 1.2, the VIX decreases 0.3% with a t-stat of -3.4 during the 24-hour
period preceding FOMC announcements, which is consistent with Hu, Pan, Wang, and
Zhu (2020).14 Meanwhile, the cumulative pre-FOMC drift over the same window is
on average 33.2 basis points, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The significant reduction of VIX index shows the systemic uncertainty reduction
out of the revealing of FOMC news preceding announcements. However, while it is
common for FOMC members to express their views about macroeconomic developments
or monetary policy issues in meetings or conversations with members of the public, they
refrain from these discussions in the week before FOMC meetings. The 24-hour pre-
FOMC window is part of the blackout period. Therefore, the significant uncertainty
reduction in this window indicates the potential presence of private information before
FOMC announcements.
13 8 of the 9 exceptions are released around 12:30 p.m. ET from April 2011 to December 2012.
Another exception happened at 11:30 a.m. ET on March 26, 1996 because of the Chariman’s other
duties. The results hold robustly without these releases.
14 The resolution of uncertainty occurs in two stages on the FOMC day, before and after the an-
nouncement. I focus on the pre-announcement reduction of VIX, which accounts for about 50% of the
total decrease around FOMC meetings.
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1.1.3 Classification of FOMC announcements via uncertainty reduc-
tion
I sort the FOMC days by their reduction of uncertainty during the 24-hour window
before announcements into terciles. Figure 1.2 plots the cumulative VIX change and
the cumulative return around FOMC meetings for the high-reduction group and low-
reduction group, separately. The high-reduction group’s VIX index decreases 1.459%
significantly over the 2 p.m.-to-2 p.m. pre-FOMC window, which is associated with a
deeper pre-FOMC drift (94.4 basis points) than the average FOMC results, as shown
in Table 1.2. By contrast, the low-reduction group’s VIX index increases instead of
decreases before announcements and there is no positive pre-announcement drift.
This classification demonstrates that not all the FOMC announcements are the
same—only the ones with uncertainty reduction preceding announcements are associ-
ated with the positive pre-FOMC drift. Later I show this is consistent with the full
model in section 1.4 that the pre-announcement drift only occurs when the insider is
informed.
In addition to the uncertainty reduction prior to FOMC announcements, Abdi and
Wu (2018) find that corporate bond returns and trade directions before FOMC an-
nouncements predict the pre-FOMC stock market returns. Park (2019) shows that
speculators’ spread trades in bond futures have predictive information about future
FOMC meetings and concludes that private information plays a key role in explaining
the pre-FOMC drift. All of these asset-market-evidence indicates the presence of private
information before FOMC news.
1.1.4 Measurement of informed trading
Informed trading is not directly observable. Following the microstructure literature, I
measure informed trading activity by the order imbalance in the testing security defined
as B−SB+S , where B (S) is the aggregate buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) trading volume.
15
I use two measures of imbalance, OIN and OID, where volume is defined as number
of trades and dollar trading volume, respectively.
15 Ahern (2020) finds order imbalance is one of the most robust predictors of insider trading after
all controls.
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Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016) argue that the E-mini S&P 500 futures (E-mini) is
the best testing security for the pre-FOMC drift.16 Following their paper, I classify
trading volume of E-mini as buyer- or seller-initiated using the tick rule. Specifically,
a transaction is classified as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) if the transaction price is
higher (lower) than the last different transaction price. For each time window, the
corresponding order imbalance is the difference between the total buyer- and seller-
initiated volumes divided by the total trading volume.
To study the pre-FOMC drift, I examine the 24-hour window preceding FOMC an-
nouncements, [−24H, 0]. Informed trading leads to the diffusion of private information
and uncertainty reduction before announcements. Therefore, for each announcement, I
construct a categorical variable, UR, that equals positive one (negative one) when the
uncertainty reduces, and the cumulative return is positive (negative) over the 24-hour
window. UR is zero otherwise.
In Figure 1.3, for each FOMC announcement, I plot the order imbalance based
on number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume (OID) in the 24-hour window before
FOMC. When there is uncertainty reduction (UR = ±1), most order imbalances tend to
be in the direction of the realized return before announcements and large in magnitude.
While when the uncertainty does not decrease before announcements (UR = 0), the
order imbalance is smaller and largely random. Table 1.3 compares the average order
imbalances in [−24H, 0] window when uncertainty reduces before FOMC announce-
ments (UR = ±1) and when uncertainty does not reduce before FOMC announcements
(UR = 0). The average order imbalances are significantly positive on days with pre-
FOMC uncertainty reduction, which is consistent with the positive pre-FOMC drift.
The difference between the average OIN (OID) of group UR = ±1 and group UR = 0
is 1.99% (2.85%) with a t-stat of 5.11 (5.24) in the 24-hour window before FOMC,
which is not only statistically but also economically significant. The trading activity
across uncertainty-reduced and non-uncertainty-reduced announcements show notable
differences, supporting the presence of informed trading before announcements when
there is uncertainty reduction.17
16 Here are their three reasons. First, the asset underlying ES contracts is the S&P 500 index.
Second, E-mini is available for trading almost 24 hours on the Globex electronic platform of the CME.
Third, E-mini is substantially more liquid comparing to other products.
17 The same pattern holds for other pre-event windows, such as [−12H, 0] and [−24H,−12H].
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Next, I assess the statistical significance of these differences. To measure abnormal
trading activities on announcement days, I also calculate the order imbalances in the
same trading hour windows of non-announcement days in the 21 trading days prior to
the current FOMC announcement. I regress the two order imbalance measures, OIN
and OID on the announcement indicator (ANN) and the uncertainty-reduced indicator
(UR). Table 1.4 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates.
The UR coefficient estimates in Columns 1 (OIN) and 2 (OID) are positive, and
statistically significant, with t-stat of 5.61 and 4.60, respectively. When there is un-
certainty reduction, on average, in the 24-hour window, the number and dollar volume
of market orders executed in the direction of the realized pre-FOMC return exceed
those in the wrong direction by 1.85% and 2.17% of the total volume, respectively.
As shown in Columns 3-6, the similar pattern holds for other pre-event windows, such
as [−24H,−12H] and [−12H, 0]. It provides robust evidence of informed trading in
the 24-hour window before FOMC announcements when there is uncertainty reduction,
agreeing with the private information explanation for the pre-FOMC drift.18
1.2 The standard asset pricing framework
To provide macroeconomic conditions for the market makers’ pricing decisions, in this
section, I present a standard consumption-based asset pricing framework that the econ-
omy’s growth rate is not observable. Later on in section 1.3, I introduce the key elements
in the microstructure literature, including the insider, liquidity traders, and the market
makers.
18 Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016) find evidence consistent with informed trading only until about 30
minutes before scheduled FOMC announcements. After I replicate their paper, I extend their results to
[−24H, 0] and find the coefficient estimates of their surprise indicator SUR is not significantly different
from zero. The main difference is that we have different definitions of when the insider trading may
happen before FOMC announcements. They think the insider trading may only happen when the
surprise of FOMC news is large so that the insider can make huge profits. While my explanation is
based on the risk-reduction channel instead of unexpected news, the insider can make huge profits
from the uncertainty of the FOMC news, even the mean of the news is the same as expected. This is
consistent with the model’s prediction, as shown in section 1.3.
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1.2.1 Physical setup of the model
There are a large number of identical infinitely lived households in the economy. I
assume that the consumption of the representative agent, Ct, follows
dCt
Ct
= mtdt+ σCdBC,t, (1.1)
where mt is a continuous-time AR(1) process (an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process) unob-
servable to the agent in the economy. The law of motion of mt is
dmt = am (m̄−mt) dt+ σmdBm,t. (1.2)
The standard Brownian motions BC,t and Bm,t in equations (1.1) and (1.2), respectively,
are independent.
At time 0, the agent’s prior belief about m0 can be represented by a normal dis-
tribution. Although mt is not directly obeservable, the agent can use two sources of
information to update belief about mt. First, the realized consumption path contains
information about mt, and second, at pre-scheduled discrete time points T, 2T, 3T, · · · ,
additional signals about mt are revealed through announcements. For n = 1, 2, 3, · · · ,
I denote sn as the signal observed at time nT and assume sn = mnT + εn, where εn is
i.i.d. over time, and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2s .
Given the information structure, the posterior distribution of mt is Gaussian and
can be summarized by its first two moments. I define m̂t = Et [mt] as the posterior




as the posterior variance, respectively, of mt given























where m̂+nT and q
+
nT are the posterior mean and variance after announcements, and
m̂−nT and q
−
nT are the posterior mean and variance before announcements, respectively.
A special case is that the announcements can completely reveal the information about
mt, which means, σ
2
s = 0. Therefore, σ
2
s measures the transparency of FOMC announce-
ments.
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In the interior of (nT, (n+ 1)T ), the agent updates her belief based on the observed
consumption process using the Kalman-Bucy filter:













variance, q (t) satisfies the Riccati equation:
dq (t) =
[






1.2.2 Preferences and the SDF
I assume that the representative agent is endowed with a Kreps-Porteus preference with
risk aversion γ and intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ.19 In continuous time,
the preference is represented by a stochastic differential utility, which can be specified
by a pair of aggregators (f,A) such that in the interior of (nT, (n+ 1)T ),
dVt = [−f(Ct, Vt)−
1
2
A(Vt)||σV (t)||2]dt+ σV (t)dBt (1.6)
I adopt the convenient normalization A(v) = 0 and denote f̄ the normalized aggregator.
Under this normalization, f̄(C, V ) is:
f̄(C, V ) =
ρ
1− 1/ψ







The case of ψ = 1 is obtained as the limit of (1.7) with ψ → 1:
f̄(C, V ) = ρV [(1− γ) logC − log [(1− γ)V ]] .
Because announcements typically result in discrete jumps in the posterior belief
about mt, the value function is typically not continuous at announcements. Given our
normalization of the utility function, for t = nT , the pre-announcement utility and
post-announcement utility are related by:







19 In this paper, I focus on the recursive utility. I can extend it to other preferences that satisfy
generalized risk sensitivity defined in Ai and Bansal (2018).
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where E−t represents expectation with respect to the pre-announcement information at
time t.
In the above setup, I can show that the value function of the representative agent
takes the form
V (m̂, t, Ct) =
1
1− γ
H (m̂, t)C1−γt ,
for some twice continuously differentiable function H (m̂, t). The HJB equation and
the corresponding boundary conditions for H (m̂, t) can be found in Appendix. Given
the utility of the representative agent, the state price density, denoted {πt}∞t=0 can be
characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For n = 1, 2, 3 · · · , in the interior of ((n− 1)T, nT ), πt is a continuous
diffusion process with the law of motion
dπt
πt
= −r (m̂, t) dt− σπ (m̂, t) dB̃C,t,
where r (m̂, t) is the instantaneous risk-free interest rate and σπ (m̂, t) is the market
price of risk. At announcements, t = nT , πt is discountinuous, and the announcement
stochastic discount factor (A-SDF) is given by
Λ∗t,t+4 =











For convenience, I focus on unit IES ψ = 1, which results in




where γA ≡ γ−1am+ρ .
20 Moreover, the A-SDF Λ∗t,t+4 is counter-cyclical if and only if
the agent has early resolution of uncertainty, i.e., γ > 1ψ , which is equivalent to γ
A > 0
when ψ = 1.





upon announcements t =
nT will be valued by weighting the payoffs through investors’ future marginal utility
and taking expectations:
20 The proof in the appendix provides the formula of SDF for a general IES. All the main results












)]A (m̂+t , t+) |m̂−t , q−t
]
, t = nT.
When there is no private information prior to announcements, the FOMC information
is only revealed upon announcements, which results in reductions of uncertainty, and
realizations of the equity premium at, rather than ahead of, the announcements, as
shown in Ai and Bansal (2018), Ai, Bansal, Im and Ying (2018), and Wachter and Zhu
(2018).
1.3 The benchmark: risk-compensated market makers
To capture the pre-FOMC announcement drift as well as the uncertainty reduction
before announcements, I introduce the insider trading into this macroeconomic frame-
work. I extend Kyle’s (1985) model (in the continuous-time formulation given by Back
(1992)) to allow that market makers are compensated for the risk of assets’ fundamen-
tals, where the market makers estimate the discounted value of the risky asset and the
A-SDF simultaneously before announcements.
1.3.1 Model setting
The insider in the stock market observes the signal of announcements sn = xnT + εn
at t = nT − 1, which happens before FOMC announcements.21 Thus, she knows
the underlying expected growth rate m̂nT and the value of the A (m̂nT , nT ) earlier than
other investors in the market. In addition to the insider, there are liquidity traders who
have random, price-inelastic demands. All orders are market orders and are observed
by all market makers. Denote by Zt the cumulative orders of liquidity traders through
time t. The process Z is assumed to be a Brownian motion independent of εn, which
has mean zero and variance σ2z (per unit of time). Let Xt denote the cumulative orders
of the insider and set Y = X + Z.
Given the macroeconomic conditions defined in last section, from equation (1.8), the
21 In section 1.5.2, I discuss that even the insider is probably informed way before, it is optimal that
she starts to trade around the highest average market uncertainty, i.e., 24 hours before announcements
shown in Figure 1.1.
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market makers’ A-SDF at t = nT − 1 is:22
Λ∗nT−1,nT =
H (m̂nT , nT )
EnT−1 [H (m̂nT , nT )]
, (1.9)
and later on they update the estimate of the A-SDF based on the observed cumulative
order flow before announcements. The market makers, who are competitive, set the
price at time t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ] as
Pt = E
[
H (m̂nT , nT )
E
[
H (m̂nT , nT ) |FYt
]A (m̂nT , nT ) |FYt
]
, (1.10)
where I denote by FYt the information filtration generated by observing the entire past
history of aggregate order flow Y (which I denote by Y t = {Ys}s≤t). At t = nT − 1, the
market markers have a prior that the expected growth rate upon announcements m̂nT
is normally distributed N (m̂nT−1,∆Q) where ∆Q = qnT−1 − qnT , as other agents in
the economy (except the insider).23 Here 1qnT =
1
σ2s
+ 1qnT−1 from Bayes’ rule. I follow
the literature to assume the value of A (m̂nT , nT ) follows a log-normal distribution.
24
More specifically, I specify logA (m̂nT , nT ) = βm̂nT + N (nT ), where β > 0 measures
how the asset value moves with respect to the fundamental.25
Given the insider knows the expected growth rate m̂nT at t = nT − 1, there is no
uncertainty of the underlying fundamental to her since then. Thus, A-SDFinsidert,nT ≡
1 under the insider’s information set for all t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ]. In other words, the
insider is “risk-neutral” toward the news contained in announcements due to her perfect
knowledge of the underlying information.26 The insider maximizes the expectation of
22 Similar to Ai and Bansal (2018), I assume that aggregate consumption does not instantaneously
respond to the FOMC announcements. This assumption is well motivated because the announcement
returns are realized in a 24-hour window before FOMC and the consumption response, if any, at this
frequency is not likely to be significant enough to rationalize the magnitude of the premium.
23 See the proof in Lemma 5.
24 It can be extended to a general smooth distribution as shown in the proof of section 1.4 in the
appendix.
25 One example of A (m̂t, t) ≈ e
φ−1
am+e




= [m̄+ φ (mt − m̄)] dt+ φσCdBC,t, (1.11)
where we allow the leverage parameter φ ≥ 1 so that dividends are more risky than consumption, as in
Bansal and Yaron (2004). The proof is in the appendix.
26 This can be shown directly through equation (1.9) where I take the expectation under the insider’s
information set at t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ].
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her terminal profit:













(A (m̂nT , nT )− Pt) θtdt|FYnT−1, A (m̂nT , nT )
]
. (1.12)
In addition to the entire past history of aggregate order flow Y , the insider knows the
actual value of the stock A (m̂nT , nT ), and, of course, her own trading. Following Back
(1992), I assume that the insider chooses an absolutely continuous trading rule dXt =











the dynamics of aggregate order flow Y is the sum of the insider’s demand the liquidity
traders’ demand:
dYt = θtdt+ dZt.
1.3.2 The equilibrium
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a price process and an admissible trading strategy,
(Pt, θt), that satisfy the market makers’ rationality condition (1.10) while solving the
insider’s optimality condition (1.12).
The introduction of the risk-compensated market makers leads to the following main
difference comparing to the standard Kyle model and related extensions in the litera-
ture.27 Instead of only estimating the (discounted) value of the risky asset, the
market makers also update the A-SDF simultaneously before announcements based on
the observed cumulative order flow. In the standard Kyle model, the risk-neutral market
makers only estimate the value of A (m̂nT , nT ) and set the price
PKylet = E
[
A (m̂nT , nT ) |FYt
]
, (1.13)
In equilibrium, PKylet must be a martingale under market makers’ information set. While
when market makers are compensated for the risk of assets’ fundamentals, the pricing












27 See Kyle (1985), Back (1992), Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016), Back, Crotty, and Li (2018), etc.
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where Vt and Λt are the market makers’ estimation of H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) and
H (m̂nT , nT ), respectively. In equilibrium, both Vt and Λt are martingales under market
makers’ information set. However, the pricing rule probably not. Later I will show Pt
is a submartingale with respect to the market makers’ information if and only they are
compensated for the risk of assets’ fundamentals. The intuition is that the uncertainty
of underlying fundamental is resolved gradually after observing aggregate order flow,
which is associated with the realization of the premium when the market makers are
compensated for risk-taking.
To solve for an equilibrium, I proceed in a few steps. First, in Lemma 2, conditional
on a conjectured insider’s trading strategy, I derive the stock price dynamics consistent
with the market makers’ filtering. Then, given the assumed dynamics of the equilibrium
price, I solve the insider’s optimal trading strategy that is captured in Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4. Finally, I show that the conjectured rule by the market makers is indeed
consistent with the insider’s optimal choice, as stated in Theorem 1.
Lemma 2. ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ], suppose the insider adopts the following trading strategy
θt =





where µP = βm̂nT−1 + N (nT ), σ
2
v = β
2∆Q, and λ = σvσz . Then the market makers’




































and the adjusted order flow Ŷt
Ŷt ≡ Yt −
∫ t
nT−1
θ̂s ds = Yt −
γAβ∆Q
λ
[t− (nT − 1)] , (1.19)
is a Brownian Motion with instant variance σ2z with respect to the market makers’
filtration FYt .
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When market makers are risk neutral, aggregate order flow Yt at equilibrium is a
martingale under the market makers’ information set, as shown by Back (1992). In
other words, the market makers are to set the pricing rule such that the expected order
rate from the insider is zero. While market makers are risk averse to the underlying
fundamental (i.e., γA > 0), equation (1.18) indicates that the expected insider’s order
rate under the market makers’ filtration FYt is strictly positive. Here is the intuition
behind this result. The information from aggregate order flow resolves market makers’
uncertainty before FOMC announcements. Since they are compensated for risk-taking,
the equity premium realized gradually during this period. This leads to an average
upward drift in market prices. Therefore, market makers would expect an average
positive trading volume from the insider to chase that premium. Besides, the insider
has to consider this additional price impact from uncertainty resolution when they trade,
which is unique in this model.
The above analysis implies aggregate order flow Yt at equilibrium is no longer a
martingale under FYt when γA > 0. More importantly, since the average positive order
flow from the insider is expected, market markers would update their estimates from
the adjusted order flow Ŷt instead of aggregate order flow Yt. Thus, I suppose that there
exists an equilibrium with two state variables: time t and the adjusted order flow Ŷt.




, the insider chooses the
order rate to maximize her trading profit. That is,





































where the subscripts denote the derivatives. The necessary conditions for having an
optimal solution to the Bellman equation (1.22) are




σ2zJyy − θ̂tJy = 0. (1.24)
These necessary conditions lead to the following results.




, where Ŷt is the adjusted
order at t. Let ωt = y and suppose that the stochastic differential equation
dωs = dZs −Θ (s, ωs) ds, ∀nT ≥ s ≥ t ≥ nT − 1




there exists a strictly monotone function g (·) such that the pricing rule is
P (t, y) = E [g (ωnT )|ωt = y], (1.25)
then
J (t, y, A (m̂nT , nT )) = E [j (ωnT , A (m̂nT , nT )) |ωt = y] , (1.26)
is a smooth solution to the Bellman equations (1.23) and (1.24), where
j (y,A (m̂nT , nT )) =
∫ g−1(A(m̂nT ,nT ))
y
[A (m̂nT , nT )− g (x)] dx ≥ 0, ∀ (y,A (m̂nT , nT )) .




= A (m̂nT , nT )
is optimal, where P (t, y) is as defined by equation (1.25).
Having established these results, I can now proceed to characterize the equilibrium
price and the insider’s optimal strategy. The equilibrium I obtain, which constitutes
the main results of this paper, is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ], there exists an equilibrium where the price process Pt






















28 Note that ωt is the adjusted order when the insider does not submit orders.
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where Ŷt, PnT−1, µP , σv, and λ are defined in Lemma 2. The expected insider’s order
rate under FYt is defined in equation (1.18).


















−A (m̂nT , nT ) +A (m̂nT , nT )
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converges almost surely to A (m̂nT , nT )
at time t = nT . When the market makers are risk-compensated, with respect to the mar-









are submartingales with a constant growth rate γAβ∆Q.








= γAβ∆Q (t− (nT − 1)) . (1.30)
This implies there is a strictly positive pre-FOMC announcement drift if and only if the
market makers are compensated for the risk of assets’ fundamentals, i.e., γA > 0.
I now comment on several implications of the theorem. First, the equilibrium price
is a submartingale, expected to increase over time. This contrasts my framework from
much of the literature. They find the price dynamics is a martingale under the risk-
neutral market makers since they are indifferent, to resolve the uncertainty now or in the
future. While when market makers are risk compensated, the resolution of uncertainty
is associated with the realizations of the premium. The positive expected pre-FOMC
announcement premium is cumulated at a constant rate γAβ∆Q, which is the negative
covariance between the innovation to the A-SDF and the asset value. Intuitively, the
pre-annoucement drift would be larger: (1) when market mares are more risk-averse
to the underlying fundamental; (2) the asset value has a lager exposure to the FOMC
news; (3) more transparent FOMC announcements which reduce more uncertainty. In
addition, the equilibrium price converges to the value A (m̂nT , nT ), known ex ante only
to the insider, at FOMC announcements. This guarantees all of the private information
is eventually incorporated into the price and generalizes the result proved in Back (1992)
under the risk-neutral market makers.
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Second, I find when the market makers are risk averse to the underlying fundamental












which is strictly positive. This is very different form the Kyle model, where the expected
insider’s order rate is always zero. Here is the intuition. Due to the average upward
drift in market prices, the market makers rationally anticipate that the insider would
trade positively on average to chase that premium. The insider also has to consider the
additional price impact from uncertainty resolution when she trades, which is unique in
this model. The equilibrium expected insider’s order rate is determined by the ratio of
the expected pre-FOMC announcement premium per unit of time (γAβ∆Q) to Kyle’s
lambda (λ). Therefore, the abnormal order imbalances are on average positive when
there is private information before FOMC announcements. In addition, the insider
would on average trade more aggressively when market mares are more risk-averse to
the uncertainty or FOMC announcements are more transparent, which is caused by the
higher realized equity premium per unit of time. In the meantime, when noise traders
are more active, the insider on average trades more due to the smaller price impact,
which has been largely missed in the Kyle-type models.29




is a also submartingale, which grows at the same
rate the equilibrium price. The risk-averse market makers benefit from uncertainty
resolution out of observing aggregate order flow. Therefore, to entice the insider to
trade and release information early, the market makers have incentives to set the price
impact that increases on average. Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) is one of the few papers
that achieve the same result through a different channel that comes from the insider’s
potential benefit to wait for better liquidity with stochastic noise trading volatility.30
29 The only exception is Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) that derive the same result by assuming
noise trading volatility follows a general stochastic process.
30 The price impact is constant in Kyle (1985). In extensions of that model Back (1992), Back
and Pedersen (1998), Baruch (2002), Back and Baruch (2004), Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010), price
impact is either a martingale or a supermartingale. Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) points that Foster
and Viswanathan (1996) and Back, Cao, and Willard (2000) may also generate an increase in the
deterministic price impact, at least near the end of the trading horizon, because of competition among
multiple informed traders.
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Fourth, when the market makers converge to be risk-neutral, the limit of the equi-
librium is well defined and converges to the traditional Kyle model (more precisely,
converges to Back (1992)). When γA converges to zero, the expected insider’s order
rate θ̂t converges to zero, which implies aggregate order flow Yt converges to a mar-









converge to martingales. This implies the expected pre-announcement drift converges
to a flat line, as in Back (1992). The convergence result demonstrates that there is a
strictly positive pre-FOMC announcement drift if and only if the market makers are
compensated for the risk of assets’ fundamentals, i.e., γA > 0, as proved in Theorem 1.
1.3.3 Properties of equilibrium
Having characterized the equilibrium, in this section, I study the equilibrium properties
and map the model to asset market fluctuations before FOMC announcements.
The following proposition captures the uncertainty reduction prior to announcements
in the equilibrium from Theorem 1.
Proposition 1. With respect to the market makers’ filtration FYt , ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ],









= −β2∆Q [t− (nT − 1)] . (1.32)
Thus, prior to announcements, the uncertainty reduces at a constant rate β2∆Q per
unit of time.
So far, ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ], I explicitly characterize the expected pre-FOMC an-
nouncement drift and the implied variance reduction in equations (1.30) and (1.32),
respectably. I take the macroeconomic parameters from Ai and Bansal (2018) and cal-
ibrate the risk aversion and the transparency of announcements to match the level of
cumulative return and uncertainty reduction upon announcements.31 The parameters
are reported in Table 1.1. I call this case as the benchmark where the market makers are
risk-compensated. For comparison, I study another case where I keep other parameters
the same and assume the market makers are risk-neutral, which is equivalent to the
original Kyle model with a log-normal distribution of the asset value (see Back (1992)).
31 See the full model calibration in section 1.4.3.
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Figure 1.4 depicts the model implications for the benchmark case (the dotted red
line) and the Kyle case (the dashed blue line) as a function of time, respectively. Panel A
plots the implicated variance changes before announcements defined in equation (1.32),
which are the same for both cases.32 This is because the implicated variance reduc-
tion only depends on the risk exposure β, which is not a function of γA. However, the
expected pre-FOMC announcement excess returns are very different, as shown in Panel
B. When the market makers are risk-compensated, the expected pre-announcement
drift has a constant positive rate as captured in equation (1.30). The expected pre-
announcement drift is literally zero with the risk-neutral market makers. Panel C com-
pares the expected insider’s order rate under the market makers’ information set, which
is strictly positive with the risk-averse market makers as captured in equation (1.31).
Panel D plots the average realized pre-FOMC announcement excess returns that are
computed from parallel simulations, respectively. This is consistent with my previous
discussion that there is a strictly positive pre-FOMC announcement drift if and only if
the market makers are compensated for the risk of assets’ fundamentals.
I follow the empirical procedure—the tick rule to calculate the order imbalances
in the model. The aggregate buyer-initiated (OIB) and seller-initiated (OIS) dollar








respectively. Thus, the order imbalances are OIB−OISOIB+OIS . Figure 1.5 shows the distribution
of the order imbalances for the benchmark and the Kyle model. The average of the
order imbalances in the benchmark is 0.85%, which is statistically significant at the 1%
level. The significant positive order imbalances come from the positive excess return
before FOMC announcements. While in the Kyle model, the average is not significantly
different from zero that is not consistent with data.
So far, I compare the proprieties of average variables in the benchmark to the Kyle
model. To have a better understanding of the equilibrium in Theorem 1, the following
proposition emphasizes the differences between the two cases under any realized path
of Zt.
32 For convenience, I match the level of the cumulative change of the V IX2 instead of the V IX
displayed in Figure 1.1.
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Proposition 2. Under the same realization path of Zt, the difference between the price
Pt in the benchmark (γ
A > 0) and the price PKylet in Kyle (γ
A
Kyle = 0) increases at a
constant rate:
logPt − logPKylet = γAβ∆Q [t− nT ] , ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ] ,
which converges to zero upon announcements. Meanwhile, the difference between the
aggregate cumulative trading flow Yt and Y
Kyle
t increases at a constant rate:
Yt − Y Kylet =
γAβ∆Q
λ
[t− (nT − 1)] , ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ] .
Figure 1.6 plots the log price dynamics and aggregate trading volume for the bench-
mark case (the dotted red line) and the Kyle case (the dashed blue line) under one
realized path of Zt.
33 Panel A and B plot the dynamics of the log price and the
aggregate trading flow as a function of time, repetitively. The two cases show similar
patterns of fluctuations, which are consistent with the linear differences in Panel C and
D. When the market makers are risk-averse to the underlying fundamental, the initial
price PnT−1 has to be lower to attract them to hold the assets. The difference of the
price converges to zero since all of the private information is eventually incorporated
into the price for both cases, i.e., PnT = P
Kyle
nT = A (m̂nT , nT ) almost surely. The insider
in the benchmark trades more aggressively to chase the realized premium, which results
in the larger aggregate trading volume over time.
1.4 Full model: the insider may not be informed
Figure 1.2 indicates that not all FOMC announcements are the same—some are not
associated with uncertainty reduction prior to announcements. Motivated by this fact,
I extend the above model to the case that the insider may or may not be informed of
the signal sn before announcements.
34 In the meantime, the market makers are not
sure whether the insider observes the signal or not. The market makers share a common
belief that such an event, in which the insider observes this information earlier than the
33 Note that although Figure 1.6 plots only one realized path of Zt, it represents the typical situation
in the model.
34 This extension is based on Li (2013), which extends Back (1992) to study the insider trading with
uncertain informed trading. He keeps the assumption of the risk-neutral market makers.
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public, occurs with a probability πnT−1 ∈ (0, 1) at time 0. Therefore, in addition to
the discounted value of the risky asset and the A-SDF, the market makers also have
to update their estimate of the probability that the insider has private information of
FOMC announcements.
1.4.1 Model setting
Let Xδ,t denote the net orders from the insider trader. Then the total cumulative order
flow Yt can be expressed as
Yt = Xδ,t + Zt,
where δ is an indicator function, which is equal to 1 if the insider has information and
is equal to 0 otherwise. By observing this order flow, the market makers update their
estimates about the probability that the insider possesses private information and the
value of the risky security. Let F0,t = FYt × {δ = 0} under the hypothesis δ = 0 and





of the probability that the insider has private information at time t.
If the insider does not have any private information (δ = 0), she has no informa-
tion other than what the market makers have. Therefore, ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ], the best
estimate of the security’s value is
v̄∗ ≡ E
[
H (m̂nT , nT )
E [H (m̂nT , nT ) |F0,t]




E [H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) |F0,t]




where I define V̄ and Λ̄ as the estimate of H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) and A (m̂nT , nT )
under the case that the insider is not informed, respectively.
If the insider has private information (δ = 1), the value estimate of the risky security
at time t conditional on δ = 1 is
v∗ (t) ≡ E
[
H (m̂nT , nT )
E [H (m̂nT , nT ) |F1,t]




E [H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) |F1,t]





where I define V (t) and Λ(t) as the estimate ofH (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) andA (m̂nT , nT )
under the case that the insider is informed, respectively.
With the uncertainty of δ, the market makers estimate the discounted value under
the information structure F1,t and estimate the probability that the insider has observed
private information under the information structure FYt . Given these two estimates,
the market makers set the price that follows
P (t) = E
[
H (m̂nT , nT )
E
[
H (m̂nT , nT ) |FYt










H (m̂nT , nT ) |FYt
] ,
=
π (t)V (t) + (1− π (t)) V̄
π (t) Λ (t) + (1− π (t)) Λ̄
. (1.36)
Note that when the market makers know the insider is always informed (πnT−1 = 1),
the market makers set the price as
P (t) = E
[
H (m̂nT , nT )
E [H (m̂nT , nT ) |F1,t]
A (m̂nT , nT ) |F1,t
]
,
which goes back to the benchmark model in section 1.3.
I impose the following restriction on the market makers’ value estimates V (t) and
















P 2 (s) ds
]
<∞,
which is sufficient to rule out the so-called doubling strategy that the insider could use.35
1.4.2 The equilibrium
Definition 2. An equilibrium is an quadruple (X0, X1, P,Π) such that
35 See Back (1992) and Li (2003) for more details.
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1. both X0 and X1 are the optimal trading strategies of the insider when she has not
or has observed private information, respectively, given P (t) and Π;
2. P (t) = Π(t)V (t)+(1−Π(t))V̄
Π(t)Λ(t)+(1−Π(t))Λ̄ is the stock price at time t, where V (t) and Λ (t) are
the market makers’ value estimates of the risky security and SDF conditional on
δ = 1, and Π (t) = π (t), is the market makers’ probability estimates that the
insider has private information, given the insider trader’s trading strategies X0
and X1.

























Ṽ is the insider’s perfect knowledge of H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ).
36 When the insider









θ (s, V ) ds+ Zt. (1.37)
From the market makers’ point of view, the cumulative order flow has two possible












if the insider is not informed.
The following assumption imposes that when the insider is not informed, she will
not take a dramatically different trading strategy. Otherwise, her trading behavior may
36 Note that the order rate of the insider should also depend on the market makers’ pricing rule
or some other state variable(s). I omit such state variables in the expression of the order rate because
what these variables are is not clear yet. Besides, both of the estimation of H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT )
and A (m̂nT , nT ) rely on the belief updates of m̂nT . In other words, inferring one of V (t) and Λ(t) is




as a function of t and V (t).
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immediately reveal that she does not have private information for a specific FOMC
announcement.37
Assumption 1. When the insider is not bettered informed, she maximizes the following





H (m̂nT , nT )
E [H (m̂nT , nT |FnT−1)]








(v̄∗ − Ps) θsds.
Given the observation of the cumulative order flow, the market makers update the
probability that the insider has private information, the A-SDF, as well as the discounted
value of the security conditional on the insider is informed. These estimates are done by
solving a nonlinear filtering problem. The equilibrium is summarized in the following
theorem (proved in the Appendix).
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ], there exists an equilibrium
(X0, X1, P,Π) that follows:
(1). The market makers’ probability estimate Π (t, y) is




























(2). The pricing rule P (t, y) has dynamics
P (t, y) = PnT−1










+ 1−Π (t, y)









σ2v(t−(nT−1)) + 1−Π (t, y)
, (1.41)
where PnT−1, σv, and λ are defined in Lemma 2;
(3). The insider’s trading strategy Xδ (t, y) satisfies
X1 (t, y) =
∫ t
nT−1









37 It is possible that the insider observes a private signal, indicating that the terminal value is v̄∗.
Under this case, since the insider has no information advantage comparing to market makers’ prior, I
interpret it as the insider having no private information.
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= θ̄ (t, y) +
(














m̂nT−1+H (nT )+N (nT ) is the mean of log [H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT )].
The expected order rate of the insider θ̄ (t, y) under the market makers’ filtration FYt
satisfies










λ Π (t, y)E (t, y)−Π (t, y) (1−Π (t, y))
y−ȳ
nT−t (E (t, y)− 1)
Π (t, y) · E (t, y) + 1−Π (t, y)
,
(1.43)












The adjusted order flow Ŷ1,t starts from 0 and follows
dŶ1,t =
(










where Ṽ = H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) when informed and Ṽ = V̄ when not informed.
The above theorem shows that the benchmark’s main results still hold when I ex-
tend the model with the potential better-informed insider.38 Conditional on the
insider is better informed, the equilibrium price dynamics is a submartingale when the
maker makers are risk-compensated. Both the growth rate of the expected pre-FOMC
announcement drift and the expected insider’s order rate are time-varying, which are
caused by the dynamics of the probability estimate. In addition, the pricing rule is
nonlinear and stochastic, which drives price volatility, market depth, and price response
to be stochastic.
1.4.3 Properties of equilibrium and model calibration
The stochastic pricing rule in Theorem 2 gives me the hope to match the nonlinear
pre-FOMC announcement drift in the data. In this section, I study the equilibrium
properties and calibrate the model to the pre-FOMC drift that occurs 24 hours before
announcements.
38 When the insider is always better informed, i.e., πnT−1 = 1, the equilibrium goes back to the
benchmark model in section 1.3. When the market makers are risk-neutral, the equilibrium goes back
to Li (2013).
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Proposition 3. For any smooth distribution of the prior G (πnT−1), the average realized







where the expectation is taken over all states of natural and η is the fraction of insider













Here the expectation is also taken over all states of natural.
Proposition 3 captures the average realized pre-FOMC drift and the average un-
certainty reduction just before announcements in the presence of the potential better-
informed insider. The intuition is as follows. When the insider is not informed, the







and the price PnT− equals PnT−1 almost surely. Besides, there is no uncertainty reduc-
tion since the insider has no information other than what the market makers have at
t = nT − 1. While when the insider is better informed, all of the private information is
eventually incorporated into the price, which is associated with uncertainty reduction.
The probability estimate converges to 1 and the price converges to A (m̂nT , nT ) almost
surely upon announcements.
The closed-form solutions in Theorem 2 and Proposition 3 generate a precise map-
ping from the model’s parameters to the asset market evidence before FOMC announce-
ments. The calibration is summarized in Table 1.1. I choose the fraction of insider that
is informed η across these FOMC announcements to be 0.5, consistent with Figure 1.2.
Besides, I assume the market makers prior π0 ≡ 0.2 to match the nonlinear trend of the
pre-FOMC announcement drift.39 I set σm = 0.43% to match the level of the average
cumulative pre-FOMC announcement excess return. All other parameters are the same
as the benchmark.
Figure 1.7 plots the average uncertainty reduction and the average realized pre-
FOMC drift 24 hours before announcements in the model and in the data. The black
39 Note that the evolution of the probability estimation is endogenously determined in the model,
which affects the trend of the pre-FOMC announcement drift.
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lines represent the fluctuations in the data. To examine the overnight price dynamics,
I calculate the pre-FOMC drift by E-mini instead of the S&P 500 index. VIX is only
allowed to trade during regular trading hours between 9:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. ET
before April 2016.40 There is no overnight data. Thus, I plot the implied variance
reduction from 3 hours before announcements comparing to that 24 hours before FOMC
announcements.41
The dotted red lines indicate the case under calibrated parameters. For comparison,
I also show the case under the risk-neutral market makers (the dashed blue lines) and
keep other parameters the same. Both cases match the uncertainty reduction pretty
well. However, only under the risk-averse market makers, there is a strictly positive
pre-FOMC announcement drift that is consistent with the data. Besides, the dotted red
line matches the nonlinear trend of the pre-FOMC drift pretty well that the cumulative
return grows faster when approaching FOMC announcements. The intuition behind
this is the following. When the insider is informed, as time goes by, the cumulative
order flow reveals more private information that speeds up the probability estimation
of the market makers. It results in a faster uncertainty reduction, which is associated
with the deeper pre-FOMC announcement drift.
I follow equation (1.33) to calculate the order imbalances in the model. Figure 1.8
plots the distribution conditional on whether the insider is informed or not. When the
insider is informed, the average of the order imbalances is significantly positive due to
the positive excess return before announcements. When the insider is not informed, the
average is not significantly different from zero. These model implications are consistent
with the empirical facts shown in Figure 1.3.
1.5 Further implications
In addition to the uncertainty reduction before announcements shown in section 1.1,
I demonstrate that the asset market fluctuations around FOMC announcements are
consistent with the model’s predictions. First, I provide empirical support that the
40 In April 2016, Cboe began dissemination of the VIX Index outside of U.S. trading hours so that
it can be traded during “extended trading hours” between 3 a.m. and 9:15 a.m ET.
41 I can extend the implied variance change to 5 hours before announcements if I delete the FOMC
announcements that happen at 12:30 p.m. ET. The same pattern holds.
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pre-FOMC announcement drift is consistent with the risk-reduction explanation before
announcements from private information in my model, instead of unexpectedly good
news. Second, I explain the timing of pre-FOMC drift that occurs 24 hours before an-
nouncements when private information is probably known way before. Third, I explain
the two distinctive patterns to equity returns on days with an FOMC announcement
since April 2011, documented by Boguth, Gregoire, and Martineau (2019). Fourth, I
show that my model can reconcile with the auxiliary puzzle documented in Lucca and
Moench (2015)—the absence of the pre-FOMC drift in fixed income instruments.
1.5.1 Risk-reduction explanation before FOMC announcements
My model predicts that a more substantial uncertainty reduction is associated with the
stronger pre-FOMC drift. In Figure 1.2, I already show that the pre-FOMC drift only
exists when there is uncertainty reduction before announcements. To more formally
assess the impact of uncertainty reduction on the excess stock market returns prior to
FOMC announcements, I run the following regression
Cum. Returnt = α+ β∆VIXt + εt,
where both ∆VIXt and Cum.Returnt are calculated from 2 p.m on pre-announcement
date to announcement time windows, and t represents each FOMC announcement. As
shown in Table 1.5, on average when VIX decreases 1 percent before FOMC news, the
cumulative return increases 51.3 basis points.42 In terms of the high-reduction group,
since the constant term α is not significantly different from zero, the single variable
uncertainty reduction can fully account for the pre-FOMC drift, which is consistent
with my model.
To understand stock-bond dynamics, Cieslak and Pang (2020) decompose daily in-
novations in stock returns and yield changes into 4 orthogonal sources of news: growth
news (cash-flow risk), monetary news (pure discount-rate risk), hedging premium news
(compensation for cash-flow risk), and common premium news (compensation for discount-
rate risk). They find risk-premium shocks generate 69% of the average FOMC-day in-
crease (split into 36% and 33% contributions of the common premium and the hedging
42 This is consistent with the simple dummy variable regression model in Table 1.6, which indicates
the change of VIX before announcements itself can explain a large fraction of the pre-announcement
drift.
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premium, respectively).43 This is consistent with my model’s mechanism—along with
the uncertainty reduction out of insider trading, the pre-FOMC drift is determined
by the negative covariance between the innovation to the A-SDF (compensation for
discount-rate risk) and the asset value (compensation for cash-flow risk).
The information channel I emphasize is consistent with recent work by Nakamura
and Steinsson (2018).44 They find that Federal Reserve announcements affect beliefs
not only about monetary policy but also about economic fundamentals. Both of the
two measures of monetary policy surprises constructed by Nakamura and Steinsson
(2018) are indifferent from zero on average. Cieslak and Pang (2020) also show that
the average growth news component is close to zero and conclude that the FOMC days
are not associated with systematically positive or negative news about the economy.
Therefore, the pre-FOMC announcement drift can not be driven by unexpectedly good
news.
1.5.2 The timing of the pre-FOMC announcement drift
To fully account for the pre-FOMC announcement drift, timing is another puzzle that
needs to be explained: Why does it occur 24 hours prior to announcements when private
information is probably known way before?
I extend the benchmark model such that the insider knows private information
earlier than 24 hours before FOMC announcements and chooses when to start to trade
so that she can maximize her profits. Figure 1.1 shows the market uncertainty increases
from Day -3 and does not decrease until the insider starts to trade 24 hours prior
to FOMC announcements.45 The insider’s expected profit out of the asymmetric
information increases in the market’s uncertainty because the insider has relatively
more private information when the market is nosier. Given that market uncertainty
increases before FOMC announcements, the insider would like to trade later instead of
trading immediately when receiving private information. However, she can not trade
43 This number will be higher if they focus on the pre-FOMC drift instead of daily close-to-close
returns since there should be no monetary policy shock before announcements.
44 Jarocinski and Karadi (2020) find similar results—ignoring the central bank information shocks
biases the inference on monetary policy nonneutrality. The effect will be stronger if they focus on the
pre-FOMC period.
45 Consistent with the empirical fact, the uncertainty keeps increasing before announcements in the
model as long as the insider has not started to trade, which is captured by equation (1.5).
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too late since she needs a large amount of liquidity trading to hide her information.
Otherwise, the profit will be smaller. It implies that the insider faces the trade-off
between uncertainty and liquidity when she decides when to start to trade. Under
my current calibration, the insider optimally chooses to start to trade 24 hours before
announcements to maximize the expected profits. Therefore, my paper also explains
the timing of the pre-FOMC drift, which is another important feature of the pre-FOMC
puzzle.
1.5.3 Two distinctive patterns to equity returns: press conferences
Since April 2011, the Chair of the FOMC has been giving a press conference at every
other FOMC meeting.46 At these meetings the FOMC also releases the summary of
its members’ economic projections (SEP), so that three forms of communication take
place: the FOMC statement, the SEP, and the press conference with the Chair.
Boguth, Gregoire, and Martineau (2019) study the impact of the press conferences
and find that the pre-FOMC drift is limited to announcements with press conferences
since April 2011. Figure 1.9 shows the average cumulative return on the S&P 500 index
on two-day windows with and without press conferences from April 2011.47 The
left top panel shows the VIX index with press conferences decreases significantly before
announcements with an average 25.4 basis points pre-FOMC return. Besides, the VIX
index keeps decreasing after FOMC announcements indicating the high uncertainty
associated with press conferences. However, the return before announcements without
press conferences is not significantly different from zero. Meanwhile, the VIX index
almost does not change before and after announcements.
The two distinctive patterns emphasize only when the upcoming FOMC announce-
ments are informative (i.e., with significant uncertainty resolution), there is a pre-FOMC
drift.48 It agrees with my model that the asymmetric information is less influential
when the FOMC news is not informative.49
46 From January 2019, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve holds a press conference after each
meeting.
47 From April 2011, some FOMC announcements happen before 2 p.m. The same pattern holds
when I precisely capture the timing of all FOMC announcements.
48 These results are consistent with findings in Boguth, Gregoire, and Martineau (2019) that an-
nouncements on days without press conferences convey less price-relevant information.
49 This explanation agrees with Kurov, Sancetta, Strasser, and Wolfe (2019). They conclude the
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1.5.4 The absence of the pre-FOMC drift in fixed income instruments
In this section, I show my model can explain the apparent lack of the pre-FOMC drift in
fixed income instruments. In the model, there is a positive (negative) pre-announcement
drift if the risk exposure β of the asset to the underlying fundamental is positive (nega-
tive). In other words, the sign of the pre-FOMC drift in the model depends on whether
the asset is risky or a hedge.
Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2017) and Campbell, Pflueger, and Viceira (2020)
document that nominal Treasury bonds changed from risky (positively correlated with
stocks) in the 1980s and 1990s to safe (negatively correlated with stocks) in the first
decade of the 2000s. The average of time-varying betas of nominal bond is close to
zero from 1996 to 2019, which results in the absence of the pre-FOMC drift in fixed
income instruments. My results agree with Cieslak and Pang (2020), which find the
reduction in the common premium is offset by a decline in the value of the hedging
premium, making the overall bond market response economically small and statistically
insignificant on FOMC days.
1.6 Discussion
Section 1.1 provides empirical support and discusses potential sources of private infor-
mation prior to FOMC announcements. In this section, I discuss the challenges that the
private information explanation faces in the literature. After that, I talk about other
explanations.
1.6.1 Challenges of the private information explanation
Most mentioned challenges of the private information in the literature are related to con-
sistently positive FOMC news, such as Lucca and Moench (2015), Bilyi (2018), Laarits
(2019), and Cocoma (2018). However, this paper studies the resolution of uncertainty
via private information results in an upward drift in market prices even if the private
news is on average neutral. Therefore, their arguments do not apply to this framework.
For example, they argue that if the drift is caused by private information, the realized
weaken of the average pre-FOMC drift since April 2011 comes from the lower uncertainty.
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pre-announcement return should predict with a positive sign that the market response
to the announcement. While my model predicts there is no correlation between the pre-
FOMC returns and announcement returns, which is supported in Luuca and Moench
(2015).50
Besides, as shown in section 1.4, the model only requires that the insider is informed
for some FOMC announcements instead of all of them. This is consistent with Figure
1.2 that uncertainty reduction only happens before some FOMC announcements, which
is associated with the pre-FOMC drift.
1.6.2 Other explanations
Hu, Pan, Wang, and Zhu (2020) and Laarits (2019) contribute the pre-FOMC drift to
uncertainty reduction before FOMC news in a representative-agent framework. Though
their stories are risk-based as this paper, there are two main differences: (1) The market
news carries two different types of risks, and only one type of risk is resolved before
FOMC announcements. (2) All investors observe the resolved information at the same
time, i.e., there is no asymmetric information caused by private information.51 Both
papers face the challenge of explaining that there is no uncertainty resolution for some
FOMC announcements and the pre-FOMC drift’s timing. In addition to that, their
models predict substantial post-announcement returns when the other risk is resolved.
However, the post-FOMC announcement return is not significantly different zero, as
documented in Lucca and Moench (2015).
To account for the pre-FOMC drift, Cocoma (2020) studies a model where both
the risk and disagreement are very low before announcements and very high after an-
nouncements. However, the risk pattern is the opposite of Hu, Pan, Wang, and Zhu
(2020), that find the risk (measured by the VIX index) starts to increase six days before
announcements, then decreases from 24 hours before FOMC news until the end of days
50 Section 24.5 of Back (2017) shows the insider trades more slowly than in the standard model since
the insider considers the effect of her trades on the price. This can potentially explain why the trading
volume is lower before FOMC announcements.
51 The two risks are different in these two papers. In Hu, Pan, Wang, and Zhu (2020), the uncertainty
about the potential magnitude of the news’ market impact is resolved before announcements, while the
risk associated with the news realization itself is resolved upon announcements. Laarits (2019) assume
there are two types of announcements the Fed will make, which will reveal either monetary policy stance
or long-term growth expectations. All investors learn the type of announcements before FOMC news,
which resolves part of the uncertainty.
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with announcements. Also, Ying (2020) shows that both call and put open interest de-
crease significantly at the end of days with announcements, which can not be explained
by higher disagreement after FOMC news.
1.7 Conclusion
The substantial stock market return before announcements when the FOMC members
refrain from discussions of monetary policy information provides a notable challenge to
standard asset pricing theory. In this paper, I propose and test the private information
explanation to account for the pre-FOMC announcement drift. When the uncertainty
reduces before FOMC, the abnormal order imbalances are 1.85-2.17% higher in the
direction of the realized return in the 24-hour window before FOMC announcements.
It provides evidence consistent with informed trading when the pre-FOMC drift oc-
curs. I integrate Kyle’s (1985) model into a standard consumption-based asset pricing
framework where the market makers require compensation for the risk of assets’ funda-
mentals. Insider trading resolves uncertainty gradually and results in an upward drift in
market prices, even the private news is on average neutral. The limit of the equilibrium
is the traditional Kyle model as the market makers converge to be risk-neutral. The
convergence result demonstrates a strictly positive pre-FOMC drift if and only if the
market makers are compensated for the risk of assets’ fundamentals.
This paper provides a general framework to account for other pre-event drifts. A
large group of papers treats average abnormal positive excess returns before events as
evidence of insider trading and tests the market liquidity measure inspired by Kyle.
While in the standard Kyle-type models, the expected average excess return before
announcements is zero due to the risk-neutral market makers. Therefore, this paper
provides a general theoretical framework for other pre-event drifts if the risk of the
news is priced in the pricing kernel. The different equilibrium implications comparing
to the standard Kyle-type models offer new insights into how private news affects asset
prices, volatility, volume, and market liquidity. I leave these interesting directions for
future work.
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Figure 1.1: The average cumulative VIX change and return around FOMC
announcements
This figure shows the average cumulative VIX change and average cumulative return on the S&P 500
index on four-day windows from 1996 to 2019. The solid line of the left (right) panel is the average
cumulative VIX change (average cumulative return of the SPX) from 9:30 a.m. ET on three days prior
to scheduled FOMC announcements to 4:00 p.m. ET on days with scheduled FOMC announcements
(labeled as Day 0). The blue (red) solid line indicates the VIX change (cumulative return of the SPX)
on the 2 p.m.-to-2 p.m. pre-FOMC window. The gray shaded areas are pointwise 95% confidence bands
around the average. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2019. The dashed vertical
line is set at 2:00 p.m. ET, when FOMC announcements are typically just released or 15 minutes before
the release.
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Figure 1.2: Classifications of FOMC meetings: sort on the reduction of
uncertainty
This figure shows the average cumulative return on the S&P 500 index on two-day windows for the high
group and low group, respectively, where I sort the reduction of uncertainty in the 24-hour pre-FOMC
window into terciles. The blue (red) solid line indicates the VIX change (cumulative return of the SPX)
on the 2 p.m.-to-2 p.m. pre-FOMC window.
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Figure 1.3: Measurement of informed trading: order imbalance












































This figure shows the order imbalance based on number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume (OID)
of E-mini in the 24-hour window before FOMC announcements. Red (blue) bars represent the order
imbalance when the uncertainty reduces, and the cumulative return is positive (negative) over the 24-
hour window, i.e., UR = 1 (UR = −1). Black bars represent the average order imbalance when the
uncertainty does not reduce in the 24-hour window before FOMC announcements.
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Panel D: Realized pre-FOMC announcement drift
This figure shows the model implications for the cases with the risk-compensated market makers (Bench-
mark) and the risk-neutral market makers (Kyle) as a function of time, respectively. Panel A plots the
implied variance change before announcements. Panel B plots the expected pre-FOMC announcement
excess return. Panel C plots the expected insider’s order rate under the market makers’ filtration FYt .
Panel D plots the average realized pre-FOMC announcement return, which is computed from 10,000
parallel samples. The parameters are reported in Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.5: Model implications: order imbalances
This figure shows the distribution of the order imbalances for the cases with the risk-compensated
market makers (Benchmark) and the risk-neutral market makers (Kyle). I simulate 50,000 times in the
frequency of one minute and winsorize the order imbalances at the 10th and 90th percentiles to mitigate
the effect of outliers. The parameters are reported in Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.6: Model implications: under one realized path of Zt
Time
Panel A: Log price
Time
Panel B: Aggregate trading volume
Time
Panel C: Diffference of log price
Time
Panel D: Diffference of aggregate trading volume
This figure shows the model implications for the cases with the risk-compensated market makers (Bench-
mark) and the risk-neutral market makers (Kyle) as a function of time, under one realized path of Zt.
Panel A plots the dynamics of the log price. Panel B plots the aggregate trading flow. Panel C plots
the difference of log price logPt − logPKylet . Panel D plots the difference of the aggregate trading flow
Yt − Y Kylet . The parameters are reported in Table 1.1.
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Realized Pre-FOMC announcement drift
This figure plots the average uncertainty reduction and the average realized pre-FOMC drift 24 hours
before announcements in the model and in the data. The dotted red lines and the dashed blue lines indi-
cate the cases with the risk-averse market makers and the risk-neutral market makers, respectively. The
black lines show the change of V IX2 and the cumulative return of E-mini around FOMC announcements
in the data. The parameters are reported in Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.8: Model implications: order imbalances
This figure shows the distribution of the order imbalances in the model conditional on whether the
insider is informed or not. I simulate 50,000 times in the frequency of one minute and winsorize the
order imbalances at the 10th and 90th percentiles to mitigate the effect of outliers. The parameters are
reported in Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.9: Classifications of FOMC meetings: press conferences
This figure shows the average cumulative return on the S&P 500 index on two-day windows with and
without press conferences from April 2011 to December 2019. The blue (red) solid line indicates the
VIX change (cumulative return of the SPX) on the 2 p.m.-to-2 p.m. pre-FOMC window.
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Table 1.1: Parameters
The model is calibrated at annually frequency. I assume the prescheduled announcements happen





long run output growth rate m̄ 1.50%
volatility of aggregate consumption σC 3.16%
persistence of the AR(1) process am 4.5%
volatility of the AR(1) process (benchmark) σm 0.30%
volatility of the AR(1) process (full model) σm 0.43%
Uncertainty and asset value
the transparency of announcements σ2s 1.6× 10−5
the exposure of the risky asset β 3
Preference
risk aversion γ 6.6
elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ 1
subjective discount factor ρ 0.005
Parameters in the full model
prior of the probability that the insider is informed πnT−1 0.2
fraction of the informed insider across announcements η 0.5
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics on S&P500 Index Excess Returns and Changes
in VIX.
Note: This table reports summary statistics for the pre-announcement day 2 p.m (−1) –
announcement (ann) and announcement – close changes in VIX (∆VIX) and cumulative excess
returns on the S&P500 (Cum.Return). The close time is 3:55 p.m. The samples are: (1) All FOMC
announcements, (2 and 3) FOMC announcements sorted on uncertainty, which is first and third
tertiles of changes in VIX (∆VIXt−1) between open and 2 p.m on pre-announcement dates, and (4 and
5) FOMC announcements with and without FOMC Press Conference. “Sharpe ratio” is the annualized
Sharpe ratio on FOMC announcement returns. The sample period is from 1996:01 to 2019:11, and
from 2011:04 for press conference sample. “No. of FOMC” is the number of FOMC in each subset.
t-statistics for the mean are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10%.
(1) All
Sort on Uncertainty Press Conference
(2) High (3) Low (4) Yes (5) No
∆VIX (%)
2 p.m (-1)-ann -0.300∗∗∗ -1.459∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ -0.734∗∗∗ -0.072
(-3.402) (-14.020) (5.485) (-5.213) (-0.465)
ann-close -0.318∗∗∗ -0.246∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.203∗ -0.035
(-4.405) (-1.819) (-3.288) (-1.773) (-0.181)
No. of FOMC 187 61 63 34 35
Cum.Return (%)
2 p.m (-1)-ann 0.332∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗∗ -0.154 0.254∗∗∗ 0.014
(5.636) (9.016) (-1.671) (3.314) (0.158)
ann-close -0.030 -0.064 0.063 0.099 -0.157
(-0.446) (-0.478) (0.603) (1.090) (-1.328)
No. of FOMC 187 61 63 34 35
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Table 1.3: Compare the order imbalances conditional on FOMC announce-
ment indicators.
Note: This table compares the level of order imbalances of the E-mini Standard & Poor’s 500 futures
in the 24-hour window before FOMC announcements. OIN is the order imbalance defined as B−S
B+S
,
where B (S) is the aggregate buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) trading volume as measured by number
of trades. OID is calculated similarly using dollar trading volume. For every FOMC announcement, I
calculate the average level of order imbalances in the 24-hour window before FOMC with and without
uncertainty reduction. Column (1) reports the average level of order imbalances on announcements
with the pre-FOMC uncertainty reduction (UR = ±1). Column (2) reports the average level of order
imbalances on announcements without the pre-FOMC uncertainty reduction (UR = 0). Column (3)
reports the difference between columns (1) and (2). The sample period is from 1996:01 to 2019:11.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10%.
UR = ±1 UR = 0 Difference
(1) (2) (3)
OIN(%) 1.272∗∗∗ -0.719∗∗∗ 1.991∗∗∗
(4.22) (-2.91) (5.11)
OID(%) 1.789∗∗∗ -1.056∗∗∗ 2.845∗∗∗
(4.21) (-3.13) (5.24)
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Table 1.4: Order imbalances conditional on FOMC announcement indicators.
Note: This table reports ordinary least squares estimates of the relation between event-time order
imbalances in the E-mini Standard & Poor’s 500 futures market and announcement day indicators.
For each FOMC announcement, the sample includes the announcement day (ANN = 1) and
non-announcement days in the prior 21 trading days or since the last announcement (ANN = 0).
OIN is the order imbalance defined as B−S
B+S
, where B (S) is the aggregate buyer-initiated
(seller-initiated) trading volume as measured by number of trades. OID is calculated similarly using
dollar trading volume. Both dependent variables are calculated in three event windows: [-24H, 0],
[-24H, -12H], and [-12H, 0], where zero is the official release time of the FOMC announcement and the
time unit is an hour. The uncertainty-reduced indicator, UR, is equal to one (negative one) for
announcements that the pre-FOMC realized return is positive (negative) under uncertainty reduction
before FOMC and zero otherwise. The sample period is from 1996:01 to 2019:11. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10%.
[-24H, 0] [-24H, -12H] [-12H, 0]
(1) OIN (2) OID (3) OIN (4) OID (5) OIN (6) OID
Constant -0.047 -0.154∗∗ 0.210∗∗ -0.065 -0.104 -0.182∗∗
(-0.98) (-2.29) (2.23) (-0.49) (-1.52) (-1.98)
ANN -0.222 -0.073 -0.562 -0.319 -0.172 -0.019
(-0.87) (-0.20) (-1.11) (-0.45) (-0.47) (-0.04)
UR 1.851∗∗∗ 2.167∗∗∗ 2.097∗∗∗ 2.213∗∗ 1.694∗∗∗ 2.052∗∗∗
(5.61) (4.60) (3.20) (2.39) (3.55) (3.21)
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Table 1.5: Returns on the S&P500 Index
Note: This table shows results for regressing the changes in VIX (∆VIX) on the cumulative excess
returns on the S&P500 (Cum.Return), Cum. Returnt = α+ β∆VIXt + εt where both ∆VIXt and
Cum.Returnt are calculated from 2 p.m on pre-announcement date to 2 p.m on announcement date
windows, and t represents each FOMC announcement. The samples are: (1) All FOMC
announcements, (2 and 3) FOMC announcements sorted on uncertainty, which is first and third
tertiles of changes in VIX (∆VIXt−1) between open and 2 p.m on pre-announcement dates, and (4 and
5) FOMC announcements with and without FOMC Press Conference. The sample period is from
1996:01 to 2019:11, and from 2011:04 for press conference sample. “Obs.” and “No. of FOMC” are
the number of observations and amount of FOMC in each subset, respectively. t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent 1%, 5%, and 10%.
(1) All
Sort on Uncertianty Press Conference
(2) High (3) Low (4) Yes (5) No
∆VIX -0.513∗∗∗ -0.603∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.460∗∗∗
(-16.387) (-5.775) (-8.405) (-4.646) (-7.672)
Constant 0.170∗∗∗ 0.056 0.207∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.021
(4.374) (0.319) (2.700) (-0.031) (-0.390)
Obs. 187 61 63 34 35
No. of FOMC 187 61 63 34 35
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Table 1.6: S&P500 Index Return Time-Series Regressions.
Note: This table reports results for regressions of the time-series of pre-FOMC announcement returns
on various explanatory variables for the sample period 1996:01 to 2019:11. The dependent variable is a
time-series of cumulative excess returns on the S&P500 from 2 p.m on days before announcement to 2
p.m on days of scheduled FOMC announcements. The first independent variable in Column (1) and
(2) is Pre-FOMC dummy (DFOMC), which is equal to one when a scheduled FOMC announcement has
been released in the following 24-hour interval and zero otherwise. The second independent variable in
Column (2) is the interaction of changes in VIX and Pre-FOMC dummy (∆VIX×DFOMC). “Sharpe
ratio” is the annualized Sharpe ratio on FOMC announcement returns. “Obs.” and “No. of FOMC”
are the number of observations and amount of FOMC in each subset, respectively. t-statistics are









Sharpe Ratio 1.14 1.14
Obs. 5899 5899
No. of FOMC 187 187
Chapter 2
A Model of Market Discipline
2.1 Introduction
Crucial to the goal of corporate value maximization is the disciplinary role of markets
on aligning investors’ and managers’ incentives. Even though infrequently tapped for
capital, markets invisibly guide management’s use of resources, as serially poor judgment
eventually necessitates costly refinance. The degree to which this channel operates,
however, is an open question. How strong is it and how does it manifest itself? More
broadly, how do agency and financial frictions jointly affect firm behavior and can they
be altered? In spite of the importance of these questions concerning the efficacy of
markets, a framework suitable for studying them has proved challenging.
In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap. We do so by developing a quantitative
model that combines a dynamic agency problem with internal and costly external fi-
nance.1 In the model, investors anticipate refinancing’s effect on management’s
incentives and thus judiciously choose it given the firm’s history. Managers understand
this and, therefore, it affects their behavior today and subsequent real outcomes, which
in turn feeds back into investors’ expectations. We call this equilibrium effect market
discipline.
Our paper makes two major contributions. First, by formalizing the interaction
1 If only costly financing were specified, markets would have no scope to affect management’s already
optimal behavior. If only an agency conflict were present, instances of costly refinancing would be left




between financial and agency frictions, we provide a unified framework for assessing
the role of markets in shaping cash holdings, investment, payouts, compensation, and
whether to refinance a firm or let it fail. Second, we derive a general formula that
connects the relative sizes of agency conflicts and financial frictions to the relative
allocation of free cash flow across investors and managers:
Size of Agency Conflict
Size of Financial Friction
∝ Marginal Cost of Delaying Payouts to Investors
Marginal Cost of Delaying Payments to Managers
.
For intuition, consider a firm with scarce cash holdings. Here the marginal cost of
delaying payouts to investors is low as the likelihood of costly refinancing is large, and
preferably avoided altogether. Any payments made to managers, during which agency
conflicts are muted, must then correspond to a financial distortion. The idea is akin to
using a supply shock to identify a demand elasticity and analogously implies that agency
conflicts can be inferred using payouts. Thus, we show that the scale at which managers
or investors are differentially paid are informative about the relative magnitude of these
underlying frictions.
It is useful at this point to take a step back into the model setup of Section 2.2 to
better understand our headline results. To separate interests and motivate their desire
to grow the firm beyond the optimal size, we allow managers the possibility of consuming
private benefits that are increasing in firm assets and resources (Jensen (1986)). Their
private consumption comes at the expense of their effort to increase asset efficiency
and enhance the probability of firm survival. Investors therefore write a contract that
continually provides managers with the incentive to choose the appropriate action.
The contract is history-dependent and acts as the bridge through which managers
internalize investors forward-looking rational expectations. The dynamics of managerial
incentives, in turn, influence several firm policies including refinancing, and not just the
nearest refinancing event but over all those that potentially could occur afterwards.
Our model’s solution described in Section 2.3 takes the form of a partial differential
equation summarized by two state variables, each normalized by assets: cash holdings
and managers’ stake, which measures their effective ownership of the firm and proxies
for both compensation and the (inverse) agency problem in this dynamic environment.
The model endogenizes four decision thresholds that collectively provide lower and upper
bounds for each of these states: (1) when investors collect payouts out of cash versus
(2) when the firm is refinanced; and (3) when management receives payments versus (4)
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when the firm is liquidated. A key challenge that we overcome is thus determining the
value of the solution jointly with the shape of the state space.
Firms strive to reach the state where positive free cash flow is freely paid to both
investors and managers; that is, the upper thresholds (1) and (3) apply. At this joint
upper boundary, the general formula holds explicitly and with equality in our setup.
It equates the allocation of free cash flow across players to the ratio of two lingering
marginal costs: a tax penalty to holding cash in the firm and managers’ relative impa-
tience to investors. This ratio also defines the linear span of a second-best frontier that
bounds from above and is tangent to the endogenous state space. Novelly, we quan-
tify the size of agency conflicts and financial frictions as proportional to the distance
between the upper thresholds and the frontier.
Next, moving away from the joint upper boundary (where (1) and (3) hold) to along
one upper boundary (where (1) or (3) holds) implies one distortion will remain minimal
while the other is aggravated. The boundary’s shape is therefore informative on the
relative frictions that firms currently face and naturally extends to relative allocation of
free cash flow, thus closing the step in understanding the origins of the general formula.
Our measurement approach has advantages over those obtainable in classic agency
or financial friction models. First, classic models measure frictions as deviations from
first-best, which may be neither attainable nor serve as a reasonable benchmark. Second,
they often make comparisons implicitly based on market values that are influenced by
hard-to-measure discount rates. By contrast, we measure relative to the second-best
frontier and we do so with quantities of cash flows that are readily observable. That
payouts and payments can be observed with simple accounting data is an appealing
feature with empirical potential, but is not within this paper’s scope to pursue.
More broadly, a burgeoning literature studies the impact of financing frictions on the
economy. It is unclear that in developed economies, however, that these are the utmost
concern since capital markets are quite deep. Instead, we argue that agency frictions
are likely to be more onerous. Indeed, our calibrated model of Section 2.4 suggests that
they are nearly 10 times more severe than financial frictions in the United States. This
is because while cash can simply be accumulated to minimize financing frictions, it is
double-edged as it exacerbates the alignment of managerial incentives.
Part of our calibration is done internal to the model and targets moments in the data
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that speak to the rich features of market discipline—payouts to investors, managerial
compensation, and frequencies of refinancing and liquidation, among others—outcomes
that are obviously important to corporate finance and firm value maximization but have
been little, if at all, studied together in modern structural models.
We then proceed to evaluating model counterfactuals in Section 2.5 by conducting
steady state analysis in the spirit of Hopenhayn (1992) by examining how the stationary
distribution shifts in response to a change in parameter. The stationary distribution
encodes all of the information about the stochastic environment and policy functions of
the model solution and is therefore an ideal object to study.
Among other analysis, we examine a policy counterfactual where we lower the cor-
porate tax rate from 30 to 21 percent and raise the external cost of finance from 50 to
150 basis points, which could be implemented with a small tax on the event of refinanc-
ing. In effect, lower corporate taxes help offset the cost that investors would otherwise
bear for a refinancing tax and further allows them to allocate additional cash flow to
mitigating agency conflicts. While subject to caveats that we discuss in the paper, we
find that its stationary equilibrium mimics an economy where relative agency frictions
are reduced by third.
Literature
Our paper analyzes the capital market implications of dynamic agency.2 As in
DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2012), we analyze investment in the context of a
dynamic agency model. In their paper, the optimal contract relaxes agents’ incentive
constraint following a history of good shocks, which raises the marginal benefit of in-
vesting in more capital. However, in this paper the distinction between internal and
external sources of finance are left unexplored, therefore ignoring the ex ante effect that
discrete instances of refinancing have on agents’ incentives.
Zwiebel (1996) critiques that a recurring, and problematic, feature of traditional
agency models is that a “discipliner” is present ex ante yet absent ex post. Often in
these models the discipliner sets constraints (for example, debt) that ex ante restrict
2 A partial list is Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Quadrini (2004), Dow, Gorton, and Kr-
ishnamurthy (2005), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), Biais, Mariotti,
Plantin, and Rochet (2007), Ai and Li (2015), Morellec, Nikolov, and Schürhoff (forthcoming), Boualam
(2019), Ward (2019), and Tong and Ying (2019).
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managers’ future decisions. If instead the discipliner were present ex post, management
could still be restricted even though constraints were never set. He argues that the
correct formulation of constraints, whether ex ante or ex post, is dynamically consistent,
as they are in our model. Our contribution here is that our paper studies a broader
range of corporate policies in the context of quantitative model.
Hartman-Glaser, Mayer, and Milbradt (2019) study moral hazard’s effect in an
environment where the firm accumulates cash, similar to ours. They show that when
cash holdings are low, firms transfer cash flow risk to managers, hoping to minimize
their desire to divert cash. In addition, they show that permitting the payments of
small, negative wages to managers allows them to solve the model as a function of only
one state variable. In contrast, we solve the model with two states without resorting to a
restricted problem. Another novelty of our paper is that the event of refinancing itself is
endogenous, a key feature in isolating the market’s disciplinary effect on management’s
behavior.
Our theory complements the literature on financing constraints.3 Bolton, Chen,
and Wang (2011a) show that the marginal value of cash affects investment, external
financing, and risk management. Specifically they show that cash holdings follow a fixed
double barrier policy. The lower bound has the firm either refinancing or liquidating,
depending on the choice of parameters. In contrast, our double barriers are dependent
on the level of management’s incentives, allowing us to study the interaction between
financial and agency frictions. In addition, the important decision whether to let the
firm refinance or fail is endogenous to our model.
Our paper contributes to the literature on misallocation and the measurement of
distortions.4 Pioneered by Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow
(2009), a large part of the literature has focused its determinants such as financial
frictions (for example, Moll (2014), Midrigan and Xu (2014), and Gopinath, Kalemli-
Ozcan, Karabarbounis, and Villegas-Sanchez (2017)). Our model, in contrast, jointly
determines financial frictions with agency conflicts, a feature largely ignored in the
3 A short list is Gomes (2001), Whited and Wu (2006), Hennessey and Whited (2007), Riddick and
Whited (2009), Rampini and Viswanathan (2010), Nikolov and Whited (2014), Milbradt and Oehmke
(2015), and Belo, Lin, and Yang (2018).
4 An incomplete list is King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Buera, Kaboski, and
Shin (2011), Asker, Collard-Wexler, and de Loecker (2014), Haltiwanger, Kulick, and Syverson (2018).
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literature. We thus provide a new rationale that possibly contributes to the mysterious
decline in US allocative efficiency (Bils, Klenow, and Ruane (2020)).
2.2 Model
Here we present the model’s setup. We first describe the firm’s technology and how
managerial effort affects its efficiency. We then introduce the flow equation for resources
and costs of external financing. We finally discuss the agency problem and close the
setup within the contracting environment.
2.2.1 Technology, Free Cash Flow, and Management’s Effort
Capital, K, is used to produce output and evolves according to the standard accumu-
lation equation
dKt = (It − δKt)dt, (2.1)
where I is gross investment and δ ≥ 0 is the rate of depreciation. Following the literature
on q theory (Hayashi (1982) and Abel and Eberly (1994)), investment incurs adjustment
costs G(I,K), allowing us to write the total cost of investment as I +G(I,K).
Free cash flow is the cash flow available to distribute to investors after paying taxes
at rate τY and paying for the investment and expenses required to maintain the firm’s
existing operations. After optimally choosing and compensating freely adjustable labor
(non-management), free cash flow is determined by a constant returns to scale technol-
ogy:5
dYt = (1− τY )dAtKt − Itdt−G(It,Kt)dt. (2.2)
Asset productivity is determined by management’s unobservable effort, et ∈ {0, 1}:
dAt = etµdt+ σdZt, (2.3)
5 For a given capital stock and with freely adjustable labor, L, the firm solves the static problem
maxL(1 − τY )(atKαt L1−αt − wLLt), where at is a productivity shock and wL is the wage rate which
could be stochastic. The optimal labor choice will be proportional to capital. The productivity shock
dAt used elsewhere thus depends on at, wL, and α.
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where dA is a productivity shock with drift etµ ≥ 0 that varies with a standard Brownian
increment dZ scaled by volatility σ > 0. Effort (et = 1) enhances profits and the
likelihood of firm survival. However, because only dA will be observable and contractible
to investors, the extent to which management can hide their effort choice and shirk
(et = 0) will scale with σ.
Even though the economic environment is iid, policies dictating the firm’s experience
under the optimal contract will be path dependent. Notably, the firm’s cash flow history,
which is in part determined by managerial effort, will affect equilibrium outcomes such
as refinancing.
2.2.2 Internal Resources, Distributions, and Costly Refinancing
Donaldson (1984) describes a firm’s resources as “the aggregate purchasing power avail-
able to management for strategic purposes during any given planning period.” They
are thus not limited to pecuniary things and could reflect the sophistication of business
networks or even the operational efficiency of the firm—any of these could be squan-
dered by managers. To empirically construct a law of motion, however, we restrict them
to be only cash holdings.
Cash held at time t is denoted by Ct and the flow equation is
dCt = dYt + τY δKtdt+ r(1− τC)Ctdt+ dFt − dDt. (2.4)
Holdings increase with the firm’s free cash flow, dY , and depreciation tax shield, τY δK.
The risk-free rate of return the firm earns on its uninvested resources, r(1−τC), reflects a
penalty on cash holdings. Funds can additionally be acquired through external financing
or distributed to investors at any time.
Let Ft and Dt denote the cumulative (nondecreasing) funds acquired and dispensed
by the firm up to time t and dFt and dDt as the respective incremental changes in
these policies over the time interval (t, t+ dt). When financing externally and receiving
funds from financial markets, firms face explicit underwriting costs and implicit costs, as
investors naturally question managers’ intended use of funds and the potential change
to their incentives.
Modeling these costs are complicated but to provide an environment in which we
can calibrate a model we follow Gomes (2001) who summarizes the costs of external
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financing with a fixed cost Φ and a marginal cost φ.6 Together these costs imply that
firms will only intermittently tap markets for funds and, when they do, raise a finite
amount. To ensure firms do not outgrow financing costs, we follow Bolton, Chen, and
Wang (2011a) and assume both costs scale with capital as informational or incentive
costs or the effects of dilution are likely to be proportional to firm size. We denote the
cumulative costs of external financing up until time t by Xt and its incremental change
as dXt.
Because financing costs scale with capital, our model provides a better approxima-
tion to the behavior of large firms, as information asymmetries between insiders and
outsiders are likely greater and vary more among small firms that often have shorter
track records. Moreover, we calibrate issuance costs to equity and not debt markets,
as equity issuances are more likely to be informationally sensitive. Homogeneity, im-
portantly, makes the model tractible and Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent (2009) provide
empirical support for it among large firms in Compustat.
Refinancing is not the only decision investors can make for they can also choose to
let the firm fail and liquidate it. To distinguish these cases, we now turn to describing
the contract between investors and managers.
2.2.3 Investors’ and Management’s Contract and Termination
Investors hire a management team to run the firm and write a contract that can be
terminated at any time. Investors have unlimited wealth and are risk neutral and
therefore discount at the risk-free rate r. Managers are also risk neutral but discount at
rate γ > r.7 They have no initial wealth and limited liability so investors cannot pay
negative wages to them. At the termination time τ investors receive a fraction of assets
and cash: 0 < lK , lC ≤ 1 of capital and resources, altogether recovering lKKτ + lCCτ .8
Managers receive their outside option, normalized to zero.
6 We do not solve for the optimal external financing policy jointly with the optimal incentive contract.
Rather, incentives are made compatible given this particular institutional structure of financing costs.
7 This traditional assumption captures either their assumed impatience or in reduced-form the
presence of outside investment opportunities available to them. While γ = r may be a more neutral as-
sumption, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) argue a contract can be made more robust by having investors
assume that γ is higher than managers’ true γ.
8 Losing a fraction of resources is consistent losses in bankruptcy. In the broader Donaldsonian
interpretation of resources, losses could reflect managers’ network or specific knowledge of the inner
workings of the firm. Shue (2013) documents the importance of executive peers within a MBA cohort
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When management exerts no effort (et = 0) they enjoy private benefits at rate
Λ (Kt, Ct) dt. Managers deriving benefits from capital, Λ(K, ·), agrees with the long
literature on empire building. There are several reasons for why they would also be
expected to grow in resources, Λ(·, C). First, cash may provide funds for managers to
invest in projects which offer private benefits but do not contribute to shareholder value.
Because effort improves the return of productive assets (Et[dAt] = etµdt) , no effort here
can be viewed as putting effort into valueless projects that only managers enjoy. Second,
more often than not, a cash-rich company runs the risk of being prodigal. And finally,
large cash holdings remove some pressure on management to perform. Ultimately, that
this function increases in both arguments is consistent with the thesis of Jensen (1986)
and the international evidence on cash holdings and agency conflicts in Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith, and Servaes (2003).
We assume the capital stock Kt, cash Ct, and cumulative free cash flow Yt are observ-
able and contractible. From (2.1) and (2.2), investment It and cumulative productivity
At can therefore be contracted upon. Investors maximize firm value by offering a con-
tract that specifies investment, refinancing, and payout policies, {I}, {F}, and {D},
management’s cumulative payments, {U}, and a termination (stopping) time, τ , all of
which depend on the entire history of productivity At. Limited liability requires U to
be nondecreasing. We let C = (I, F,D,U, τ) represent the contract.
Given the contract, management chooses an effort process {et ∈ {0, 1} : 0 ≤ t < τ}
to solve





e−γt (dUt + Λ (Kt, Ct) (1− et)dt)
]
, (2.5)
where Ee[·] is the expectation operator under the probability measure induced by their
effort choices. Their expected utility is composed of the present discounted value of
compensation and private benefits only when taking action et = 0.
At the time the contract is initiated, the firm has K0 units of capital and C0 units
of cash. Given an initial payoff W0 to managers, the problem investors face is





e−rt(dDt − dFt − dXt − dUt) + e−rτ (lKKτ + lCCτ )
]
s.t. C is incentive compatible and W (C) = W0. (2.6)
in explaining firm policies that do not necessarily contribute to firm productivity.
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The value to investors is the expected present discounted value of payouts, dD, less
funds injected dF at cost dX and payments to managers dU , plus what they recover in
liquidation.9
Management’s payoff W0 is determined by their relative bargaining power (De-
Marzo and Sannikov (2006)). If managers possess all power, then WM0 ≡ max{W :
P (K0, C0,W ) ≥ 0}. If however investors have all power, W I0 ≡ argmaxW≥0 P (K0, C0,W ).
More generally, we blend the two extremes with a parameter ψ ∈ (0, 1) by setting
W0 = ψW
M
0 + (1− ψ)W I0 .
Incentive Compatible Contract
We focus on the case where the contract is incentive compatible and implements the
efficient action et = 1 for all t. Given this contract and history up until time t, man-







Note the collapse of the expectation operator Ee[·] to the one that agrees with investors’
expectation E[·]. Rational expectations on behalf of both parties has management
internalizing investors’ expectations and investors offering a contract consistent with
those expectations. This model feature makes it dynamically consistent and formalizes
the notion of market discipline affecting management’s behavior ex ante.
Standard dynamic contracting theory decomposes management’s incremental total
compensation at time t into incremental payments, dUt, and incremental continuation
payoff, dWt (Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Sannikov (2008)). The optimal contract
compensates management for their time preference on average; the analogous promise
keeping condition is Et [dWt + dUt] = γWtdt. Furthermore to maintain incentive com-
patibility, management’s compensation must remain sufficiently sensitive to the firm’s
free cash flow, dYt. Following DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), we formulate this sensi-
tivity, βt, with the martingale representation theorem:
dWt + dUt = γWtdt+ βt (dYt − Et [dYt]) = γWtdt+ βt(1− τY )σKtdZt. (2.8)
9 Notice that payments to managers dU are not subtracted from dC in (2.4). We thoroughly discuss
this alternative setup in Appendix B. In our setup, we are implicitly assuming that firms do not refinance
to pay managers current payments, like bonuses.
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Agents who deviate reduce their compensation by βt(1−τY )µKtdt and receive private
benefits Λ (Kt, Ct) dt. Incentive compatibility is thus implemented with βt(1−τY )µKt ≥
Λ (Kt, Ct). Because liquidation is ex post inefficient and therefore costly to enforce, the




for all t. (2.9)
Intuitively, the optimal sensitivity is a ratio of private benefits to capital’s expected
return potential and provides a nexus among free cash flow, compensation, capital, and
cash holdings.
An important assumption is that the shocks to agents’ continuation utility are all
local; that is, for a given C, K, and W , the instantaneous forward distribution of 2.8
across two different economies are identical. Of course, firm value is generally not, and
therefore dynamics will in general differ. This assumption is how we choose to model
market discipline as an indirect force that invisibly guides managers’ behavior.
Given the functional form of Λ(·) it naturally implies that for a given beneficial
shock to free cash flow (dZt > 0), greater capital or resources are associated with larger
increases in managers’ compensation, consistent with Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier
(2008). In contrast, a series of negative shocks will result in either refinancing or else
the termination of the contract and liquidation of the firm. For example if incentives
have become too poor, investors will decide not to refinance the firm and let it fail. We
now formalize this important decision while discussing the solution to our model.
2.3 Model Solution
Here we describe some properties of the solution to (2.6). Management’s continuation
payoff Wt in (2.7) is a state variable that summarizes management’s current incen-
tives that reflect their expected path of compensation and the likelihood of contract
termination. Capital Kt captures the history of investment via (2.1). The firm’s cash
holdings Ct track the histories of refinancing and payouts. Altogether, whatever the
history of the firm up until date t, the only relevant state variables are Kt, Ct, and Wt
and, therefore, investors’ value function at time t, P (Kt, Ct,Wt), can be solved with a
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation.
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We assume that adjustment costs, G(I,K), and private benefits Λ(K,C) are ho-
mogeneous of degree one in their arguments. The total cost of investment is thus
I + G(I,K) = Kg(i), where i = I/K is the investment rate, and we specify private
benefits to take a linear form
Λ(K,C) = Kλ(c) = K (λK + λCc) (2.10)
that separates the agency friction attributed to capital (λK) and resources (λC). Homo-
geneity allows us to reduce the problem to two endogenous state variables—managers’
stake (their scaled continuation payoff), w = W/K, and scaled cash holdings, c =
C/K—and write p(c, w) = P (K,C,W )/K.
Common to risk neutral models, investors optimally choose investment to equate









subject to the incentive compatibility constraint β ≥ λ(c)/((1 − τY )µ) from (2.9) and
(2.10). This equation’s solution is jointly determined with the boundaries that, when
present, determine refinancing, payouts to investors, payments to managers, and con-
tract termination.
In what follows we first present the solutions to models nested by our complete
model as they are simpler yet still informative. We begin with the first-best model,
then the model without an agency conflict followed by one without costly refinancing,
before building to our complete model.
2.3.1 First-Best Solution
In the first-best economy there are neither agency (Λ(·) = 0) nor financial ((Φ, φ) =
(0, 0)) frictions, management always chooses to exert effort, and the firm holds no cash
and pays free cash flow out immediately. Because the economic environment is iid




(1− τY )µ− g(i)
r + δ − i
. (2.12)
10 We assume µ < g(r + δ) and qFB > lK to have a well-defined problem.
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In this economy, the classic Hayashi (1982) result equates average Q and marginal
q to investment’s marginal cost to solve for optimal investment:
g′(iFB) = qFB =
(1− τY )µ− g(iFB)
r + δ − iFB
. (2.13)
Finally, because our managers are relatively impatient, it is best to pay them im-
mediately, leaving PFB(K,W ) = qFBK − wK to investors.
2.3.2 Cash Management With No Agency Conflict
In the absence of an agency friction (Λ(·) = 0), management will always choose to exert
effort. The only state variable is scaled cash holdings, c = C/K, implying firm value
per unit of capital, p(c), only depends on c, and the setup is similar to Bolton, Chen,
and Wang (2011a). We follow their exposition when it is always optimal to refinance
the firm.
Because of the fixed issuance cost, the firm will want to minimize instances of refi-
nancing and will therefore only do so when resources reach zero. When refinancing, the
firm receives a total issue amount of f > 0 per unit of capital. Because firm value is
continuous before and after issuance, value matching at the refinancing boundary c = 0
holds:
p(0) = p(f)− Φ− (1 + φ)f. (2.14)
The right side is the firm’s post-financing value less fixed issuance costs Φ and propor-
tional financing costs φ. Because f is optimally chosen, smooth pasting equates the
marginal value of the last dollar raised p′(f) to one plus the marginal financing cost,
p′(f) = 1 + φ. (2.15)
Conversely, because holding cash in the firm is penalized at rate τC , the firm will
distribute it to investors when abundant. Formally, let c denote this endogenous payout
boundary and for c > c we have the equation p(c) = p(c)+(c−c). Because this equation
holds continuously, the limit c→ c is summarized by the derivative
p′(c) = 1. (2.16)
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Intuitively, at c the firm is indifferent between distributing and retaining one dollar,
so the marginal value of cash must equal one. Since the payout boundary is optimally
chosen, we also have the super contact condition holding at this point
p′′(c) = 0. (2.17)
To summarize, incremental payouts dD occur when c ≥ c and incremental financing
dF is received when c = 0. Within these boundaries both dD and dF are zero and the
dynamics of (2.1) and (2.4) imply, by Ito’s lemma, that the evolution of scaled cash
holdings is
dct = [(1− τY )µ− g(it) + τY δ + (r(1− τC)− (it − δ))ct]dt+ σ(1− τY )dZt. (2.18)








p′′(c)σ2(1− τY )2 for c ∈ [0, c] (2.19)
subject to the boundaries (2.14), (2.15), (2.16), and (2.17) that jointly pin down the
location and optimality of the refinancing and payout decisions concerning f and c. The





where its marginal cost is equated to its marginal benefit; namely, average Q, p(c),
adjusted for the marginal value of cash p′(c), less the reduction in cash holdings c.
If cash is scarce, its marginal value is high and then, for a given Q, investment is
diminished. Cash holdings thus influence the choice of investment.
2.3.3 Agency Problem with Costless Refinancing
In the presence of an agency conflict yet the absence of external financing costs ((Φ, φ) =
(0, 0)), episodes of refinancing are left indeterminate. Because cash held in the firm
would incur a penalty, free cash flow is immediately paid to investors. The only state
variable becomes managers’ stake, w = W/K, making firm value per unit of capital to
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investors equal to p(w). The setup is then similar to DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang
(2012) and following them the firm is liquidated when the contract is terminated.
Management will be terminated once their continuation utility hits zero (their out-
side option) because otherwise they would immediately consume private benefits. Hence,
investors’ liquidation payoff at this termination boundary is
p(0) = lK . (2.21)
Next, because investors can always compensate management with cash, it will cost
at most one dollar to increase w by one dollar, implying pw(w) ≥ −1. But because
termination is costly ex post it will be optimal to grow w at low values as quickly as
possible by setting incremental payments dU/K in (2.8) to zero. As management is more
impatient however (γ > r), at some point they will need to receive current payments.
Formally, this payment boundary is the threshold where investors are indifferent between
reducing their value by one dollar to pay agents one dollar immediately
p′(w) = −1, (2.22)
and because it is determined optimally it satisfies the super contact condition
p′′(w) = 0. (2.23)
To summarize, dUt/Kt = 0 within the payment and termination boundaries and
βt = λK/((1 − τY )µ) for all t. The evolution of w that is derived from the optimal
contract then follows from (2.1) and (2.8):




With the dynamics of management’s payoff given, the solution to investors’ problem














for w ∈ [0, w] (2.25)
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that is pinned down by the boundaries (2.21), (2.22), and (2.23) and where investment
is determined by
g′(i) = p(w)− p′(w)w. (2.26)
When choosing investment, investors internalize its effect on managers’ incentives. For
a given w = W/K, an increase in capital reduces management’s effective claim on the
firm and induces a more severe agency friction.
2.3.4 Complete Model
We now discuss the complete solution in (2.11). It nests the previous two models as
special cases and for brevity we streamline its presentation and draw attention only
to novelties. Common to the nested models, within the boundaries of the solution the
firm finances itself internally and only affects management’s incentives through their
continuation payoff. Total firm value per unit of capital now depends on both scaled
cash holdings and managers’ stake, p(c, w) + w.
Boundaries
As before, the optimal contract specifies termination when managers’ stake equals their
outside option
p(c, 0) = lK + lC × c, for all c. (2.27)
Thus regardless of the level of cash the firm will be liquidated when w = 0 because at
this point managers will shirk (et = 0) and investors will terminate the contract.
At stakes above w = 0, firm value satisfies pw(c, w) ≥ −1 and, again, at the payment
boundary investors will be indifferent between promising and paying managers one dollar
pw(c, w(c)) = −1, for each c, (2.28)
while the super contact condition determines the level of the boundary itself
pww(c, w(c)) = 0, for each c. (2.29)
We emphasize that the payment boundary w(c) is now a function: investors will choose
to raise or lower the threshold depending on the level of cash. For example, if cash
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holdings increase from a small amount, the value of the firm will rise as the likelihood of
costly refinancing falls. Because firm value is now higher, it will be optimal to reduce the
probability of inefficient termination. Thus when starting at a low cash level, investors
will find it efficient to further raise w(c) along with c and shrink the likelihood of
termination.
Next, we turn to the boundaries that determine the decisions of refinancing and
payouts to investors. As before the firm refinances only when it runs out of cash, but
the magnitude, f(w) > 0, is now state-dependent.11 To see this, since firm value is
continuous before and after equity issuance it implies that
p(0, w) = p(f(w), w)− Φ− (1 + φ)f(w), for each w, (2.30)
where smooth pasting satisfies
pc(f(w), w) = 1 + φ, for each w. (2.31)
The size of refinancing now depends on management’s stake, w. It is natural to believe
that investors would likely provide more funds to a firm with a shrinking agency conflict.
This intuition implies that we should expect to see regions where f ′(w) > 0.
Because holding cash is costly, the firm will pay out once holdings are sufficiently
large. Since firm value must be equal before and after a payout, the exact amount obeys
the equation p(c, w) = p(c(w), w)+(c−c(w)) for c > c(w), where we can see the payout
boundary c(w) is now a function of w. And because it is continuous, the equation holds
in the limiting case as c→ c(w) and implies the boundary
pc(c(w), w) = 1, for each w, (2.32)
and again optimality requires
pcc(c(w), w) = 0, for each w. (2.33)
Altogether, the payout boundary becomes dependent on management’s stake, and the
relation is not necessarily monotone for the following reasoning. It is possible in equi-
librium that if w is sufficiently high it could be efficient to lower the cash threshold
11 We can show refinancing is always optimal at zero cash holdings. When holdings become zero, the
liquidation value of the firm is lK−w. Because pw(0, w) ≥ −1 over w ∈ [0, w(0)] and with equality when




′)dw′ ≥ p(0, 0) +
∫ w
0
[−1]dw′ = p(0, 0)− w = lK − w.
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for payouts, conceivably making a costly refinancing event more likely. Of course, at
high w investors know managers incentives are well aligned and will be motivated to
keep refinancing a distant event. This effect arises because our economy is dynamically
consistent and is also novel to the complete model.
And finally, we require along the boundary curves c(w) and w(c) that super contact
holds with respect to both states. Economically, this means that along a segment of
c(w) it is optimal to not give managers current payments and similarly that along a
part of w(c) that investors will not earn payouts. Of course, there could be segments
on which w(c) and c(w) overlap where both managers receive payments and investors
payouts and form a joint upper boundary. These last few technical conditions follow
below.
To ensure that c(w) achieves super contact we first differentiate p(c, w) = p(c(w), w)+






, for each c ≥ c(w). (2.34)
Since the equation’s right side is not a function of cash, taking a derivative with respect
to c and letting c→ c(w) implies
pwc(c(w), w) = 0, for each w. (2.35)
Next, a similar idea starting from p(c, w) = p(c, w(c))−(w−w(c)) but differentiating
with respect to c and then w and letting w → w(c) gives
pcw(c, w(c)) = 0, for each c. (2.36)
And finally from equations (2.35) and (2.36) it is evident that
pcw(c(w), w(c)) = 0, for every c and w. (2.37)
Summary
To summarize, events of refinancing dF , payouts dD, and payments to managers dU
are zero within the boundaries and termination occurs when w = 0 regardless of cash
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holdings. Here, system dynamics are governed by
dct = ((1− τY )µ− g(it) + τY δ + [r(1− τC)− (it − δ)]ct)dt+ σ(1− τY )dZt
(2.38)




Both resources and incentives vary with productivity and the optimal contract makes
these two variables perfectly correlated. Because the drifts will differ in general, however,
the stationary distribution will display the rich tradeoffs of the economic environment.
One such tradeoff arises from the interdependence of (2.38) and (2.39). The optimal
contract sets µet = µ implying that cash will grow quickly. But as cash holdings
accumulate, so does the severity of the agency friction, λ(c). This raises the sensitivity
of management’s compensation to the underlying productivity shocks. So while growth
in productivity benefits cash holdings and potentially delays a refinancing event, the
likelihood of contract termination increases for a given w, making the firm riskier. Thus
riskier firms will generally hold more cash, consistent with the empirical evidence in
Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2012).
In what follows we assume that βpww/2 + pcw and pww are nonpositive, conditions
which we discuss further and verify numerically in Appendix B. The solution to (2.11),
then, can be represented by the partial differential equation
rp(c, w) = max
i
p(c, w)(i− δ) + pc(c, w) ((1− τY )µ− g(i) + δτY + [r(1− τC)− (i− δ)]c)
+ pw(c, w) ((γ − (i− δ))w) +
1
2














subject to incentive boundaries in (2.27), (2.28), and (2.29) that determine termination
and the payment threshold to management, w(c); the resource boundaries of (2.30),
(2.31), (2.32), and (2.33) that locate the position and ensure the optimality of the re-
financing and payout decisions, f(w) and c(w); as well as the mixed boundaries given
by (2.35), (2.36), and (2.37). We detail our computational method to solve this prob-
lem in Appendix A. A key novelty relative to Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions, and Moll
(forthcoming) is that the shape of state space is solved jointly with (2.40).
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The optimal investment decision is determined by
g′(i) =
p(c, w)− pw(c, w)w
pc(c, w)
− c (2.41)
and now reflects several margins: the gain in value, p(c, w), less the detrimental change
to managers’ incentives, pw(c, w)w, adjusted for the marginal value of cash, pc(c, w),
and its reduction, c. More generally, the decision deepens the link between cash hold-
ings, compensation, and investment. Empirically, increasing long-term incentive plans
(LTIP) raises investment (Larcker (1983) and Glover and Levine (2017)) as do cash
holdings, a result more or less established in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and
subsequently refined by a large literature.
Distortions and The Joint Upper Boundary
A key tradeoff balances greater cash holdings c with a greater agency friction λ(c) while
considering both parties’ interests. Ideally, the firm would locate where both financ-
ing and agency frictions and their value distortions are minimized, which respectively
correspond to where pc(c(w), w) = 1 and pw(c, w(c)) = −1.
A remarkable outcome is that in spite of the problem’s complexity, our setup pro-
duces a simple, intuitive tradeoff along the joint optimal boundary, a fact which we
summarize in the following proposition:
Proposition (Tradeoff Along the Joint Upper Boundary). Consider a marginal change
along the joint upper boundary from (c(w), w(c)) to (c(w)+dc, w(c)+dw), then the rate






Proof. See Appendix B. 
At the boundary at which investors receive payouts and managers payments, the
slope equals the ratio of marginal costs of retaining cash to withholding payments to
managers. Even though the value distortions have dissipated (pc(·) = 1 and pw(·) = −1),
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the lingering sources of inefficiency, the cash tax penalty and managers’ impatience,
survive and determine the optimal tradeoff faced by firms.
More specifically, if investors decide to hold an additional amount dc of cash, they
will bring managers’ payment boundary inwards by rτCγ−rdc. Accordingly, the proposition
suggests that the rates and magnitudes at which managers or investors are differentially
paid are informative about the relative size of these underlying frictions.
More generally, movements away from the joint upper boundary either increase
cash’s marginal value, pc(·) > 1 as costly refinancing becomes more likely, or raise
the marginal value of an additional dollar promised to managers, pw(·) > −1, as it is
becomes more valuable to avoid costly termination. Therefore as either c or w decrease,
the marginal costs of not paying out shareholders or not currently paying managers fall
and change the tradeoff faced along the boundary.
Mathematically this means the curvature of the boundary on either side of the
joint upper boundary reflects marginal changes in relative distortions. Shifts away
from (c(w), w(c)) and along (c(w), w), for example, are informative about the distortion
attributed to the agency friction. The model can novelly be used to measure these
distortions.
In our specified setup, the tradeoff is exactly linear at the joint upper boundary and
a different specification, like decreasing returns to scale, could relax this linearity. The
general insight that the curvature of the boundary is informative about the underlying
magnitudes of distortions, however, would remain.
Aggregation
With the description of firm behavior complete, we now describe the stationary distribu-
tion of firms. While the payout, payment, and refinancing boundaries are not absorbing,
the termination boundary is. Because of this, every firm will eventually fail and in order
to study a stationary distribution we therefore allow entry. The exit rate, moreover, is
an salient equilibrium object that governs the severity of the agency friction.
Each firm is described by its current state (c, w), and therefore the density of firms
is defined over this state space. The non-stationary distribution at time t, h(c, w, t),
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satisfies the Kolmogorov forward equation
∂h(c, w, t)
∂t
= ϕ(c, w)m+A∗h(c, w, t), (2.43)
where A∗h(c, w, t) is the adjoint of the infinitesimal generator of the bivariate diffusion
process (dct, dwt).
12 By construction, this generator contains the rates of exit that
occur along the termination boundary w = 0. To ensure a stationary mass of firms, we
add a product of an entry rate m and an entry mass ϕ(c, w) that integrates to one.
We pin down the entry rate in the stationary distribution with the normalization




0 h(c, w)dwdc = 1.
After this normalization notice the left side of (2.43), twice integrated, is zero and we
can then rearrange it for the stationary entry rate, which by construction equals the







When a firm’s contract is terminated, a new, replacing firm’s cash holdings is drawn
from a distribution with positive support. The entrant, however, also starts with a
new continuation payoff, w0, that is determined by the bargaining power of agents and
investors. We specify initial conditions during our calibration in the next section.
2.4 Model Calibration and Analysis
Having characterized the solution to the model, we now calibrate it before turning to
study the solution’s properties. After the calibration and as before, we build to the
complete model by revisiting the predictions of its nested models. We then define the
measurement of financial and agency distortions.
2.4.1 Calibration
Our calibration is summarized in Table 2.1. It is split into externally- and internally-
calibrated parameters that target informative data moments. Our empirical environ-
ment contains only US public firms, as agency frictions are likely to be present among
12 Specifically, A∗h(c, w, t)dt = −Et[dc]hc(c, w, t) − Et[dw]hw(c, w, t) + 12Et[(dc)
2]hcc(c, w, t) +
1
2
Et[(dw)2]hww(c, w, t) + Et[(dcdw)]hcw(c, w, t).
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them, and report the details of our widely-used Compustat and Execucomp data sam-
ples in Appendix F.
We begin by calibrating our external parameters by setting the tax rate on corporate
income to τY = 30 percent, the interest rate to r = 4 percent, and the depreciation rate
of assets to δ = 8 percent, all common values in the literature. We choose to model
a tax penalty for holding cash in the firm. Two relevant sections of the IRS tax code
are Section 531 on the accumulated earnings tax and Section 541 on undistributed
personal holding company income. Both sections impose the same penalty rate and we
accordingly use τC = 20 percent.
We specify a smooth adjustment cost technology as we are interested in the model’s




(i− δ − z)2, (2.45)
where θ measures the magnitude of the adjustment cost and z is an exogenous expansion
rate that locates the function. Following Hall (2001), we interpret the parameter θ as a
doubling time of capital. He uses either 2 or 8 years for his upward adjustment cost and
20 or 80 years for his downward adjustment cost. Because financial and agency frictions
will lower investment rates below first-best and potentially the depreciation rate of
capital, we assume an exogenous expansion rate z to match the average investment rate
in the data and generate long-run capital growth. Our choices are θ = 6 and z = 9
percent.
Next, we turn to the costs of refinance. Beginning with the seminal work of Jensen
and Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf (1984), subsequent literature has tried to
estimate indirect costs, like asymmetric information and incentive costs, and direct costs,
underwriting fees and dilution for example. Estimates vary across studies: Calomiris
and Tsoutsoura (2013) argue a 3 percent decline in the price of equity in response to a
seasoned equity offering is reasonable but can be as high as 15 percent for smaller firms
in totality when accounting for all costs; and Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000) show that
the majority of costs for a seasoned offering are variable, ranging from 4 to 6 percent
depending on issue size, with fixed costs slightly below half a percent. Informed by
them, we impose Φ = 0.5 percent and φ = 5 percent.
In the event of contract termination, we assume the firm is liquidated. In a recent
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study of recovery rates within bankruptcies, Kermani and Ma (2020) estimate values
between 33 and 46 percent for all assets. Chen (2010) structurally estimates average
recovery rates for bondholders to near 40 percent. We assume a lK = 40 percent recovery
rate for capital and the perfect recovery of cash, lC = 1.
Internal Calibration: Averages
We internally calibrate our remaining six parameters (µ, σ, γ, λK , λC , ψ) to features of
the stationary distribution that clearly map model to data. This distribution encodes all
information about optimal policy functions and is therefore an ideal target for calibra-
tion. Specifically, we target moments of free cash flow, compensation, and cash holdings
as well as the shape of its state space that determine the frequencies and magnitudes
of payouts, refinancing, and termination.
The incremental return on capital, µ, directly influences the mean rate of free cash
flows. We set µ = 0.17 to match this average.
Specialists’ time rate of preference is γ > r. Its value influences the length of the
interval [0, w(c)], as greater impatience (higher γ) requires sooner current payments
and lowers w(c). In reality managerial compensation, while easily measurable, is com-
plex as it contains salary, variable bonuses, long-term incentive plan contributions, and
stock and options, the timing of which can also follow a complicated structure. As a
resolution, we convert the stock of expected discounted future compensation, W , to a
flow by multiplying it by γ, avoiding the subjective calculation necessary to evaluate
(2.7) and effectively using the flow of compensation in the data to match the optimal
contract’s promising-keeping condition and track management’s stake in the firm. Al-
together, we set the parameter by calibrating to average compensation in the data and
correspondingly choose γ = 0.048.
Finally, we set the agency costs across both capital and resources as λK = 0.04,
which influences the variation in management’s continuation utility and the probability
of contract termination, and λC = 0.09, which influences cash’s marginal value and
therefore average cash holdings.
Recall that failure is source of inefficiency in the model and provides discipline to
managers who under individual rationality would prefer to remain in the firm. The
average termination rate in the model is m from (2.44). We target this rate with σ = 35
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percent to match the two percent average default rates of public firms over 1993 to
2017 (Boualam, Gomes, and Ward (2020)). Thus our volatility parameter is targeted
at the frequency of events which are determined by the boundaries rather than, say, the
cross-sectional dispersion in investment rates.
We factor the entry mass into a conditional and marginal distribution, ϕ(c0, w0) =
ϕc(w0|c0)ϕc(c0) and assume initial scaled cash holdings, c0, draws from a log-normal dis-
tribution with mean 0.15−σ2/2 and standard deviation σ, which generates an entrant’s
cash holdings close to the model’s average refinancing size. Given the cash draw, c0, the
distribution of w0 is degenerate and the value of initial w0 comes from an assumption
of managers’ relative bargaining power. From wage responses to news, Taylor (2013)
structurally estimates relative bargaining power to be equally split between shareholders
and the chief executive and, accordingly, we pick ψ = 50 percent.
Internal Calibration: Frequencies and Magnitudes
Next, we describe how we construct the model’s frequencies and magnitudes of refinanc-
ing and payouts to closely match their empirical construction. In the data, we form an
indicator for a firm for whether it had ever, over the course of an entire year, had re-
financed or paid out and simply average over these indicators to estimate frequencies.
We do not record multiple events of the same firm within a year.
Our motivation for calculating the payout frequency in the model, then, follows
from the question: Given the stationary mass at a point, (c, w), what fraction of firms
would be expected to breach the payout boundary following a productivity shock, ∆z,
given at an annual rate? Given the shock, cash holdings and managers’ stake move by
∆c = µc(c, w) + σc∆z and ∆w = µw(c, w) + σw(c)∆z, respectively, where µc(c, w), σc,
µw(c, w), and σw(c) are the annualized drifts and volatilities of (2.38) and (2.39). Given
these moves, we calculate
Refinancing Rate: E[1{∆c+ c < 0}|c, w] = N
(




Payout Rate: E[1{c(w + ∆w) < ∆c+ c}|c, w]
= E [1{∆z > (c(w + µw(c, w) + σw(c)∆z)− c− µc(c, w))/σc}] ,
(2.47)
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where N (·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution and we compute the rate of
payouts with Gaussian quadrature while accounting for the correlation between c and w.
Refinancing size is simply E[f(w)|w] and is consistent with our empirical construction.
These objects are conditional on (c, w) and we integrate over them with the stationary
density to calculate refinancing and payout statistics.
Internal Calibration: Summary
The summary of the internal calibration is tabulated in Table 2.2. The model matches
well the data’s average levels of cash, compensation, investment, free cash flow, and
entry/exit and refinancing rates.
One feature of the data that the model has difficulty in matching is refinancing size.
When it occurs in the data, it raises a much larger amount on average than in the model.
Small firms are known to raise a lot more upon refinancing (Fama and French (2005))
and so allowing for decreasing returns to scale would help the model in this dimension.
The payout rate of the model, moreover, is lower than in the data. Payouts in the
data are measured using common dividends and repurchases. In the model, payouts
are more akin to special one-time dividends and repurchases, and so its frequency will
naturally be lower since dividend policies are known to be quite persistent (Lintner
(1956)). Additionally, the decision to return cash to investors would depend on the rate
of return to the firm’s investment. Here, decreasing returns to scale might also help
as they would cause larger firms to have relatively lower investment returns and make
payouts more appealing.
2.4.2 Solution to Cash Management with No Agency Conflict
Figure 2.1 plots the solution to the optimal cash management policy without an agency
conflict being present. In Panel A, enterprise value is plotted in blue, p(c) − c, over
the domain of scaled cash holdings, c = C/K ∈ [0, c], where c is the payout boundary.
The red dashed line depicts marginal financing costs, Φ + φc, and its tangency with
enterprise value determines the refinancing size f .
Because refinancing is always preferred to liquidation, firm value is above lK when
cash is zero. It is concave in this region, reflecting the precautionary motive induced
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by the prospect of costly refinancing. As c grows and eventually reaches c, the slope
of enterprise value becomes zero. Concurrently, cash’s marginal value is initially above
one but converges to one.
Panel B plots the investment rate, i = I/K, as a function of cash holdings. The
decision is influenced by the marginal value of cash that reflects financial frictions. As
this marginal value grows the firm reduces investment to tilt the drift of cash’s evolution
upwards and reduce the likelihood of costly refinancing.
The stationary density of cash holdings is depicted in gray. Intuitively, the mass of
firms above the refinancing size f dominates the mass below and cluster near the upper
boundary. Refinancing is costly and firms avoid this by accumulating cash and making
investment decisions to promote this goal.
2.4.3 Solution to Agency Problem with Costless Refinancing
Figure 2.2 depicts the solution to the agency model in the absence of external financing
costs. Panel A shows the value function of investors, p(w), under a contract of com-
mitment and over the domain of managers’ stake, w = W/K ∈ [0, w], where w is the
payment boundary.
Because termination is ex post inefficient, investors become averse to fluctuations
in w. Investor’s value function, p(w), is thus concave as investors internalize the risk
that the optimal contract places on management’s actions. At w = 0 the contract is
terminated and investors receive the liquidation value lK . Upon termination, a new firm
is drawn depending on managers’ bargaining power, ψ.
Two forces drive the shape of p(w). Initially as w grows from zero, the agency
friction falls and agrees with investors’ desire to weaken it to avoid liquidation, p(w)
thus increases. To further alleviate the agency friction, investors must promise a larger
and larger share of the firm to management, and therefore p(w) eventually declines
reflecting this wealth transfer. As w increases, the slope of the value function declines
and eventually becomes −1 at the payment boundary, the point at which investors are
indifferent between promising and paying managers one dollar.
Panel B plots the investment rate. To understand this graph it is best to think of
the firm’s total value being determined in part by investors’ capital, K, and in part
by management’s ability to run the firm and their stake in the firm, W . Investment is
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costly to investors as it lowers management’s effective ownership of the firm, w = W/K,
and hence induces a greater agency friction. The cost of a greater friction is much larger
at low levels of w and this is why investment is reduced. As the friction wanes with
growing w, investment waxes along with it.
Finally, the stationary density of management’s stake is shown in gray. Because
liquidation is costly, the optimal contract sets du = 0 to grow w as quickly as possible.
Because of management’s impatience, however, du is eventually set to be positive at the
payment boundary, w. The density accumulates at this upper bound.
2.4.4 Solution to Complete Model and its Properties
The complete model retains the properties of the two nested models previously de-
scribed. Investment, for example, is generally reduced as w or c fall from the payment
or payout boundaries. The optimality of its solution similarly requires investors’ value
function to possess certain properties prescribed by the equilibrium contract as well as
the decisions that determine the boundary conditions. In particular, the derivatives of
the value function to each state, w and c, should be monotone decreasing functions,
respectively, and the second derivatives should equal zero at the upper boundaries.
We depict the accuracy of these properties in Figure 2.3. Panels A and B report
the first own-derivatives of a state across three percentiles of the other state’s marginal
density. Both the marginal cost of compensation pw(c, w) and the marginal value of cash
pc(c, w) are decreasing functions, implying own-state concavity of the value function.
As they approach their respective boundaries, the rate of change of these derivatives fall
and approach zero. A notable difference between the complete model and the agency
model with costless refinancing is that pw(c, w) < 0 for all w here and therefore the
contract is renegotiation-proof.
Next, in Panels C and D we plot the super contact condition associated with the
payout and payment boundaries. If the decision is optimal, they should both be uni-
formly zero across the entire boundary. In general they are very close, although in the
tails of the distribution of the state in question the magnitude of the deviation from zero
grows. These deviations visually overstate the impact on the model’s predictions, as
they are concentrated over states on which the equilibrium stationary distribution puts
little mass, as depicted by the marginal densities in gray. Sensitivity analysis confirms
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that the quantitative predictions of the model are robust to local changes in boundary
curves.
Figure 2.4 displays the complete solution. Panel A shows the value function that
is solved jointly with the state space. The boundary touches both zero axes for cash
holdings and managers’ stake. Remaining on a curve while moving in to the interior, the
boundary curve eventually reaches the joint upper boundary, marked by a black square.
The rate of change of either boundary, c(w) or w(c), reflects the current marginal values
of states, pc(c, w) and pw(c, w), that in turn reflect the underlying financial and agency
frictions.
Intuitively, the rise of c from zero coincides with a higher firm value and a greater
likelihood of termination, making it efficient to raise the payment boundary w(c). At
some point, however, the cost of termination falls as cash holdings and liquidation
value have grown, bringing the payment boundary back in. In addition, as w moves
away from zero, firm value increases and reduces the probability of termination. The
expected return on investing capital within the firm is thus higher and improves the
motive to push the payout boundary out farther. When managers’ incentives have im-
proved enough, both party’s interests are well-aligned, and it becomes optimal to lower
the payout boundary, reflecting our dynamically consistent contract whereby managers
share investors interests. In general, the overall shape is determined by these competing
effects.
The refinancing curve, f(w), is plotted as a dotted black line. This function cap-
tures the disciplinary role of markets on management. In equilibrium, management
understands that refinancing will be dependent on the firm’s history up to that point
and therefore this will change their behavior ex ante. As expected, refinancing does
increase with w. As w rises from zero, f(w) initially grows rapidly, but then plateaus
and eventually falls.
Why it falls is reminiscent of Zwiebel (1996), who argues that managers voluntarily
set debt to restrict themselves. Analogously, in our model management internalizes
refinancing’s effect on their incentives. They realize that with already good incentives,
a larger issue causes unnecessarily greater risk to investors as λ(c) and the risk of
termination grow with c for a given w, and refinancing f(w) thus falls. In general, the
quantitative effects of increasing f(w) and managers voluntarily restraining themselves
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determine the appearance of the curve.
The stationary density of firms is graphed in Panel B. The density approximately
tracks out a path from zero cash holdings to the payout boundary, a track far above the
termination boundary. Its particular gradient arises from the equilibrium investment
decisions that drive the state equations. Because the model is stochastic the mass of
firms are spread out along this track, causing some firms to fail.
2.4.5 Measurement of Distortions
The traditional approach to measuring distortions typically compares market values
and investment across first-best and second-best outcomes. Market values, however,
rely on an accurate discounting of future cash flows that are very influenced by hard-
to-measure discount rates. Fully understanding investment, moreover, requires a good
proxy for marginal q, an object notoriously hard to estimate (Erickson and Whited
(2000)). First-best, furthermore, may not be a reasonable benchmark as it is unlikely
to be attained in practice as financial and agency frictions do exist.
The Proposition of Section 2.3 defines the slope of the joint upper boundary and
implies the existence of a second-best frontier that is tangent to this boundary. We
therefore use the proposition to measure distortions relative to this frontier and form
measurements based on quantities rather than on prices.
We construct an orthogonalized definition of the agency distortion by evaluating the
distance between the frontier and the payout boundary, weighted by the mass of firms
across this distance. We use a similar definition for the financial distortion. We denote
the frontier as a function of state by F(c) and F−1(w) and in Appendix B we derive
the formal definitions
Agency Distortion: E[∆c1{c(w) < c+ ∆c < F−1(w)}|c, w], (2.48)
Financial Distortion: E[∆w1{w(c) < w + ∆w < F(c)}|c, w]. (2.49)
Similar to the frequency calculations from before, they are based on the annualized drifts
and volatilities of (2.38) and (2.39) and, as they are functions of (c, w), we integrate
over them with the stationary density to calculate the economy’s average agency and
financial distortions.
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Why do we measure the agency distortion by the distance from the payout boundary?
Compare a firm at the joint upper boundary (c(w), w(c)) to one on (c(w), w) where
w < w(c). For this firm, the financial friction is due only to the holding cash penalty,
rτC , since pc(c(w), w) = 1, so the only distortion from the second-best frontier can be
attributed to agency. The idea is akin to holding using a supply shock to identify a
demand elasticity.
Put differently, payouts which occur between c(w) and F−1(w) are required by in-
vestors to compensate them for holding a firm with an acute agency friction. Analo-
gously, current payments which occur between w(c) and F(c) are promised to managers
to operate a firm with a scarce cash holdings. These average distortions thus provide an
economic interpretation of how much investors are compensated on average to remain
invested in an agency-laden firm or managers to remain operating a cash-poor one.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the approach to measuring the agency distortion. It depicts
the top-down view of the stationary density. The second-best frontier, the dashed-dot
line, bounds the state space from above and produces a tangency at the joint upper
boundary marked by the black square. Given a firm at (c, w) and the dynamics of
(2.38) alone (recall our distortions’ definitions are orthogonalized), we can evaluate the
probability that this firm will receive a shock and cross the payout boundary c(w). For a
given w, we truncate the likelihood of shock realizations beyond F−1(w) as they surpass
second-best outcomes. Since the shock changes cash holdings (or compensation), we are
measuring quantities.
To sum up, we provide novel, theoretically-consistent measurements of financial and
agency distortions and show that payouts and compensation, two readily observable
variables, can evaluate their magnitudes. Common to the literature in general, the
measurements of these distortions are conditional on a model, as they are in Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), and an alternative model would lead to different estimates. In Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), they partially control for this shortcoming by comparing the same model
across countries and evaluate relative distortions. A different yet also valid approach
would be to pick a model and compute the ratio of payouts to payments. This ratio
mimics an index of the relative severity of agency to financial distortions and, usefully,
can be constructed for one industry in one country. Evaluating changes in this index
are more robust and less affected by model misspecification.
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2.5 Model Analysis and Evaluation of Market Discipline
With all objects defined and the model solved, we now focus on two forms of model
analysis. First, we contrast impulse response functions across different calibrations.
Recall that market discipline is an indirect force which we model by having only local
shocks affect management’s continuation utility in (2.8). Dynamic analysis allows us
to visualize and quantify this force by showing that firms, even with the same initial
(c, w), evolve differently over time.
Second, we use steady state analysis pioneered in Hopenhayn (1992) by observing
how the stationary density of firms shifts in response to a change in a model parameter.
We use it here to understand how changes in industrial structure, whether in the tax
code or in the severity of a deep agency friction, affect the observable characteristics
of firms and the distortions present in the economy. Though these stationary densities
remain constant through time, they do so by the neutralizing effects of entry and exit,
of firm growth and contraction. This analysis is therefore useful for understanding
adaptation in ex ante behavior as it captures the long-run effects of these structural
changes.
2.5.1 Evaluation of Market Discipline
We assess market discipline’s quantitative effect in the following way. We first solve
two economies that differ by a parameter. For illustration we contrast the fixed cost of
refinance, setting Φ to 50 and 150 basis points. We then choose an initial pair of states
that defines a firm, (c0, w0) and let investment, scaled cash holdings, and managers’
stake evolve in the absence of future shocks and track the evolution of a firm’s policy.
Related, an impulse response function maps the dynamics of firm policies from the
steady state after experiencing a normalized shock, typically. Because our steady state
is composed of a distribution of firms, our notion here is the natural extension of an
impulse response function to an arbitrary firm in the steady state distribution.
Our firm is initialized with scaled cash holdings near the average refinancing amount
in data, c0 = 15 percent of net assets, and a level of managerial compensation equal to
the average in the data, γw0, equal to 1.3 percent of net assets. The response functions
are depicted in Figure 2.6. As expected, both scaled cash holdings and managers’ stake
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start at the same level. Over time, however, they diverge because firm value and the
state space differ.
Cash holdings are more quickly accumulated in the high Φ economy, ending up
nearly 5 percentage points higher. Managers, however, end up with a smaller ownership
stake in the firm. As cash is more valuable in the high Φ economy, the probability
of refinancing within the year falls, but the likelihood of payouts is largely unaffected.
Effectively managers, not investors, bear the change in fixed cost. That in turn predicts
that distortions attributed to agency are now greater and basically only become quan-
titatively similar after 20 quarters, when nearing the joint upper boundary. Finally,
financial distortions are roughly similar, as the effects of a greater fixed cost of refinance
have been offset by a more rapid accumulation of cash.
Altogether, a small change in fixed cost of refinance can have a dramatic impact on
managers’ compensation, firms’ cash holdings, and the agency distortion in the economy.
This underscores that market discipline has a material force on economic dynamics.
2.5.2 Steady State Analysis
The results of this form of analysis are summarized in Table 2.3. For convenience, the
first column restates the benchmark moments targeted in the internal calibration. It
also includes estimates of average distortions and the ratio of their magnitude relative
to the benchmark.
Our benchmark calibration has firms paying out 2.54 percent of firm assets per year
out as a result of agency frictions. Managers are compensated by an additional 0.27
cents per dollar of assets to operate riskier firms with low cash ratios. We find agency
frictions to be nearly ten times more severe than financial ones when measured with
our model’s quantities. The intuition is that financial frictions can simply be offset
by accumulating cash (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) document an abnormally high
accumulation rate since the 1990s). An accumulation of cash, however, is double-edged
as it exacerbates the agency conflict, which requires payouts to investors (see Farre-
Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz (2014) for corroborating empirical evidence connecting
payouts and agency).
The scenario in Column (2) raises average productivity, µ, to 18 percent. The
firm now as a whole is more profitable and managers are correspondingly paid more
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and terminated less. The return to investment rises and the firm holds more cash,
reducing the frequency of external finance. These patterns are consistent with a boom.
In this economy, cash holdings and capital grow, implying that so do agency frictions.
The model therefore predicts agency conflicts to be procyclical and financial frictions
countercyclical.
In Column (3) we lower the corporate tax rate from 30 to 21 percent, matching a
change enacted in 2017. The tax cut raises average asset productivity and strengthens
the precautionary savings motive for holding cash. Although reducing corporate taxes is
widely believed to lead to stimulating investment, we find that the effect is only modest
as it raises the investment rate not even one percentage point. Investors instead prefer
to allocate the additional free cash flow to managerial compensation to alleviate agency
frictions and to distributing cash to themselves.
The change of the fixed refinancing cost, Φ, appears in column (4). Frequencies of
payout and refinancing fall, similar to the boom-like patterns of column (2), but markets
refinance on more stringent terms and as a result they terminate more firms. Greater
cash holdings effectively offset a potentially aggravated financial friction. But managers
must now operate more cautiously and with more resources that can potentially be
squandered. Investors thus require more compensation for a larger agency conflict, as
can be seen by an agency distortion growing from 2.54 to 2.92.
A Preliminary Proposal to Reduce Agency Frictions
Columns (3) and (4) collectively mimic a corporate income tax cut combined with the
introduction of a tax of one percent on the instance of refinancing. We combine both
changes in column (5). As before, a higher Φ reduces refinancing rates and increases the
probability of termination, a change which alone would require a greater compensation
for agency conflicts demanded by investors. Combining this change with lower corporate
taxes, however, raises average cash flows that allows investors to reallocate a portion of
them towards rewarding managers and alleviating agency conflicts.
In the final column (6) we initially lower the agency friction attributed to cash from
0.09 to 0.05 and then lower managers’ bargaining power to match the entry/exit rate of
column (6). Several rows across columns (5) and (6) look similar quantitatively. And
relative to the benchmark case the frequency of refinancing has fallen and conditional
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on it happening, its average size has grown.
Altogether, an economy that implements the tax proposal above generates an econ-
omy that mimics one with a relatively less severe agency friction. This is an imputed
result of market discipline. The relative values of average distortions are near identical.
In its current state, however, the analysis shown here is only suggestive and presents a
tradeoff whereby the overall effects on agency and financial frictions must be weighed. Of
course a fuller and potentially general equilibrium analysis that includes a government
budget constraint would be required to be more confident in prescriptions for policy.
But we find it interesting nonetheless and leave a more analysis to future work that we
discuss next in the conclusion.
2.6 Conclusion
We quantitatively evaluate the fundamentally important question of the degree to which
investor and managerial incentives are aligned and the role markets play in attaining
firm value maximization. We formalize the notion of market discipline whereby markets,
even though tapped intermittently, invisibly guide management’s use of resources.
Our quantitative model clarifies the role of markets in affecting a wide range of firm
policies, from cash holdings, investment, payouts, compensation, to whether to refinance
a firm or let it fail. We also derive a novel, general formula that shows how investor
payouts and managers’ compensation are informative about the underlying distortions
of costly external finance and agency conflicts. Our benchmark calibration has firms
paying out 2.54 percent of firm assets per year out as a result of agency frictions and
managers are compensated by an additional 27 cents per dollar of assets to operate
riskier firms with low cash ratios, implying agency frictions are nearly 10 times more
severe than financial ones.
While novel, our analysis necessarily omits some features that we believe are impor-
tant. First is decreasing returns to capital. The model-data fit on statistics of refinancing
and payouts would be expected to improve with this amendment. Yet another useful
extension would be clearly formulate capital structure. Our current setup works best
to describe large firms that are not overly indebted. Other improvements that could
be equally important include time-variation in aggregate states. Lustig, Syverson, and
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Van Nieuwerburgh (2011) partially attribute the rise in the disparity across executive
compensation to changes in executive’s outside options. Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013)
entertain a model where market conditions fluctuate and influence the costs of external
financing over time. One last extension would be to model takeovers, board compo-
sition, and competition, as these likely influence managers’ behavior. We leave these
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2: Internal Calibration Targets
Note: This table reports averages and percentiles of several variables targeted in the data by the
model’s stationary distribution. The data annually cover the period from 1993 until 2017 and
definitions are in Appendix F. Data variables are winsorized across all firm-years by 5 percent at the
upper and lower tails except for refinancing size which is only winsorized at the upper tail. Percentiles
are from the 25th, 50th, and 75th breakpoints. In the model, continuous variables are scaled cash
holdings, c = C/K, compensation, γw = γW/K, investment i = I/K, and free cash flow
Et[dY ]/K + τY δ. Indicator variables are payout rate (2.47), entry/exit rate (2.44), refinancing rate
(2.46), and refinancing size which is f(w).
Model Data
Mean Mean P25 P50 P75
Cash Holdings 21.8 22.7 2.1 7.8 26.2
Compensation 1.4 1.3 0.3 0.7 1.6
Investment 8.1 8.7 2.8 5.5 10.9
Free Cash Flow 4.0 4.8 -0.2 7.8 14.6
Payout Rate 37.9 53.2
Entry/Exit Rate 1.2 2.0
Refinancing Rate 16.4 16.8
Refinancing Size 14.4 51.5 12.4 24.8 58.9
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Table 2.3: Steady State Analysis (Annual)
Note: This table reports averages under the stationary density from various calibrations of the model.
Variables are scaled cash holdings, c = C/K, compensation, γw = γW/K, investment i = I/K, and
free cash flow Et[dY ]/K + τY δ. Indicator variables are payout rate (2.47), entry/exit rate (2.44), refi-
nancing rate (2.46), and refinancing size which is f(w). Agency and financial distortions are computed
respectively in (2.48) and (2.49).
τY = 0.21 λC = 0.05
Benchmark µ = 0.18 τY = 0.21 Φ = 0.015 Φ = 0.015 ψ = 0.03
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash Holdings 21.8 25.1 23.3 24.9 25.2 25.0
Compensation 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.6
Investment 8.1 9.0 8.7 8.1 8.6 8.6
Free Cash Flow 4.0 4.4 4.7 4.1 4.7 3.9
Payout Rate 37.9 37.1 40.1 37.1 39.0 36.4
Entry/Exit Rate 1.2 0.8 0.1 1.8 0.4 0.4
Refinancing Rate 16.4 13.8 18.0 13.8 15.9 14.1
Refinancing Size 14.4 18.5 17.5 19.5 20.7 16.9
Distortions
Agency (a) 2.54 2.64 1.66 2.92 2.14 1.83
Financial (f) 0.27 0.25 0.33 0.26 0.35 0.29
Ratio (a/f) 9.52 10.71 5.10 11.36 6.13 6.28
Relative to (1) 1.00 1.13 0.54 1.19 0.64 0.66
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Figure 2.1: Cash Management with No Agency Conflict
Note: This figure depicts the solution to the cash management problem with no agency conflict under
the parameters tabulated in Table 2.1 with the exception of setting (µ, z) = (0.16, 0.02). The domain
for both panels is scaled cash holdings, c = C/K ∈ [0, c], where c is the payout boundary. In Panel A,
the blue curve is the firm’s enterprise value, p(c) − c. The red dashed line depicts marginal financing
costs, Φ + φc, and its tangency with enterprise value determines the refinancing size, f . The stationary
density is unscaled to the vertical axis and shown in gray. Panel B plots the investment rate and its
decision equation.
95
Figure 2.2: Agency Problem with Costless Refinancing
Note: This figure plots the solution to the agency problem with costless refinancing under the parameters
tabulated in Table 2.1 with the exception of setting (µ, z) = (0.15, 0.02). The domain for both panels
is managers’ stake (scaled continuation payoff), w = W/K ∈ [0, w], where w is management’s payment
boundary. In Panel A, the blue curve is investors’ scaled value function. At the termination boundary,
w = 0, investors recover lK , and a new firm is drawn with initial payoff w0 = ψw + (1 − ψ)p, where
p = argmaxw p(w). The stationary density is unscaled to the vertical axis and shown in gray. Panel B
plots the investment rate and its decision equation.
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Figure 2.3: Accuracy of Model Solution
Note: This figure shows the accuracy of the complete model solution under the parameters tabulated in
Table 2.1. Panel A plots the first derivatives of investors’ scaled value function with respect to managers’
stake (scaled continuation payoff), w = W/K, for percentiles of the marginal distribution of scaled cash
holdings, c = C/K. Panel B plots the first derivatives of investors’ scaled value function with respect
to scaled cash holdings for percentiles of the marginal distribution of managers’ stake. Panel C plots
the super contact condition for the payment boundary, the second derivative of p(c, w(c)) with respect
to w for each value of c and Panel D plots the super contact condition for the payout boundary, the
second derivative of p(c(w), w) with respect to c for each value of w. The marginal densities of scaled
cash holdings and managers’ stake are unscaled to the vertical axes and shown in gray.
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Figure 2.4: Properties of Model Solution
Note: This figure summarizes properties of the model solution under the parameters tabulated in
Table 2.1. Panel A plots investors’ scaled value function from above, bounded by the non-rectangular
state space over managers’ stake, w = W/K, and cash holdings, c = C/K. The black dotted line is the
size of refinancing conditional on managers’ stake, f(w). The red line is the payment boundary, w(c),
and the blue line the payout boundary, c(w). These boundaries intersect at the joint upper boundary,
(c(w), w(c)), marked by the black square. Panel B plots the stationary density. In both panels a brighter
color represents a higher value.
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Figure 2.5: Illustration of Measurement of Distortions
Note: This figure illustrates the calculation used to measure the agency distortion relative to second-
best; an analogous calculation holds for the financial distortion. It plots the stationary density in green
from above, bounded by the state space over managers’ stake, w = W/K, and scaled cash holdings,
c = C/K. A darker green represents a higher value. The red line is the payment boundary, w(c),
and the blue line the payout boundary, c(w). These boundaries intersect at the joint upper boundary,
(c(w), w(c)), marked by the black square. The second-best frontier, the dash-dotted line, touches the
joint upper boundary and has slope dw/dc = −rτC/(γ − r). Next, the point (c,w) marked by an O
represents the density of firms at that point. The probability density of cash holdings over the next year
point starting from O is normal with mean Et[dc] that is marked on the figure and standard deviation
(1 − τY )σ. This normal density is over the support denoted by the horizontal dotted line extending
from O out to the second-best frontier, but is displayed with a tilt for the reader. The measurement for
point (c,w) is the expected value over the interval starting at c(w) and ending at the frontier F−1(w).
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Dynamics Induced by Market Discipline
Note: This figure plots the impulse response function of several firm policies of the same firm initialized
at (c, w) but contrasted across two economies that differ by fixed costs of refinance: Φ = 0.5 or 1.5
percent. All variables are in percent. We initialize scaled cash holdings c = C/K near the average
refinancing amount in the data, c0 = 0.15, and managers’ stake at w = (W/K)/γ = 0.013/γ, where 1.3
percent is the average size of compensation in the data. Dynamics follow from the drifts of (2.38) and
(2.39). Refinancing and payout statistics and agency and financial distortions are from (2.46), (2.47),
(2.48) and (2.49), respectively.
Chapter 3
Debt Dynamics without
Commitment in the Presence of
Fixed Issuance Costs
3.1 Introduction
A large and growing literature in corporate finance investigates a firm’s optimal dynamic capital
structure policy through the lens of a tradeoff between the cost of financial distress and the
benefit of tax deductibility of interest payments. In such a setting, shareholders may have
incentive to issue additional debt over time both to increase tax benefits and to extract wealth
from existing debtholders. Anticipating this incentive, creditors conjecture the firm’s future
debt issuance policy when pricing current debt. Thus, a firm’s ability to commit to a future
debt issuance policy may significantly impact its ability to extract tax benefits.
In this paper, we investigate a firm’s optimal dynamic debt policy when shareholders cannot
commit to future rebalancing policies and are subject to debt restructuring costs. Specifically, at
any time, by paying a fixed cost, a firm can either issue additional debt or repurchase outstanding
debt at market prices. In contrast to much of the existing literature, we do not assume that
the firm must repay all debt outstanding prior to issuing new debt.1 As emphasized by
DeMarzo and He (2021), this counterfactual assumption is not innocuous. Indeed, we show
that the modeling of non-callable debt in the presence of fixed restructuring costs significantly
1 See, e.g., Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Leland (1998), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001),
Strebulaev (2007), Danis, Rettl, and Whited (2014), Hugonnier, Malamud, and Morellec (2015), and
Dangl and Zechner (2020).
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complicates the analysis, and has important implications for the existence of equilibria.
We first show that, in a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), shareholders never voluntarily
reduce debt outstanding. This result extends the “leverage ratchet effect” of Admati, DeMarzo,
Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2018) to an economy with fixed restructuring costs and allows us to
restrict the search for equilibria (but not the set of off-equilibrium deviations) to the class of
Markovian strategies that involve only debt issuances. Within this class, we focus on policies
of the “barrier” type specified in terms of (i) a single state variable, namely, the firm’s income-
to-debt ratio y, (ii) a default barrier y
b







), and (iii) a function Y(y) defined on the restructuring region y ≥ y
u
that characterizes the amount of new debt that is issued to bring the firm’s income-to-debt ratio
back to an optimal target inside the inaction region.
We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an MPE in barrier strate-
gies. The interaction between issuance costs and debt maturity determines whether an equi-
librium exists. More specifically, for issuance costs greater than some analytically-determined
constant, the firm finds it optimal to never issue debt regardless of maturity, implying that our
model reduces to that of Leland (1994). For issuance costs below this threshold, we identify
three regions depending upon debt maturity. For sufficiently short maturity, we again find that
the firm chooses not to issue debt, as shorter maturities imply higher rollover costs. As we in-
crease debt maturity above an analytically-determined threshold, we identify a region in which
shareholders extract positive tax benefits, with magnitude that varies with maturity, in spite of
being unable to commit to an issuance strategy. Finally, as debt maturity increases further, we
identify a region in which an MPE no longer exists. This is a surprising result because, in this
region, rollover costs are relatively low, and thus significant tax benefits are available for firms
that can commit to a dynamic debt policy. The lack of an equilibrium in this region is thus
due to the myopic nature inherent in no-commitment policies. The intuition for the existence of
this region is as follows: low rollover costs induce the manager to issue debt aggressively, i.e., to
lower the restructuring boundary y
u
. This in turn reduces the price creditors are willing to pay
for the new debt issuance. But this lower price induces the manager to increase the location of
the default boundary y
b




In order to quantify the loss of shareholder value due to their inability to commit to a par-
ticular strategy, we also explore the implications of our model for the case in which shareholders
can commit to a future debt issuance policy. In particular, we identify a global-optimal strategy
that maximizes equity value across all states of nature, subject to limited liability. Interestingly,
if our model is calibrated to match typical empirical estimates of five-year maturity and one-
percent debt issuance costs, we find that the tax benefits to debt in the MPE are only slightly
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lower than those of the global-optimal policy with commitment. We therefore conclude that,
in the presence of realistic debt issuance costs, shareholders’ inability to commit to a future
debt issuance policy may have only a small impact on the tax benefits to debt that a firm can
extract. Furthermore, we show that when the issuance cost parameter approaches zero, share-
holders can extract close to 100% of the claim to the firm’s cash flow for both cases with and
without commitment. Thus, even for a case of vanishing, but positive, issuance costs, we see
that not being able to commit to a dynamic capital structure policy may have minimal impact
on a firm’s ability to extract tax benefits to debt.
While our main focus is on MPEs, the global optimality of the policy with commitment allows
us to also explore a possible equilibrium outside of the Markovian class. The optimal policy with
commitment generates the highest equity values across all states of nature. Hence, shareholders
do not have incentive to ever deviate if the punishment is that, following a deviation, debt is
always priced according to the no-commitment equilibrium. Debtholders can credibly threaten
such a punishment: Because they observe the size of the debt issuance and pay fair value for
their claim, they are indifferent to the firm’s restructuring policy. Under this “grim-trigger”
punishment, the global optimal policy with commitment is therefore subgame perfect.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides a formal characterization of barrier-
strategy MPEs when debt issuance is subject to a fixed cost, and firms are not forced to retire
outstanding debt prior to issuing new debt. The main challenge of this problem comes from
the analysis of off-equilibrium deviations. When the income-to-debt ratio is outside the inaction
region, that is, y ≥ y
u
, shareholders rebalance towards a target Y(y) that depends on the value of
the state variable y. We provide a verification argument for the existence of an MPE and derive
necessary and sufficient conditions for debt issuance to indeed be optimal in the restructuring
region y ≥ y
u
. In contrast, when a firm is forced to retire all outstanding debt prior to issuing
new debt, the issuance decision is always made with zero debt outstanding. Hence, when debt
must be recalled prior to restructuring, the function Y(y) for all y ≥ yu reduces to a single point
Y(y =∞), which greatly simplifies the analysis.
Our paper builds upon the quickly evolving literature that examines optimal dynamic capital
structure decisions of firms. There are only a few tractable frameworks in this literature, due to
the difficulty of valuing assets in an economy in which current prices depend on the firm’s future
debt issuance policy.2 Most relevant to our work is DeMarzo and He (2021), who investigate
2 See, for example, He and Milbradt (2016), Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2018),
DeMarzo, He, and Tourre (2018), DeMarzo (2019), Benzoni, Garlappi, and Goldstein (2020), the lit-
eratures on roll-over debt structure, e.g., Leland and Toft (1996), He and Xiong (2012a), Cheng and
Milbradt (2012), Décamps and Villeneuve (2014), Della Seta, Morellec, and Zucchi (2020), as well as
the literature on optimal maturity choice, e.g., Leland (1998), Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009), He and
Xiong (2012b), Chen, Xu, and Yang (2012), Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013), Diamond and He (2014),
He and Milbradt (2014), Abel (2016).
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leverage dynamics without commitment in the absence of rebalancing costs. They show that
the unique MPE is characterized by a locally deterministic process in which new debt is issued
in all states of nature, even when the firm is near default. Due to this aggressive policy, there
are no tax benefits to debt regardless of maturity. In contrast, in our model, shareholders can
extract positive tax benefits, the size of which depends on maturity. Moreover, tax benefits tend
to increase as issuance costs decline. Thus, our model does not converge to that of DeMarzo and
He (2021) even in the presence of arbitrarily small issuance costs, in spite of the fact that our
model is identical to theirs when the issuance cost parameter is set to zero at the outset. The
intuition for this result is the following: regardless of how small the debt issuance parameter is,
so long as it is positive, optimal debt issuance is not locally deterministic, because that would
imply an infinite accumulation of issuance costs in a continuous time framework. Hence, in our
model the equilibrium policy is always characterized by a region of inaction defined by a lower
default boundary and an upper debt-issuance boundary.
Another related paper is Malenko and Tsoy (2020), who consider a model of debt issuance
and repurchases without restructuring costs. They focus on time-consistent barrier policies
that satisfy a credibility constraint when EBIT follows a jump-diffusion process, which in turn
identifies a subgame-perfect equilibrium outside of the Markov class. Aside from the inclusion
of jumps and the absence of issuance costs, their results are analogous to our identification of
equilibria with commitment sustained by a “grim-trigger” punishment, in which any deviation
would lead to debt being priced as in the no-commitment economy.
A vast literature has studied dynamic capital structure choice in the presence of issuance
costs.3 Two papers in this literature are closely related to our work. First, Goldstein, Ju, and
Leland (2001) show that the firm can extract positive tax benefit from debt in a model with
perpetual callable debt, proportional issuance costs, and commitment. We extend their analysis
to the case of non-callable debt, finite maturity, fixed issuance costs, and no-commitment, and
explore the interplay between maturity and issuance costs. Second, Dangl and Zechner (2020)
also study the interplay between issuance costs and maturity when the firm chooses how to
refinance expiring debt. Similar to our findings, Dangl and Zechner (2020) highlight a tradeoff
between the costs of higher rollover frequencies and the benefits of increased flexibility associated
with shorter maturity debt. Unlike Dangl and Zechner (2020), we focus on non-callable debt
that does not have to be retired prior to additional debt being issued. Moreover, we formally
derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an MPE in barrier strategies.
Finally, our setting allows us to study debt policies with fixed issuance costs in an economy
3 See, e.g., Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1984, 1985), Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989),
Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), Strebulaev (2007), Morellec, Nikolov, and Schürhoff (2012), Hennessy
and Whited (2007), Gomes and Schmid (2012), Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011b), Hugonnier, Malamud,
and Morellec (2015), Bolton, Wang, and Yang (2020), and many others.
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that is otherwise identical to that of DeMarzo and He (2021) and, moreover, to quantify the
difference in available tax benefits between models with and without commitment.
The predictions of our model are in line with the empirical literature that investigates the
capital structure and maturity decisions of firms. The presence of fixed restructuring costs in
our model predicts that firms issue debt in discrete (rather than continuous) amounts, consistent
with observation. Moreover, our model generates both persistence in leverage and a negative
correlation between profitability and leverage, consistent with, e.g., Titman and Wessels (1988)
and Frank and Goyal (2014). Our model captures these features because, when firms are in the
inaction region, higher profitability increases equity values while debt outstanding remains con-
stant, leading to lower leverage, and vice-versa. Also consistent with our model’s predictions are
van Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang (2010), and Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010), who document
that firms are able to extract tax benefits to debt. Moreover, our findings are consistent with
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996), who report that firms are not indifferent
toward debt maturity choice. Fama and French (2002), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and Welch
(2004) provide evidence that shocks to capital structures are persistent, and Leary and Roberts
(2005) attribute this persistence to the presence of adjustment costs. Finally, Graham and Har-
vey (2001) report survey evidence that 45% of CFOs are concerned with the tax advantage of
interest deductibility, suggesting that firms are not indifferent to capital structure choices.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 3.2, we present the model, prove necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of a barrier-strategy MPE, and derive a policy with
commitment that maximizes equity values within the class of barrier strategies. In Section 3.3,
we study the properties of the MPEs in comparison with the global optimal policy with com-
mitment. Section 3.4 concludes. Appendix A contains the formal definition of strategies and
equilibrium and Appendix B contains propositions and proofs. Additional supporting results
are in the Online Appendix.
3.2 The Model
The firm. We consider an economy in which all agents are risk neutral and the discount rate
r > 0 is exogenous. The representative firm is characterized by two state variables. The first is





= µdt+ σ dW
t
, (3.1)
for some constants µ < r and σ > 0, where dW
t
denotes increments of a standard Brownian
motion. The value V
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in equation (3.2), we can choose either as the ex-
ogenous state variable. We choose Yt for consistency with the existing dynamic capital structure
literature.
The second state variable is the date-t outstanding face value of debt F
t
associated with a
coupon rate c and inverse maturity ξ. During the interval (t, t + dt), debtholders receive cash
flows (c + ξ)Ft dt as long as the firm operates. As in the benchmark case of DeMarzo and He
(2021), we assume that recovery of bonds in default is zero.
The dynamics for the face value of debt are endogenously determined in that, by paying a
fixed adjustment cost βY
t
at any time, the firm can adjust its capital structure by retiring or
issuing bonds at market prices. The adjustment cost is fixed in that it is independent of the size
of debt adjustment. As a result of debt adjustments, the face value of the firm’s debt evolves











is the fractional change in outstanding debt at a restructuring time t,
and dN
t
is a counting process which increases by unity each time debt is restructured. Both
(At , dNt) should be understood as policy decisions of the firm.
We look for equilibria in which all asset claims H(Yt , Ft) are homogeneous of degree one








). By choosing λ = 1/F
t
, we can
express the value of any claim, scaled by the face value of debt, as a function of a single state



















Below, we investigate (reduced) Markov-Perfect Equilibria (MPE hereafter) in which the strat-
egy followed by management is characterized solely in terms of the state variable yt .
3.2.1 Characterization of Markov perfect equilibria
In our framework, a strategy is Markov if for each value of the state variable y
t
, management
makes one of three choices: (i) default, (ii) change the level of debt outstanding; or (iii) do
neither, and simply service outstanding debt. Definition 4 in Appendix A formalizes the concept
of MPE for a general class of default and debt restructuring strategies. The characterization
of an MPE for such a large class of strategies is impractical. However, we are able to derive
results that allow us to restrict the analysis to a tractable subset of strategies. In particular, in
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Proposition 7 we show that in every MPE, firms never find it optimal to repurchase debt. This
result, which extends the “leverage ratchet” effect (see, e.g., Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and
Pfleiderer (2018) and DeMarzo and He (2021)) to the case of fixed issuance costs, allows us to
consider only debt issuance strategies. Furthermore, in Proposition 8 we show that in any MPE
the equity value is a non-decreasing function of the income-to-debt ratio y
t
that vanishes when
yt falls below a constant threshold yb . These two results allow us to restrict the search of MPEs
(but not the set of possible deviations) to the subset of debt issuance and default strategies
characterized by a constant default threshold.
3.2.2 Markov perfect equilibria in barrier strategies
A class of strategies of particular interest within the set identified in Section 3.2.1 is the class
of barrier strategies B that can be characterized by two parameters and one function. The two
parameters are the default boundary (y
b











is the default region, where it is optimal for management to immediately default, rather than
continue to service outstanding debt. The region yt ∈ (yb , yu) is the inaction region, where it is





is the restructuring region, where it is optimal to issue debt in sufficient amounts
so that the post-issuance income-to-debt ratio immediately returns to the inaction region. The


















).4 An important special case is ŷ ≡ Y(y
u
), which is the target
income-to-debt ratio chosen at the upper boundary of the inaction region.
Note that, under a barrier strategy, if the state variable “begins” in the inaction region, then
the entire restructuring region is inaccessible, except for y
u
. Yet, as we discuss in Section 3.2.3,
the existence of a barrier equilibrium relies on a verification argument for all off-equilibrium















































where, consistent with the focus on barrier strategies, we have replaced the counting process
(dN
t
) with an indicator function that equals one if and only if the current state vector is in the
4 In Corollary 2 of the appendix, we prove that it is never optimal to jump either to the default
region or to another location in the restructuring region.
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Debt valuation. Consider a representative debtholder who at date-t owns the entire debt
claim with face value F
t
. Due to the bond’s exponential maturity, the face value of debt owned by




e−ξ(s−t). Hence, the amount of maturing principal paid out over the
interval ds is −dFs = ξFt e−ξ(s−t) ds. Thus, the cash flow received by creditors over the interval
ds, which is composed of both coupon and principal payments, is equal to (c+ ξ)F
t
e−ξ(s−t) ds.













denotes the first time that the income-to-debt ratio y
t
hits the default boundary y
b
from above, that is, τ
b









Similarly, debt issuance occurs when the current income-to-debt ratio is in the restructuring
region [y
u
,∞). Importantly, to preclude arbitrage opportunities, the bond price per unit face










Standard arguments relying on Itô’s lemma and the continuity of the bond price at the issuance






), the debt price in equation (3.7) is the unique
solution p(y) to the following ordinary differential equation:
0 = (c+ ξ)− (r + ξ) p(y) + (µ+ ξ)y p′(y) + σ
2
2





subject to the boundary conditions
p(y) = 0 0 ≤ y ≤ y
b
(3.11)
p(y) = p(Y(y)) y ≥ y
u
. (3.12)
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2 − (µ+ ξ)−
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2 − (µ+ ξ)
)2
+ 2(r + ξ)σ2
σ2
< 0 (3.15)
are the two solutions λ± to the quadratic equation
−(r + ξ) + (µ+ ξ)λ+ σ
2
2
λ(λ− 1) = 0. (3.16)
Because (Mp , Np) ≤ 0 and yb < ŷ < yu , if follows that the bond price function is strictly concave






) > 0, p′(ŷ) ≥ 0, and p′(y
u
) ≤ 0.
Equity valuation without commitment. Because the decision to default or adjust the
level of outstanding debt is made when debt has been issued previously, shareholders may have an
incentive to deviate from the policy conjectured by creditors. Absent commitment, this implies
that creditors will lend money to the firm only if the debt contract is incentive compatible in that
shareholders would never want to deviate from the default and issuance strategy that creditors
use to price the bonds at issuance. Here we formalize the notions of incentive compatibility and
Markov Perfect Equilibria.
The firm’s EBIT Y
t
is subject to a corporate tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1) and coupon payments are






) ≡ (1− τ)Y
t
− (c(1− τ) + ξ)F
t
. (3.17)
If bondholders conjecture that the firm will use a barrier strategy a ∈ B but shareholders instead
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use a different barrier strategy s ∈ B, then the value of equity is










where we have defined δ(y
t
) ≡ δ(1, y
t
).
Definition 3. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in barrier strategies is a strategy a ∈ B
such that
e(yt |(a,a)) = sup
s∈B
e(yt |(s,a)), t ≥ 0. (3.19)
The definition formalizes the fact that in an MPE shareholders have no incentive to deviate
from the creditors’ conjectured strategy.




) associated to a particular barrier strat-
egy a ∈ B. Due to absolute priority, the equity claim is zero in the default region, that is,
e(y
t





In the restructuring region [y
u
,∞), to preclude arbitrage, the value of the equity claim just prior
to debt restructuring must equal the equity claim just after restructuring plus any cash flows




) the equity value in the unscaled economy,
for values of the state variables Ft and Yt such that yt ≡
Yt
Ft
∈ [yu ,∞), we have that
E(Ft , Yt) = sup
F̂t≥0
{







The second term on the right-hand side is the cash flow to equity from the debt issuance of size
















, and denoting zt ≡
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F̂t
































































, y ≥ yu . (3.23)
For the special case (y = y
u




Standard results show that the equity value in equation (3.18) is the solution to the following
ordinary differential equation










subject to the boundary conditions












p(Y(y))− βy y ≥ yu . (3.26)
The solution to this problem is
e(yt) =













< yt < yu
ê(Y(yt)) +Me Y(yt)Θ +Ne Y(yt)Π if yt ≥ yu ,
(3.27)
with ê(y) denoting the levered claim to EBIT,
ê(yt) = −














are the unique solutions to the value-matching conditions
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, with ŷ ≡ Y(y
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). (3.30)




). Proposition 9 in Appendix B shows that a
necessary condition for a barrier strategy a ∈ B to be an MPE is that the equity value function











3.2.3 Existence of Markov perfect equilibria in barrier strategies
Up to this point, most of our focus has been on the inaction region (y
b
, yu). This focus has allowed
us to construct a candidate MPE within the class of barrier strategies formally characterized by
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Proposition 9. However, in order to insure that such a candidate strategy is indeed an MPE, we
need to verify that shareholders have no incentive to deviate from the strategy conjectured by
creditors. The following proposition provides a verification argument that identifies necessary
and sufficient conditions for an MPE to exist.
Proposition 4 (Verification argument for MPE existence). Consider a barrier strategy a =
(y
b
, yu ,Y(y)) that satisfies the necessary conditions of Proposition 9 and let







p(z|a)− βy, y, z ≥ 0. (3.33)





Φ(y, z|a) = sup
z≥0
Φ(y, z|a), y ≥ 0, (3.34)
and constitutes an MPE if and only if
e(y|a) ≥ Φ(y, z|a), (y, z) ∈ [0, yu ]2, (3.35)
and the following condition holds for all y ≥ yu :
δ(y)− (r − µ) e(y|a) + (µ+ ξ) p(y|a) + 1
2
σ2y2 p′(y|a) ≤ 0. (3.36)
In the case of y →∞, condition (3.36) simplifies to
δ(y)− (r − µ)e(y|a) ≤ 0. (3.37)
Equation (3.34) is a consequence of Corollary 2, which proves that it is never optimal to
restructure in a way such that the post debt-issuance income-to-debt ratio falls either in the
default region, y < y
b
, or in the restructuring region y > y
u
. The condition in equation (3.35)





). Equations (3.36)–(3.37) are off-equilibrium conditions guaranteeing that
it is optimal to issue debt when the income to debt ratio falls in the restructuring region, y ≥ y
u
.
To provide intuition for the off-equilibrium conditions (3.36)–(3.37), we note that for a
policy to be optimal, shareholders cannot be better off following any other strategy. In this
regard, we compare two strategies. The first strategy is to follow the proposed optimal policy
by immediately issuing an optimal amount of debt as described in equation (3.21) above. The
second strategy is to wait a period dt (in turn, receiving the cash flows owed to shareholders),
and then issue an optimal amount of debt according to equation (3.21). Hence, for a proposed
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In the proof of Proposition 4 we show that equation (3.39) is equivalent to equation (3.36).
Equation (3.38) describes the problem of an agent whose only available gamble is associated
with an expected loss, and whose only decision is to choose when to stop playing. Thus, we
refer to these alternative, but equivalent, formulations of the off-equilibrium condition as a
“supermartingale condition.”
Finally, equation (3.37) implies that the claim to equity for an unlevered firm is higher
if shareholders issue debt according to the MPE policy rather than remain unlevered forever:
e(yt) ≥ δ(yt)/(r − µ) = (1− τ)vt .
3.2.4 Commitment equilibria in barrier strategies
So far we have focused on Markov-perfect equilibria in which shareholders do not have the
ability to commit to a future debt issuance policy. To assess how valuable the ability to commit
is to shareholders, here we investigate benchmark models in which shareholders can commit to
a future restructuring policy.6 Specifically, we generalize two models that have been widely
studied in the literature. First, we investigate a version of the Leland (1994) model in which
the firm can commit to never restructure its debt, i.e., y
u
→∞. Second, we consider a version
of the Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) model in which shareholders commit to an optimal
restructuring threshold yu and target ŷ. In both cases, we generalize the original model by
allowing for finite maturity debt.
Generalized Leland model
We specify the EBIT process Y
t
as in equation (3.1). Similar to equation (3.3), we specify
existing debt with a constant coupon rate c and constant amortization rate ξ. However, here





6 It is reasonable to assume that firms can never credibly commit to a default boundary yb prior to
issuing debt. However, as we discuss in more detail below, debt issuance is potentially a repeated game,
hence there is the possibility that a policy with commitment to a restructuring boundary is a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
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At date 0, the firm has EBIT Y
0
and no debt outstanding, i.e., F
0














Instead, if it decides to make a one-time debt issuance, it will choose this level optimally:
E
issue
(Y0 , 0) = max
F≥0
{E(Y, F ) + P (Y, F )− βY0} . (3.42)


















Note that when yu =∞, there is no difference between models with and without commitment.
Also note that the value of equity is the maximum:
E(Y
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It is well known (see, e.g., DeMarzo and He (2021, Propositions 4 and 6)) that in this case the




















































if yt > yb,Leland
. (3.47)
Here, ê(y) is the value of the levered claim to EBIT as defined in equation (3.28), and the
exponent Π is a negative constant defined in equation (3.15).












(Y, 0) = E
issue
(Y, 0), we find the value of β for which the firm is indifferent

















An important special case is when ξ = 0, which determines an upper bound for β above which






















As we discuss below in Section 3.3.1, the Leland (1994) benchmark is important because
the function β∗(ξ) derived in equation (3.49) provides an analytic expression that separates the
region of existence of equilibria into MPEs for which the optimal issuance boundary y
u
is finite
from those for which it is infinite. Moreover, equation (3.48) identifies the limiting value of the
optimal target ŷ in our model as y
u
→∞.
Generalized Goldstein, Ju, and Leland model
The second benchmark with commitment is a version of the Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001)
model in which shareholders can commit to an optimal restructuring threshold y
u
and target
ŷ, but are still subject to limited liability. The reason we allow for commitment at the upper
boundary but not at the lower boundary is because debt issuance is potentially a repeated game
in which reputation effects might allow such a policy to be supported within an subgame perfect
equilibrium. In contrast, there is no repeated game associated with default.
Proposition 5 (Goldstein, Ju, and Leland model). Let the income-to-debt ratio dynamics (dy
t
)
be given by the process (3.6), and assume that shareholders can commit to a future debt issuance
threshold y
u
























for any y ∈ (y
b
, yu). The equity and debt values are
e(y|a
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where ê(y) is the value of the levered claim to EBIT defined in equation (3.28); Θ > 1 and























) = 0 (zero debt recovery at default) (3.54)



























(equity value at issuance).(3.57)
In the Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) model, commitment reflects the shareholders’ ability
to choose an optimal restructuring policy for the entire life of the firm. This is in contrast
to a model without commitment that requires incentive compatibility, that is, shareholders
never choose to deviate from the restructuring strategy that creditors use to price the bonds at
issuance. A special case of Proposition 5 is the limiting case of vanishing issuance costs:





) are given by equations (3.52)–(3.53) subject to the default boundary conditions (3.54)
and (3.56) and the restructuring boundary conditions
p′(y
u










The boundary condition at equation (3.59) is obtained from the boundary condition (3.57)
by setting β = 0 and performing a first-order Taylor series expansion around the point (y
u
/ŷ)−1.
Because β = 0, this model has the same setup as that of DeMarzo and He (2021). The next
proposition establishes the global optimality of the a
GJL
policy in that the values of (yu , ŷ) that
maximize the equity claim are independent of the state variable yt . As such, the aGJL commit-
ment policy serves as a natural benchmark for investigating the disparity in tax benefits between
models with and without commitment. As we show in Section 3.3.5, the global optimality of
the a
GJL
commitment policy implies that such a policy can be a subgame perfect equilibrium
when the punishment from deviation is that all future debt issuances will be priced according
to the model of DeMarzo and He (2021).
Proposition 6 (Global optimality of the Goldstein, Ju, and Leland policy). The commitment
policy a
GJL








The intuition for this global optimal property can be gleaned from combining the equity
valuation given in equation (3.52) with the boundary condition at y
b




























Importantly, the only place the restructuring parameters (y
u
, ŷ) appear in equation (3.60) is
through the coefficient Me(aGJL). The implication is that the first order conditions for (yu , ŷ)
























The global-optimality result from Proposition 6 explains why the first-order conditions in equa-




In this section, we investigate the properties of the MPE in barrier strategies derived from
our model. Table 3.1 reports the coefficients for the baseline calibration of the model. We
set the annual risk-free rate r = 4%, and the drift and volatility of the EBIT dynamics in
equation (3.1) to µ = 0 and σ = 22%, respectively. We assume that corporate profits are taxed
at a rate τ = 20% and we fix the coupon rate c = r.7
The key parameters of our model are the debt issuance cost parameter β and the inverse
maturity parameter ξ. We calibrate them to match two empirical facts: (i) an average debt
maturity of three to seven years (e.g., Choi, Hackbarth, and Zechner (2018)) and (ii) debt
issuance costs in the range of one to two percent of the amount issued (e.g., Altınkılıç and
Hansen (2000)). Within these ranges, we focus on a maturity of five years (i.e., ξ = 0.2), and
a debt issuance cost parameter β that generates a 1% fee on the amount raised. That is, we














where p(ŷ), which equals p(yu), is the MPE debt issuance price when debt maturity is five years.
We obtain a value β = 0.065, which corresponds to 0.026% of asset value.
3.3.1 Existence of MPEs in barrier strategies
Figure 3.1 partitions the parameter space (β, ξ) into two regions separated by the blue line
labeled “existence threshold.” The points to the right of this blue line represent MPEs in that,
for these points, the necessary and sufficient conditions of Proposition 4 are satisfied. Within
this region, the red line labeled “no-issuance threshold” further partitions barrier-strategy MPEs
7 Choosing c so that the bond is priced at par at issuance generates nearly identical results.
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into two sub-regions: one region with a finite restructuring boundary y
u
, and one region with
yu = ∞, implying that firms in this region optimally choose to not issue debt in the future.
This red line β∗(ξ) is determined analytically by equation (3.49). Figure 3.2 shows that, as
the issuance cost parameter β approaches β∗(ξ), (y
b
, ŷ) converge to those of the generalized
Leland (1994) model, equations (3.45) and (3.48), and y
u
approaches infinity. That is, when β
is sufficiently high so that the optimal yu goes to infinity, both the no-commitment model and
the global optimal model with commitment converge to the Leland model.
The intuition for the three regions in Figure 3.1 is the following: The roll-over cost of debt
for a given maturity (1/ξ) is increasing in the issuance cost parameter β. Hence, for sufficiently
large values of β, issuance costs exceed the tax-benefits from debt and, in equilibrium, the
firm finds it optimal to not issue debt in the future (the region to the right of the red line in
Figure 3.1). A special case in this region is β = limξ→0 β
∗(ξ), defined in equation (3.50) and
denoted by the red dotted line, where the optimal upper restructuring boundary y
u
is infinity
regardless of maturity. For intermediate levels of β, the tax benefit from debt exceeds issuance
costs and the MPE is characterized by a barrier strategy with a finite restructuring boundary
y
u
(the region in between the blue and the red lines).
However, for sufficiently low values of β, there is no barrier strategy MPE (the region
to the left of the blue line in Figure 3.1), in spite of the fact that, for optimal policies with
commitment, lower values of β offer even larger tax benefits to debt. The lack of MPE in
this region is thus due to the myopic nature of no-commitment equilibria, the intuition for
which can be gleaned from Figure 3.2. As Panels B and C demonstrate, as the issuance cost
parameter declines, management chooses to issue debt more aggressively, both by reducing the
debt issuance boundary y
u
and the post-issuance target ŷ. As shown in Panel D, this more
aggressive debt issuance policy causes bondholders to reduce the price they are willing to pay
for the debt issuance. For sufficiently low values of β, Panel A shows that this lower debt price
leads management to default at higher thresholds y
b
. As β is lowered from just above the MPE
existence threshold to just below it, the reduction in debt issuance price and increase in the
location of the default boundary lead to a vicious circle, leading to a situation with no Markov
Perfect equilibrium. The location of the MPE existence threshold coincides with the left-most
point of the red lines in Figure 3.2
Mathematically, the reason there is a region of no MPE is because the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions of Proposition 4 for the existence of an MPE in barrier strategies are violated.
Specifically, we find that necessary conditions in equations (3.36)–(3.37) do not hold. As shown
in the appendix, these conditions are equivalent to the supermartingale condition derived in
equation (3.39).8
8 Hugonnier, Malamud, and Morellec (2015) find a similar no equilibrium region for the case of
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In contrast, if the manager can commit to the global optimal policy of Section 3.2.4, the firm
issues debt less aggressively and, as β decreases, the value of debt remains largely unchanged
(Figure 3.2, bottom panel). Moreover, in the presence of commitment, there is always an optimal
barrier strategy for any level of β. For sufficiently large values of β, the global-optimal barrier
policy entails never restructuring existing debt, i.e., y
u
→ ∞. As stated in Section 3.2.4, the
no-debt-issuance threshold for the case with commitment coincides with that of the generalized
Leland (1994)model.
3.3.2 Off-equilibrium restructuring policy







), defined in equation (A42). In the MPE, the firm issues debt at
y = yu , bringing the income-to-debt ratio to the value ŷ ∈ (yb , yu), denoted by the black dot in
the figure. Off-equilibrium, i.e., y > y
u
, the target income-to-debt ratio Y(y) is an increasing




) on y is a key feature
of our model, and is due to our assumption that the firm is not required to repurchase (i.e.,
call) all outstanding debt prior to issuing new debt. This assumption contrasts with much of
the existing literature, which assumes all debt must be called prior to any new debt issuance,
which in turn implies that the debt issuance decision is always made at (y =∞), and thus the
function Y(y) reduces to a single value, Y(∞).
3.3.3 Tax benefits to debt, issuance costs, and debt maturity
In this section we quantify the tax benefits to debt as a function of restructuring costs and debt





, ŷ), we evaluate the tax benefits for an initially unlevered firm, F
0
= 0 (i.e.,
y =∞). Shareholders choose the initial amount of debt F̂ such that:
E(Y
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, F̂ ) + P (Y
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We define the tax benefit in terms of: i) the value of the equity claim E(Y
0
, 0) for a firm that
follows an optimal capital structure policy, and ii) the value of the equity claim for a firm that
never issues any debt E
no issue






















callable make-whole debt with proportional issuance costs.
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As demonstrated in DeMarzo and He (2021), equation (3.64) also applies to the special case
β = 0, in which the tax benefit is zero, regardless of debt maturity.9
The left panel of Figure 3.4 shows the tax benefit is zero at the boundary of the MPE
existence region, but otherwise is strictly positive with magnitude that varies with debt maturity.
In particular, the debt maturity that maximizes tax benefits increases with issuance costs, as
highlighted by the red markers. This is due to a tradeoff between debt-issuance fees and tax
benefits net of bankruptcy costs. A shorter maturity makes debt less risky and thus allows the
manager to increase leverage and extract more tax-benefit. This is evident from equation (3.6)
in which the drift of the EBIT process y increases with ξ. Hence, for ξ → ∞ debt becomes
virtually risk-free. However, a shorter maturity also implies more frequent rollovers, leading to
higher restructuring costs.
To provide a benchmark for the MPE, we also compute the tax benefit in equation (3.64)
for the case of the global optimal policy with commitment (blue markers in Figure 3.4). As the
figure shows, the value of tax benefit associated with the MPE (red markers) is very close to
that of the global-optimal policy (blue markers).





Along the (β, ξ) points that maximizes the tax benefit in the MPE, the firm extracts most of
the value of the EBIT claim. Indeed, as β is lowered, for both the case with commitment (blue





which, from equation (3.64), corresponds to a tax benefit equal to τ/(1− τ) = 0.25 in our cali-
bration. In sum, the presence of even arbitrarily small issuance costs can break the irrelevance
of capital structure and maturity choices found in DeMarzo and He (2021) that arise in an MPE
without issuance costs.
3.3.4 Debt and equity values
The left panel of Figure 3.5 shows the value of equity and debt in the MPE as a function of
the income to debt ratio y. As in the baseline calibration, we set β = 0.065 and ξ = 0.2, which
implies a fractional cost of 1% of the debt amount issued and a maturity of five years. As
shown in Proposition 10, the value of equity associated with the MPE (red line) is nonnegative,
nondecreasing, and convex. The black line shows that the bond price in the MPE is strictly
concave in the inaction region. For large values of y, the value of debt approaches the price of
a risk-free bond with the same promised cash flows, which is c+ξr+ξ = 1 in our calibration. As y
approaches y
b
, the debt price drops to zero because there is no recovery at default.
The right panel shows that the difference between equity value in the global optimal policy
9 See equation (31) of DeMarzo and He (2021), evaluated in the limit y →∞.
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and in the MPE is within 0.3% of the asset value. Related, we find that dynamic debt is-
suance increases enterprise value by 5.2% compared to an unlevered firm. In the global optimal
benchmark with commitment the tax benefit is very close at 6%. This suggests that, when the
rebalancing cost β and the inverse maturity ξ are calibrated to match empirical observation,
shareholders’ inability to commit to a future issuance policy has limited impact on the tax
benefits that a firm can extract.
3.3.5 Non-Markov subgame perfect equilibria
So far we have used the global optimal policy with commitment only as a benchmark to study the
properties of barrier-strategy MPEs. Here we discuss conditions under which the global optimal
policy is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, albeit outside the Markov class. As an example, we
consider the case of vanishing issuance cost β in Corollary 1, which allows us to compare the
global optimal policy with the DeMarzo and He (2021) smooth issuance policy in which β = 0.
For both cases we consider the empirically relevant five-year debt maturity, i.e., ξ = 0.2.
Figure 3.6 shows the value of the debt, p(y), (left panel) and equity, e(y), (right panel)
claims. The blue line reports values associated with the global optimal barrier strategy with
commitment defined in Corollary 1. The dashed-red line refers to the DeMarzo-He MPE. The
figure shows that, for all values of y, the value of debt and equity are always higher under the
global optimal policy. Since equityholders are always better off by following the global optimal
policy, they do not have incentive to ever deviate if the punishment is that, following a deviation,
debt is always priced according to the DeMarzo-He MPE. Because debtholders observe the size of
the debt issuance and pay fair value for their claim at the restructuring date, they are indifferent
to the firm’s debt issuance policy. Therefore, debtholders can credibly threaten to punish any
deviation from the optimal policy by pricing debt according to the DeMarzo-He MPE (or the
MPE that we identify when β is not zero). As a result, shareholders would gain zero cash benefit
at the date of the deviation, and would be left with an equity claim that has lower valuation
than under the global optimal policy.10 Under this “grim-trigger” punishment, the global
optimal policy with commitment is a subgame perfect equilibrium outside of the Markov class.11
10 Shareholders would obtain zero cash benefit because debt issuance at the deviation date is a locally
deterministic process.
11 Because debt issuance is a repeated game, managers care about the firm’s reputation and target
minimum credit rating levels (e.g., Kisgen (2006, 2009)). This provides empirical support for the
theoretical argument that optimal policies with commitment can be time-consistent.
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3.4 Conclusion
Within a standard tradeoff setting, we derive optimal dynamic capital structure policies when
the firm faces fixed debt-restructuring costs, and shareholders cannot commit to future debt
policies. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Markov Perfect
Equilibria in barrier strategies when the firm is not required to repurchase all of its outstanding
debt prior to issuing additional debt. We show that the interaction between issuance costs and
debt maturity determines three regions of interest: when issuance costs are sufficiently high
and maturity sufficiently low, the MPE is characterized by no future debt issuances. For lower
issuance costs and longer maturities, it is optimal for the firm to issue additional debt when
leverage becomes sufficiently low, which allows shareholders to extract positive tax benefits.
Finally, for even lower issuance costs and longer maturities, we identify a region in which no
MPE exists in spite of significant tax benefits that are available to a model with commitment.
The lack of an MPE in this region is due to the myopic nature of no-commitment strategies.
We also investigate a barrier model with commitment. We show that the optimal policy is
in fact globally optimal in that equity values are higher in every state of nature compared to
any other model consistent with limited liability. Moreover, we show that this policy can be
supported within a subgame perfect equilibria if creditors (credibly) threaten to follow a grim
trigger policy in which any deviation leads to all future debt issuances being priced according to
the MPE policy. This global optimal equilibrium provides a useful benchmark for estimating how
much shareholders are hurt by not being able to commit to a debt issuance policy. Calibrating
our model to empirically relevant values (e.g., bonds issued with a five-year maturity, and subject
to a 1% debt issuance cost), we find that tax benefits to debt for the no-commitment case are
very close to those for the global optimal solution. Finally, as the issuance cost parameter
approaches zero, shareholder can extract 100% of the firms EBIT flow under both models with
and without commitment. Thus, even for a case of vanishing, but positive, issuance costs, we
conclude that not being able to commit to a dynamic capital structure policy may have minimal
impact on a firm’s ability to extract tax benefits to debt. This is in contrast to the case of zero
issuance costs, in which, as shown by DeMarzo and He (2021), there are no tax benefits to debt
regardless of maturity choice.
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Table 3.1: Baseline model coefficients.
The table shows the values of the model coefficients in the baseline calibration. An inverse debt
maturity ξ = 0.2 corresponds to a five-year expected maturity. The fixed issuance cost β = 0.065
corresponds to a 1% of the debt amount issued.
Parameter Symbol Value
Annual risk-free rate r 0.04
Annual coupon rate c 0.04
Annual EBIT drift µ 0
Annual EBIT volatility σ 0.22
Corporate tax rate τ 0.2
Loss given default α 1
Inverse debt maturity ξ 0.2
Fixed issuance cost β 0.065
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Figure 3.1: Existence of barrier-strategy MPEs.
The figure identifies the regions in the space (β, ξ) of issuance costs and inverse-maturity parameters
for which barrier-strategy MPEs exist. In the region to the left of the blue line there is no MPE in
barrier strategies. To the right of the red line it is optimal not to issue debt.
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Figure 3.2: Debt issuance policies and values for a fixed maturity.
The figure shows the default boundary yb (first panel); the post-issuance target ŷ (second panel); the
restructuring boundary yu (third panel); and the value of debt p(ŷ) (fourth panel) as a function of the
issuance cost β. The red lines correspond to the no commitment case (MPE) while the blue lines refer
to the case of commitment. The two red markers in the top two panels denote the values of yb and ŷ
in the Leland model. The vertical dotted line in the next panel refers to β∗(ξ = 0.2), which is the
smallest value of β for which the optimal issuance boundary is yu =∞ when ξ = 0.2. The inverse
maturity parameter is fixed at ξ = 0.2, corresponding to a debt maturity of 5 years.
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Figure 3.3: Restructuring function Y(y).
The figure shows the restructuring function Y(y), y ≥ yu , defined in equation (A42). As in the baseline
calibration, we set β = 0.065 and ξ = 0.2, which reflect a fractional cost of 1% of the debt amount
issued and a maturity of five years. The black dot denotes the restructuring point (yu , ŷ = Y(yu)).
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Figure 3.4: Tax benefits and equity share of EBIT claim.
The figure shows the tax benefit (left panel) and the equity share of EBIT (right panel), for values of
(β, ξ) that belong to the MPE existence region of Figure 3.1. The red markers correspond to the set
(β, ξ) at which the tax benefit in the MPE is highest. For the same set of (β, ξ) points, the blue
markers show the tax benefit (left panel) and equity share of EBIT (right panel) under the global
optimal policy with commitment.
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Figure 3.5: Debt and equity values
The left panel shows the value of equity and debt in the MPE as a function of the income to debt
ratio y. The right panel shows the difference between equity value in the global optimal policy and in
the MPE, scaled by asset value. As in the baseline calibration, we set β = 0.065 and ξ = 0.2, which
reflect a fractional cost of 1% of the debt amount issued and a maturity of five years.
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Figure 3.6: Debt and equity values with vanishing issuance costs.
For ξ = 0.2, the figure shows the value of the debt p(y) (left panel) and equity e(y) (right panel) claims.
The blue line reports values associated with the global optimal barrier strategy with commitment
defined in Corollary 1. The dashed-red line refers to the DeMarzo and He (2021) MPE with ξ = 0.2.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1 Appendices
The following appendices provide details of the proof in section 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. Appendix A
shows the related proof of the macroeconomic environment in section 1.2. Appendix B contains
all the proofs for the benchmark economy that the insider is always informed. Appendix C
provides the details for the economy that the market makers are uncertain about whether the
insider is informed or not.
A Proof of the standard asset pricing framework
Proof of Lemma 1. The HJB equation for recursive utility satisfies
f̄ (Ct, V (m̂t, t, Ct)) + L [(m̂t, t, Ct)] = 0.
Due to homogeneity, consider the value function of the form





















































−) = E [H (m̂+t , t+) |m̂−t , q−t ] . (A2)
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+ f̄V (Ct, Vt) dt. (A3)
Therefore, for n = 1, 2, · · · , in the interior of (nT, (n+ 1)T ), the law of motion of the state price
density, πt satisfies the stochastic differential equation of the form:
dπt = πt
[




































is the risk-free interest rate, and









is the market price of the Brownian motion risk.








































Therefore, when upon announcements (t = nT ) and 4→ 0,
Λ∗t,t+4 =















1−γ is the consumption-wealth ratio. Consider the following log-linear


















1−γ is the consumption-wealth ratio when m̂t is equal to its unconditional




























lnH (m̂t, t) + ξ0,




[κ− ρ− κ (lnκ− ln ρ)].




































I guess H (m̂t, t) is of the form
H (m̂t, t) = e
−γAm̂t+H(t). (A8)







(t) = κH (t)− f (t) . (A10)


















H (t) can be solved in closed form from equations (A10) and (A2). In order to solve for asset
prices, I do not need the functional form H (t).





Besides, from equations (A6) and (A9), it is straightforward to show the A-SDF is counter-
cyclical if and only if the agent has early resolution of uncertainty, i.e., γ > 1ψ , which is equivalent
to γA > 0 when ψ = 1. 
Lemma 5. Under the assumption that the aggregate consumption does not change in the 24-hour
window before announcements, at t = nT −1, the agent has a prior that the expected growth rate
upon announcements m̂nT is normally distributed N (m̂nT−1,∆Q) where ∆Q = qnT−1 − qnT .
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= qnT−1 − qnT . (A13)
Therefore, at t = nT−1, mnT is normally distributed N (m̂nT−1,∆Q) where ∆Q = qnT−1−qnT .

B Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is in several steps.
B.1 Step 1: Market Maker’s Updating
First, I establish that if the market makers conjecture that the insider’s trading strategy follows
equation (1.15), then the price dynamics equation (1.20) satisfies the market makers’ break-even
pricing rule given in equation (1.10).
Proof of Lemma 2. The conjectured trading strategy (1.15) implies that
θt =


































where the last equality comes fromH (m̂nT , nT ) = e
−γAm̂nT+H(nT ) andA (m̂nT , nT ) = e
βm̂nT+N(nT ).




m̂nT−1 +H (nT ) +N (nT ).
Therefore, the aggregate trading volume follows
dYt = θtdt+dZt =
(


















where dZt = σzdBt and YnT−1 = 0.






















log [H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT )]
β−γA
β σv (nT − t)
dt+ dBt,
where the last equality comes from λ = σvσz . Because Yt are observable to market makers, Y
∗ is
also observable. The corresponding innovation process is given by
dB∗t =
log [H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT )]− v̂t
β−γA





log [H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT )] |FYt
]
. (A16)











logH (m̂nT , nT ) v (m̂nT , nT ) |FYt
]
, (A18)
is the conditional variance of log [H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT )] given market marker’s information
















































σ2v (nT − t) . (A20)













Define an adjusted order flow Ŷt as







ds = Yt −
γAβ∆Q
λ
[t− (nT − 1)] . (A22)
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From the aggregate trading volume (A15), the adjusted order flow follows




























Since v̂nT−1 = E
[
logH (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) |FYnT−1
]





















where the last equality holds due to the definition of the adjusted order flow in equation (A22).
From the filtering theory, B∗t is a standard Brownian Motion with respect to market makers’
filtration. Therefore, the adjusted order flow Ŷt is a Brownian Motion with instant variance σ
2
z









is the market makers’ expectation of the insider’s order rate, which is strictly positive when the
market makers are risk compensated.
The market makers’ prior about log [H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT )] at time nT − 1 is rep-
resented by a normal distribution. The Kalman filter implies the posterior distribution of
log [H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT )] under FYt is also Gaussian, which is summarized by the pos-
terior mean v̂t and the posterior variance
∑
v,t. Therefore, ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ], the market
makers’ estimation of H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) is
Vt = E
[

































































logH (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) |FYt
]
+






βH (nT ) + γAN (nT )
β − γA
(A29)





with Λ∗nT−1 = −γAm̂nT−1 +H (nT ). Therefore, the posterior variance of logH (m̂nT , nT ) under
the market makers’ information is,
ΣΛ∗,t = V ar
[












(nT − t)σ2v .
The Kalman filter implies the posterior distribution of log [H (m̂nT , nT )] under FYt is also Gaus-
sian, which is summarized by the posterior mean Λ∗t and the posterior variance ΣΛ∗,t. Therefore,
∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ], the market makers’ estimation of H (m̂nT , nT ) is
Λt = E
[

















































Therefore, both Vt and Λt are functions of the adjusted order flow Ŷt. From the definition of

















































) = λdŶt + γAβ∆Qdt, with PnT−1 = eµP− 12( γAβ )2σ2v+ 12( β−γAβ )2σ2v . (A32)
Furthermore, from equation (A23), the process Ŷt is a Brownian bridge with instantaneous










with probability 1 as t→ nT .1 This implies the equilibrium price in equation (A32) satisfies :






(t− (nT − 1)) (A33)


























→ βm̂nT +N (nT ) = logA (m̂nT , nT ) .
almost surely as t→ nT from the insider’s information. This is equivalent to Pt → A (m̂nT , nT )
with probability 1 as t→ nT under the insider’s filtration.

B.2 Step 2: Insider’s Optimal Strategy
Second, I capture the insider’s optimal trading strategy when the equilibrium pricing rule is a





Proof of Lemma 3. By Thereom 7.6 in Chapter 5 of Karatzas and Shreve (1991) (Feynman-
Kac representation), the value function J defined in equation (1.26), is a unique solution to the
Bellman equation (1.24) with the terminal condition J (nT, y,A (m̂nT , nT )) = j (y,A (m̂nT , nT )).
1 The distribution of a Brownian bridge is the same as a Brownian motion conditional on the






is the terminal value of
Ŷt, which is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2
z and is independent of Z. Hence, the
distribution of Ŷt, unconditional on the terminal value or Z (i.e., from the market makers’ filtration),
are the distribution of a Brownian motion with variance σ2z . This is consistent with what I get from the
filtering theory in equation (A25).
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Taking the derivative under the expectation operator yields2
Jy (t, y, A (m̂nT , nT )) = E [jy (y + ωnT − ωt, A (m̂nT , nT ))]
= E [g (y + ωnT − ωt)]−A (m̂nT , nT )
= P (t, y)−A (m̂nT , nT ) ,
which shows J (t, y, A (m̂nT , nT )) also satisfy equation (1.23) with P (t, y) as defined by (1.25).

Proof of Lemma 4. For any trading strategy θt, apply Ito’s Lemma to the value function,
J
(

















































where I use equations (1.23) and (1.24). I can rearrange this as∫ nT
nT−1
(





















The left-hand side is the profit of the insider, and the right-hand side is bounded above by
J
(











due to the nonnegativity of J
(
nT, ŶnT , A (m̂nT , nT )
)





P 2t dt <∞











t ≤ J (nT − 1, PnT−1, A (m̂nT , nT )) ,
with equality if and only if ŶnT = g





A (m̂nT , nT ) from equation (1.25). Thus, J
(
nT − 1, ŶnT−1, A (m̂nT , nT )
)
is an upper bound
2 The proof that the derivative of the right-hand side of (1.26) can be taken under the expectation
operator is similar to Back (1992).
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on the insider’s expected profit, conditional on the termination value A (m̂nT , nT ), and the





= A (m̂nT , nT ).

Having established these results, finally, I show that the conjectured rule by the market
makers is indeed consistent with the insider’s optimal choice, as stated in Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Since ŶnT = g
−1 (A (m̂nT , nT )) a.s., for any scalar a, the probability,
given the market makers’ information at time nT − 1, that ŶnT ≤ a is F (g (A (m̂nT , nT )))
where F is the distribution function of A (m̂nT , nT ). According to Lemma , the distribution
function of ŶnT , given the market makers’ information at time 0, is normal distribution with
mean zero and variance σ2z and I denote it as N . Therefore, N = F ◦ g, implying g = F−1 ◦
N . When logA (m̂nT , nT ) is normally distributed with mean βm̂nT−1 + N (nT ) and variance
β2 [qnT−1 − qnT ] = σ2v . Set g (y) = F−1 (N (y)):
F (g (y)) = N∗
(










g (y) = exp (βm̂nT−1 +N (nT ) + λy) , (A35)
where λ = σvσz and g (y) is a increasing function in y since λ > 0. From the conjectured trading





















βm̂nT−1 +N (nT ) + λ
(







βm̂nT−1 +N (nT ) + λŶt +
1
2










(t− (nT − 1))
)
(A36)













σ2v , which is exactly equation (A33). There-
fore, the pricing function in equation (A35) implies the price dynamics follow equation (A32).
Equation (1.25) implies that P (t, ωt) is a martingale under the filtration generated by ω.
This implies the price dynamics and the expected trading volume θ̂ (t) with respect to Ft must
satisfy
Pt − θ̂ (t)Py +
1
2
σ2zPyy = 0. (A37)
It’s very straightforward to show this pricing rule in equation (A36) satisfies the above property.
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→ A (m̂nT , nT ) with probability 1 as t → nT . It follows that the strategy
(1.28) is optimal. Therefore, {Pt, θt} in equations (1.27) and (1.28) is an equilibrium.


















−A (m̂nT , nT ) +A (m̂nT , nT )
[






As in Back (1992), I explicityly indicate the conditional expectation at time t given the mar-
ket makers’ information by EM [·] and the conditional expectation given the insider’s information
by EI [·]. Given equation (A35), the pricing rule in equation (1.25) yields
P (t, Zt) = E















= EI [P (nT,ZnT ) |Zt] exp
(
−γAβ∆Q (nT − t)
)
, (A39)
where the last equality comes from equation (A36) when t = nT :
P (nT,ZnT ) = exp
(






= exp (βm̂nT−1 +N (nT ) + λZnT ) .
Rearrange equation (A39), I find
P (t, Zt) exp
(
−γAβ∆Q (t− (nT − 1))
)





which implies P (t, Zt) exp
(
−γAβ∆Q (t− (nT − 1))
)
is a martingale under the insider’s infor-
mation set. Since the distribution of Zt with respect to the insider’s information is the same as












































−γAβ∆Q (t− (nT − 1))
)





submartingale with a deterministic growth rate γAβ∆Q per unit of time since both γA and β
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is also a submartingale with a deterministic growth rate γAβ∆Q per unit of time.







= γAβ∆Q (t− (nT − 1)) = γAβ∆Q (t− (nT − 1)) , (A40)
which implies the expected pre-FOMC announcement drift grows at a constant rate γAβ∆Q. 
Next, I prove the properties of the equilibrium in Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. In the meantime, the posterior variance of logPnT at time t ∈









































σ2v (nT − t)
= σ2v (nT − t) = β2∆Q (nT − t) .









= β2∆Q [(nT − 1)− t] ,
which implies the uncertainty reduces at a constant rate β2∆Q per unit of time. 
To prove Proposition 2, I first characterize the equilibrium when the market makers are
risk-neutral, i.e., the original Kyle model under γAKyle = 0.
Lemma 6. When the market makers are risk-neutral, ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ], there exists an equi-























where µP , σv, and λ are defined in Lemma 2. Here the dynamics of aggregate order flow Y
Kyle
is the sum of the insider’s demand the liquidity traders’ demand:




Proof. See Back (1992) or let γA = 0 in Theorem 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. It is a straightforward calculation from the equations (1.27), (1.28),
(A41) and (A42). 
C Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is in several steps. At the beginning, I provide the essential tools to construct the
equilibrium of the model.3
C.1 Step 0: tools for the market makers’ updating
Lemma 7. Let µ (t, V ) be the estimate of the unnormalized density function of the random
variable V = H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) given the stochastic differential equation (1.38) when
the insider is informed. Then µ (t, V ) must satisfy the following stochastic differential equation
(Zakai equation):






µ (t, V ) dYt, µ (0, V ) = f (V ) ,
which has a unique solution










θ2 (s, V ) ds
)]
.
Hence, the value estimate V (t) of H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) is given by
V (t) ≡ E [H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) |F1,t] =
∫
V
V µ (V, t) dV∫
V
µ (V, t) dV
(A43)
where f (v) = dF (v)dv is the prior probability density function at time 0.
Proof. See Zakai (1969) or Baras (1991). 
Lemma 8. The value estimate given by (A43) satisfies the stochastic differential equation
dV (t) = λ (t)
(



















µ (V, t) dv∫
V
µ (V, t) dv
(A45)
3 The method of proof is based on Li (2013) that solves the economy with the risk-neutral market
















Ŷ1,t ≡ Yt −
∫ t
0
θ̂ (s) ds (A47)
is a Brownian Motion with instant variance σ2z under F1,t.
Proof. Applying Ito’s Lemma to equation (A43) leads to the above standard filtering results.

Through observing the aggregate trading volume Yt, market makers estimate the probability
that Yt is generated by the the insider has private information or not. This updating problem
can be solved as to calculate the likelihood ratio between the two hypotheses, δ = 1 versus δ = 0.
Following Li (2013), the logarithm of the likelihood ratio between hypotheses (1.38) and (1.39)
is given by




















where θ̂ is as defined by (A45).
Lemma 9. The market makers’ estimate of the probability that the strategic trader has private
information





πnT−1 exp [φ (t)]
1− πnT−1 + πnT−1 exp [φ (t)]
(A48)
satisfies the following stochastic differential equation:
dπ (t) =







dŶ (t) , π (0) = πnT−1 (A49)
where









is the information process, which is a Brownian motion with instantaneous variance σ2z under
the filtration FYt .
Proof. The definition of π (t) in equation (A48) is obtained by the Bayes’ rule. By Ito’s Lemma,





= π (1− π) dφ+ 1
2
π (1− π) (1− 2π) (dφ)2
=




















Lemma 9 shows that the market makers’ probability estimate is governed by a nonlinear stochas-
tic differential equation. Note that when the prior πnT−1 = 0 or πnT−1 = 1, the solution to the
belief dynamics (A49) is π (t) ≡ 0 or π (t) ≡ 1, respectively.
C.2 Step 1: market makers’ updating
First, I show that given the insider’s trading strategies when she is informed and not informed,
how the market makers estimate the probability that the insider has private information and
the price dynamics through nonlinear filtering.
Let Π (t, y) be an arbitrary function in C1,2 on [0, 1] × R with a close range [0, 1]. At





























I guess the insider’s trading strategy follows
θ (t, y, V ) =











+ θ̄ (t, y) , (A51)
and








+ θ̄ (t, y) . (A52)
The expected trading rate of the insider under market makers’ perspective FYt is





zΠ (t, y)−Πy (t, y)σ2z
)
· E (t, y) + Πy (t, y)σ2z
Π · E (t, y) + 1−Π
, (A53)
where I let E (t, y) be defined as4











The following Lemma states the market makers’ expectation of the insider’s order rate and
their value estimate of H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ), given the insider’s order rate θ (t, y, V ) defined
in equation (A51).
4 As shown later, Li (2013) is a special case of this economy where θ̄ (t, y) = 0 when the market
makers are risk-neutral.
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h−1 (V )− Ŷ1,t
nT − t
dt+ dZt (A56)









defined by (A52), is then the market makers’ expected order rate from the insider, conditional
on the insider having private information. That is,













Furthermore, the expected value of H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) under F1,t is






H (t, y) = E [h (y + ZnT − Zt)] ,
where the expectation is taken over the Brownian motion Z.
Proof. See Lemma 6 in Li (2013). 





































nT − 1, Ŷ1,nT−1
)




= dŶ (t) + θ̄ (t, y)
(A47)










+ θ̄ (t, y) . (A58)


































which is the market makers’ optimal estimate of the probability that the insider has private




defined by equation (A51).




































= θ̄ (t, y) . (A61)

































Therefore, conditional on whether the insider is informed or not, there are two different dynamics
of probability estimation, as stated in equations (A57) and (A62).
As stated in Lemma 11, a direct application of Theorem 1 in Li (2013) leads to the same
property of probability estimate.
Lemma 11. Let Ŷ1,t be the Brownian bridge as defined by equation (A56) for any V ∈ V.
Suppose that the prior πnT−1 ∈ (0, 1). Then, the market makers’ probability estimate that




, always resides in (0, 1) for all t < nT . Upon
announcements, it converges to 1 or 0 depending on whether the insider has private information
or not.



















Lemma 10, ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ], the estimation of H (m̂nT , nT )A (m̂nT , nT ) conditional on δ = 1
follows








































xnT−1 +N (nT ).
Similarly, the estimation of SDF H (m̂nT , nT ) conditional on δ = 1 follows













σ2v (nT − t)
)
,









µΛ = −γAxnT−1 +H (nT ).
Therefore, this implies the price defined in equation (1.36) depends only on the current















































































































































C.3 Step 2: Insider’s Optimal Strategy
In this section, I show that if the dynamics of price follows equation (A63), then the optimal
trading strategy of the insider is indeed of the form given in equation (A51) through verification
proof.




, the insider chooses the order rate
to maximize her trading profit. When the insider has private information, for each terminal
value A (m̂nT , nT ), she maximizes the terminal profit∫ nT
nT−1
(






When the insider is not bettered informed, given no new information coming before announce-
ments, her best estimation of the asset value at ∀t ∈ [nT − 1, nT ] is always
v̄∗ ≡ E
[
H (m̂nT , nT )
E [H (m̂nT , nT |FnT−1)]













which is the same as market makers at t = nT − 1.
Under Assumption 1, the insider chooses the order rate to maximize the expectation of her




















θ (t)− θ̂ (t)
]
dt+ dZt, (A65)
where A (m̂nT , nT ) = v̄
∗ when the insider is not informed as shown in equation (A64).




(A (m̂nT , nT )− P (t, y)) θt + Jt + Jy
[








where the subscripts denote the derivatives. The necessary conditions for having an optimal
solution to the Bellman equation (A66) are




σ2zJyy − θ̂ (t) Jy = 0. (A68)
Under these necessary conditions, a direct application of Li (2013) leads to the following results:




, where Ŷ1,t is the adjusted order
at t. Let ωt = y and suppose that the stochastic differential equation
dωs = dZs −Θ (s, ωs) ds, ∀nT ≥ s ≥ t ≥ nT − 1
has a unique solution, where Zs is a Brownian motion with instant variance σ
2
z . If there exists
a strictly monotone function g (·) such that the pricing rule is
P (t, y) = E [g (ωnT ) |ωt = y] , (A69)
then
J (t, y; v, πnT−1) = E [j (v, ωnT ) |ωt = y]
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is a smooth solution to the Bellman equations (18) and (19), where
j (v, y) =
∫ g−1(v)
y
[v − g (x)] dx ≥ 0, ∀ (v, y)






= A (m̂nT , nT ) is
optimal, where P (t, y) is as defined by equation (A69).
Equation (A69) implies that P (t, ωt) is a martingale under the filtration generated by ω.
5
This implies the price dynamics with respect to F1,t must satisfy




Finally, I am ready to prove that (X0, X1, P,Π) is an equilibrium. The insider’s trading




s, Ŷ1 (s) , V̄
)




s, Ŷ1 (s) , V
)
ds,
where Ŷ1 is the solution to the stochastic differential equation (A56). Π (t, y) and θ (t, y, V ) are
defined by equations (A59) and (A51), respectively.




is the optimal probability
estimate of market makers given the trading strategy in equation (A51). Then, I need to show
that the price dynamics in equation (A63) is a legitimate pricing rule. That is,
[1]. The price rule defined above satisfies
Pt −Θ (t, y)Py +
1
2












= A (m̂nT , nT ) almost surely.





























































5 Notice that due to the existence of the SDF, the pricing rule P (t) is no longer a martingale under
market makers (unconditional) information set FYt . Though both V (t) and Λ (t) are martingales under
FYt .
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I also use the definition of E (t, y) from equation (A54).



























































































































































































































































































Next, I will show all of term (a), (b), and (c) are zero under the trading strategy (A51). From


























is a martingale under market makers’ information set since Ŷ (t) is a
Brownian motion under FYt . In addition,





































σ2zΠyy = 0 (A73)
This shows that term (a) in equation (A71) is always zero for any (t, Ŷ1,t).
Moreover, from equation (A59),





σ2z (nT − t)
. (A74)
Combining with equation (A52), I have
σ2zΠy −
[
Θ (t, y)− θ̄ (t, y)
]
Π = 0, (A75)
which implies term (b) in equation (A71) is always zero for any (t, Ŷ1,t).
The definition of θ̄ (t, y) directly indicates term (c) in equation (A71) is always zero for any

















which increases in Ŷ1,t since λ > 0. This verifies the condition [2].




















σ2v + β (m̂nT − m̂nT−1) a.s.
= logA (m̂nT , nT ) a.s.
The second equality holds since Ŷ1,t is a Brownian bridge that converges to h
−1 (V ) almost
surely. The third equality comes from the definition of PnT−1. Therefore, the condition [3] also
holds.

6 Combining equations (A74) and (A53), I can derive θ̄ (t, y) as in equation (1.43).
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converges to the true asset value A (m̂nT , nT ) almost surely when t → nT .
Since all the private information is eventually incorporated into the price, it implies there is no










converges to the initial price PnT−1
almost surely when t → nT . There is no uncertainty reduction upon announcements since the




























where the expectations are taken over all states of natural. 
Appendix B
Chapter 2 Appendices
A Details of Solution Method
We solve the partial differential equation in (2.40) with a finite difference method that approx-





j=1, where we define w(ci) = wJi(ci) and c(wj) = cIj (wj). Each set of grid points
along j, wj(ci), depend on the value of ci, because of the boundary curve {w(ci)}Ii=1. The set
of grid points along i, ci(wj) shares the same logic.
We approximate first derivatives of p using both backward and forward differences and
second derivatives with central differences. All differences of c and w are calculated respectively
over the fixed increments ∆c and ∆w. For the approximation of the derivatives at the boundaries,
there are three different cases:
1. The boundary conditions of w imply that p(c, 0) = lK + lCc ⇒ p(ci, w0) ≈ lK + lCci and
pw(c, w(c)) = −1 ⇒ p(ci, wJi+1) ≈ p(ci, wJi) − ∆w under a forward difference, where
both conditions hold for all i.
2. The boundary conditions of c imply that p(0, w) = p(f(w), w) − Φ − (1 + φ)f(w) ⇒
p(c0, wj) ≈ p(f(wj), wj) − Φ − (1 + φ)f(wj) and pc(c(w), w) = 1 ⇒ p(cIj+1, wj) ≈
p(cIj , wj) + ∆c under a forward difference, where both conditions hold for all j.
3. The boundary conditions along the joint upper boundary where pcw(c(w), w(c)) = 0 for
all c(w) and w(c) implies
p(cIj+1, wJi+1) ≈ p(cIj+1, wJi)−∆w ≈ p(cIj , wJi)−∆w + ∆c.
We describe our computational algorithm below:
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j=1 and approximate the derivatives
2. Calculate the investment policy function in (2.41)
3. For each w in [w1(c1), wJ1(c1)], we use bisection to find the refinancing policy f(w) such
that pc (f(w), w) = 1 + φ
4. We update the value function through an implicit method that solves the vector




2,1 , . . . , p
b+1
2,J2 , . . . , p
b+1
IJ ,JI
)′ with notation pi,j = p(ci, wj). It be-
gins with a guess b = 1 and proceeds to iterate until convergence (max(|pb+1−pb|) < 10−9)










where i is calculated from step 3, ∆ > 0 is the step size of the iterative method, and Q

















































































































Adjustments to transition rates along the boundaries are made to Q for the non-rectangular
grid as it is an approximation and ensure that the non-termination-boundary rows of the
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transition matrix Q sum to zero. The termination-boundary rows do not sum to zero
as they measure the (absorbing) exiting mass of firms. The matrix Q is the discretized
analogy of the infinitesimal generator of (dct, dwt): Aϑ(c, w) for some arbitrary function
ϑ(·). The elements of Q are based on an upwind scheme and defined as
• qssi,j = −max(Et[dw], 0)/∆w+min(Et[dw], 0)/∆w−max(Et[dc], 0)/∆c+min(Et[dc], 0)/∆c−
Et[dw2]/∆2w − Et[dc2]/∆2c
• qsui,j = max(Et[dw], 0)/∆w + Et[dw2]/(2∆2w)
• qsdi,j = −min(Et[dw], 0)/∆w + Et[dw2]/(2∆2w)
• qusi,j = max(Et[dc], 0)/∆c + Et[dc2]/(2∆2c)
• qdsi,j = −min(Et[dc], 0)/∆c + Et[dc2]/(2∆2c)
• quui,j = −qduij = −qudij = qddij = Et[dwdc]/(4∆c∆w),
where the conditional moments of state variables are Et[dw] = (γ − (i− δ))w,
Et[dc] = ((1− τY )µ− g(i) + δτY + [r(1− τC)− (i− δ)]c), Et[dw2] = (σλ(c)/µ)2, Et[dc2] =
(σ(1− τY ))2, and Et[dcdw] = σ2(1− τY )λ(c)/µ.











































(qusIJ ,JI )× (∆c)

,
and intuitively captures the rates of cash outflows from payments to managers, −∆w,
and inflows to investors from payouts, ∆c, liquidation, lK + lCc, and refinancing, p1,j




The stationary distribution, h(c, w), is calculated by solving, h(c, w) = −(QT )−1ψ, where ψ is
the entry vector. The rows of ψ that are non-zero are determined by the assumed shape of the
entry distribution that isolates c and the assumption on how agents’ initial continuation utility
w is determined through bargaining power. The normalization of h(c, w) to one implies that the




In the model with no agency friction there is no exit as firms always refinance. Here we
compute the stationary distribution h(c) by solving an eigenvalue problem of the adjoint of the
transition matrix Q: QTh(c) = 0.
B Proof of Tradeoff Along the Joint Upper Boundary
We first prove a lemma on investment being constant along the joint upper boundary before
turning to prove the proposition. In what follows we ignore dependence of boundaries on states
for brevity: that is, c = c(w) and w = w(c).
Lemma. Investment is constant along the joint upper boundary.
Proof. Denote (c, w) and (c+ dc, w+ dw) as two points along the joint upper boundary. From
the first-order condition in (2.41) we have
g′(i(c, w)) =
p(c, w)− pw(c, w)w
pc(c, w)
− c,
where optimality implies that the investment rates at these two points are
g′(i(c, w)) = p(c, w) + w − c, and (A1)
g′(i(c+ dc, w + dw)) = p(c+ dc, w + dw) + (w + dw)− (c+ dc). (A2)
Next, from the continuity of the value function along the boundary we know
p(c, w + dw)− p(c, w)
dw
= −1 and p(c+ dc, w + dw)− p(c, w + dw)
dc
= 1,
which we can rearrange to yield
p(c, w) = p(c, w + dw) + dw = p(c+ dc, w + dw)− dc+ dw (A3)
and then adding w − c to both sides of (A3) gives
p(c, w) + w − c = p(c+ dc, w + dw) + (w + dw)− (c+ dc). (A4)
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Finally, the optimal investment rates along the boundary ((A1) and (A2)) and (A4) imply
i(c, w) = i(c+ dc, w + dw).
Therefore, the investment rate is constant along the joint upper boundary. 
Now we turn to proving the proposition, which we restate here for convenience.
Proposition (Tradeoff Along the Joint Upper Boundary). Consider a marginal change along
the joint upper boundary from (c(w), w(c)) to (c(w) + dc, w(c) + dw), then the rate of change






Proof. The partial differential equation in (2.40) is
rp(c, w) = max
i
p(c, w)(i− δ) + pc(c, w) ((1− τY )µ− g(i) + δτY + [r(1− τC)− (i− δ)]c)
+ pw(c, w)(γ − (i− δ))w +
1
2














Using our two points, (c, w) and (c+ dc, w + dw), we can reduce (A5) to
p(c, w)[r − (i− δ)] = −(γ − (i− δ))w
+ (1− τY )µ− g(i) + δτY + [r(1− τC)− (i− δ)]c (A6)
and
p(c+ dc, w + dw)[r − (i− δ)] = −(γ − (i− δ))(w + dw)
+ (1− τY )µ− g(i) + δτY + [r(1− τC)− (i− δ)](c+ dc), (A7)
where we use the Lemma to simplify investment i ≡ i(c, w) = i(c+dc, w+dw). Therefore, when
subtracting (A6) from (A7) we are left with
[r − (i− δ)](p(c+ dc, w + dw)− p(c, w)) = [r(1− τC)− (i− δ)]dc− (γ − (i− δ))dw. (A8)
We can then place (A3) into (A8) to find
[r − (i− δ)](dc− dw) = [r(1− τC)− (i− δ)]dc− (γ − (i− δ))dw,
which reduces to (2.42) in the text. 
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C Derivations of Distortions
We derive the conditional expectation for the agency distortion and use but do not report for
brevity a similar derivation for the financial distortion (2.49). We ignore the dependence of
µc(c, w) on state variables in what follows.
















c(w)− c < ∆c < F−1(w)− c
}
d(∆c) (A9)
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eudu = −eu + k = −e− 12x2 + k,




















































D Verification of HJB Optimality and Full Effort Condi-
tion
Define the gain process {G} under any incentive-compatible contract C = (I, F,D,U, τ) for any




e−rs(dDs − dFs − dXs − dUs) + e−rtP (Kt, Ct,Wt),
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where Kt, Ct, and Wt evolve as in (2.1), (2.4), and (2.8). Homogeneity and Ito’s lemma imply
ertdGt = Kt

 −rp+ p(it − δ) + pc ((1− τY )µ− g(it) + δτY + [r(1− τC)− (it − δ)]ct)
+pw(γ − (it − δ))wt + 12pcc(σ(1− τY ))
2 + 12pww (βt(1− τY )σ)
2
+ pcwβt(1− τY )2σ2
 dt
+ [(1− pc)× (dDt − dFt)− dXt − (1 + pw)dUt] /Kt + (pc + βtpw)σ(1− τY )dZt

,
where p(·)’s dependence on states (ct, wt) and G(·)’s dependence on a contract C have been
omitted for conciseness from this point on.
Under the optimal investment i∗t , and incentive policies β
∗
t = λ(ct)/ ((1− τY )µ) the top two
lines in the square brackets are the optimized PDE in (2.40) and therefore zero. For models in
which the only state variable is agents’ continuation utility this nonpositivity condition follows
from the concavity of p(w). In this more general case, we show and verify numerically that for
any other incentive-compatible policy both pww and the sum βpww/2 + pcw, under the policy
with the smallest β, are nonpositive.1 Panels A and B of Figure A-1 depict pww and the sum
under β∗t and the calibration in Table 2.1.
The figure broadly shows that these terms are negative across the entire state space. How-
ever, in the upper and lower 10 percent of the distributions, indicated by the dashed lines,
there are instances of these terms being slightly positive, especially in the lower portion of w’s
distribution. Solving this model is difficult, particularly since the exact shape of the boundary
of the state space is not well understood and functional forms must be used to approximate
it. Accordingly, these instances coincide with regions where super contact conditions diverge
further from zero (see Panels C and D of Figure 2.3) and are therefore likely due in part to
numerical error and also coincide with regions where the stationary density does not place a
large mass (see Panel B of Figure 2.4). Because of this latter fact, perturbing the boundary to
minimize further this error has little impact on the quantitative predictions of our model. In our
defense, there is no other evidence of non-optimality in the solution and we place no restrictions
on agents’ ability to process information (for example, Krusell and Smith (1998)).
Next, the term capturing the optimality of the continuation payment policy, −(1+pw)dUt, is
nonpositive since pw ≥ −1 but equals zero under the optimal contract. The term that captures
the optimality of net funds dispensed, (1 − pc)(dDt − dFt), is also nonpositive since (i) pc ≥ 1
and (ii) dDt ≥ dFt because either (ii.a) cash holdings are sufficient for payouts, dD > 0 and
dF = 0; or (ii.b) if current cash holdings are insufficient to finance payouts the firm will raise
funds externally for payouts, in which case dD ≥ dF since cash holdings are positive. This
term is also zero under the optimal contract. Lastly, the issuance cost, −dXt, is nonpositive but
1 This can be seen by simplifying the second-order terms that depend on the incentive coefficient
β, pwwβ
2(1− τY )2σ2/2 + pcwβ(1− τY )2σ2, to be less than or equal to zero.
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equals zero under the optimal contract.
Therefore, for the auxiliary gain process we have
dGt = µG(t)dt+ e−rtKt(pc + βtpw)σ(1− τY )dZt,
where µG(t) ≤ 0. Let ϕt ≡ e−rtKt(pc + βtpw)σ(1− τY ). We impose the usual regularity condi-





= 0 for all T > 0. This implies that {G} is a supermartingale.
We can now evaluate the principal’s payoff for an arbitrary incentive compatible contract.











e−rs(dDs − dFs − dXs − dUs) + e−rτ (lKKτ + lCCτ )− e−rtP (Kt, Ct,Wt)
)]








e−r(s−t)(dDs − dFs − dXs − dUs) + e−r(τ−t) (lKKτ + lCCτ )
]




qFB − (lK + lC × c)
)
E[e−rtKt].








e−r(s−t)(dDs − dFs − dXs − dUs) + e−r(τ−t) (lKKτ + lCCτ )
]
≤ qFBKt − wtKt,
which is the first-best result and
qFBKt − wtKt − P (Kt, Ct,Wt) ≤ (qFB − p(c, 0))Kt =
(
qFB − (lK + lC × c)
)
Kt.
as w + p(c, w) is increasing in w since pw(c, w) ≥ −1.
We impose the standard transversality conditions limT→∞ E[e−rTKT ] = 0 and limT→∞ E[e−rTCT ] =




e−rs(dDs − dFs − dXs − dUs) + e−rτ (lKKτ + lCCτ )
]
≤ G0. (A11)
for all incentive-compatible contracts. On the other hand, under the optimal contract C∗,
principal’s payoff G(C∗) achieves G0 because the above weak inequality holds with equality when
t→∞.
Full Effort Condition
Finally, we require Λ(Kt, Ct) to be sufficiently small to ensure the optimality of et = 1 all the
time. When managers shirk (et = 0) they enjoy private benefits at rate Λ(Kt, Ct)dt. Cash
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holdings would then evolve as
dCt = (1− τY )σKtdZt − Itdt−G(It,Kt)dt+ τY δKtdt+ r(1− τC)Ctdt+ dFt − dDt.
When they shirk their payoff would not depend on cash flow realizations, so their continuation
payoff would change according to
dWt = γWtdt− dUt − Λ(Kt, Ct)dt.
For this not to be the case and for effort (et = 1) to remain optimal, it must be that investors’
payoff rate from allowing agents to shirk be lower than under the optimal contract and equiva-
lently that investors’ optimal gain process remain a supermartingale with respect to this shirking
policy:
rp ≥ p(i− δ) + pc (−g(i) + δτY + [r(1− τC)− (i− δ)]c)
+ pw(γ − λ(c)− (i− δ))w +
1
2
pcc(σ(1− τY ))2, for all c and w.
We confirm this optimality of full effort numerically and depict the result in Panels C and D
of Figure A-1. In more general situations where the inequality binds, then a more complicated
contract than the one described in this paper would need to be considered. Zhu (2013) considers
this extended contracting environment in the context of the DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006)
model.
E Alternative Setup Where Managers are Paid Out of
Cash
In this appendix we derive the necessary equations required for the optimality of the equilibrium
under the assumption that managers’ incremental payments dU subtract from incremental cash
holdings dC. We streamline its presentation and elaborate after on the key differences from our
benchmark setup.
Under this alternative setup, cash holdings possess the law of motion
dCt = dYt + τY δKtdt+ r(1− τC)Ctdt+ dFt − dDt − dUt
and investors maximize





e−rt(dDt − dFt − dXt) + e−rτ (lKKτ + lCCτ )
]
174
subject to similar conditions as in (2.6). The laws of motion for K and W are identical to the
benchmark’s. The scaled HJB equation then becomes under dU = dF = dD = dX = 0 within
the boundaries
rp(c, w) = max
i

















which is identical to the benchmark’s. We enumerate the boundary conditions below.
1. The termination boundary is
p(c, 0) = lK + lC × c for all c.
2. For each c, there is a compensation level w(c) at which it is optimal to pay managers in
current payments,
p(c, w) = p(c− (w − w(c)), w(c))− (w − w(c)) for w ≥ w(c)
⇒ p(c, w)− p(c, w(c))
w − w(c)
=
p(c− (w − w(c)), w(c))− p(c, w(c))
w − w(c)
− 1
⇒ pw(c, w(c)) = −pc(c, w(c))− 1, as w → w(c), (A12)
and which requires the condition pww(c, w(c)) = 0 for each c.
3. When cash holdings reach zero, the firm refinances with an equity issue of size fK. The
refinancing decision is determined in part by where w lies relative to w(f), managers’
payment boundary for each level of post-refinancing cash holdings.
• If w ∈ [0, w(f)], then for each w
p(0, w) = p(f, w)− Φ− (1 + φ)f, (A13)
along with the condition pc(f, w) = 1 + φ as before.
• If w > w(f), then the firm will refinance and pay management current payments,
so for each w
p(0, w) = p(f, w(f))− Φ− (1 + φ)f − (w − w(f)). (A14)
Differentiating this equation with respect to c gives










= 1 + φ. (A15)
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Because this first-order condition depends only on the marginal value of cash and
does not depend on w, we can use continuity of w approaching w(c) in (A12) to
write
pw(f, w(f)) = pw(c, w(c))|c=f = −1− pc(c, w(c))|c=f = −1− pc(f, w(f))








= 1 + φ. (A16)
4. When cash holdings get large we have as before
pc(c(w), w) = 1 and pcc(c(w), w) = 0 for each w.
5. And finally the mixed derivatives along the boundaries require that
pcw(c(w), w) = 0 for each w,
pcw(c, w(c)) = −pcc(c, w(c)) for each c, and
pcw(c(w), w(c)) = −pcc(c(w), w(c)) = 0 for every c and w.
We now discuss the salient differences between the alternative setup and our benchmark.
From bullet 5., the mixed derivative at the payment boundary pcw(c, w(c)) = −pcc(c, w(c)) no
longer equals zero because it now needs to account for the reduction in cash holdings.
From 2., pw(c, w) + pc(c, w) ≥ −1 rather than simply pw(c, w) ≥ −1, showing the intuitive
change that the bound of the marginal cost of compensation now depends on the marginal cost
of cash. Along the payout boundary c(w) the inequality collapses to pw(c(w), w) ≥ −2: that is,
it now costs investors at most two dollars to raise managers’ continuation utility marginally—the
reduction in cash holdings costs investors one dollar (pc(c(w), w) = 1) and raising management’s
continuation utility costs, at most, another dollar. Because (A12) implies that pc(c, w(c)) de-
creases in c, the slope along the payment boundary, ∂w(c)/∂c, should be negative.
At last from 3., refinancing can now follow two decision rules depending on the location of w
relative to w(f). This hypothetical decision is depicted in Figure A-2. The refinancing decision
f(w) is traced out with the dashed line. Refinancing decisions satisfy (A13) as in our benchmark
and is depicted by the arrow from p(0, w) to p(f, w), where f is determined by pc(f, w) = 1 +φ.
At some w, however, it may be optimal to refinance and concurrently pay managers. This
decision is depicted by the top two arrows, first moving from p(0, w) to p(f, w), reflecting the
post-refinancing gain in value, and then downwards from w to w(f), reflecting the transfer from
investors to managers of size w − w(f). Along this two-part arrow, the refinancing decision is
determined by (A15). The firm would decide by choosing the maximum of (A13) and (A14).
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Of course, this is not the only possibility for refinancing. A different equilibrium could
be imposed by simply requiring (A13) to hold at all points in the alternative setup. Under
this policy, refinancing and current payments to managers would never co-occur, as it is in our
benchmark. However, in this alternative setup this decision may not be optimal on behalf of
investors as they might prefer to refinance more and pay managers, whereas in our benchmark
it is optimal.
To sum up, there are several reasons that we prefer our benchmark to this alternative
setup. First, the HJB equations are identical. Second, the alternative setup introduces multiple
choices in the refinancing decision and it is unclear a priori how to select the correct choices.
Third, the refinancing region satisfying (A14) is unlikely to matter quantitatively, since the
stationary distribution is likely to put effectively zero mass on low cash, high manager stake
firms because of the optimal contract placing a perfect correlation structure across dct and dwt.
Altogether it introduces more complexity into an already challenging setup and is unlikely to
make a quantitative impact on our results. That said, we want to acknowledge this shortcoming
of our model and given this discussion, our model is likely to approximate mature firms best
and not small startups. A model more suited to describing the economics of startups would be
in Hartman-Glaser, Mayer, and Milbradt (2019).
Last but not least, the formula describing the tradeoff along the joint upper boundary is little
changed in the alternative setup. The full derivation closely follows that for the benchmark model
and we therefore do not present it here. To summarize the differences, recall that the bound on
compensation is now pw(c, w)+pc(c, w) ≥ −1 and can reach a minimum of pw(c(w), w(c)) = −2.







As we discuss in Section 2.4 our model is better suited to measuring relative and not absolute
distortions. Therefore, a change to this alternative setup will not impact our steady state
analysis of the changes in relative distortions.
F Data Appendix
We use all industrial, standard format, consolidated accounts of firms in Compustat. We exclude
firms without a NAICS code and in the utilities (22), financial (52-53), other (91), and public
(92) industries. As is standard in the literature, we remove firms with missing or non-positive
book assets (at) or sales (sale) and those with net property, plant, and equipment (ppent) of
less than five million dollars. Our data sample starts in 1993, when compensation data from
Execucomp becomes virtually complete, and ends in 2017. Following Gillan, Hartzell, Koch,
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and Starks (2018) and McKeon (2015), we exclude observations where salary is available yet
the item tdc1 is missing to minimize backfilling bias and define refinancing as common stock
issuance greater than 5 percent of book assets. Because in the model state variables are defined
over K and in the data over assets (C +K), we subtract cash from assets in the data to make
variables comparable and define net assets as book assets less cash, at− che.
Cash Holdings = cash (che) / net assets
Compensation = (salary + bonus + LTIP + equity rewards) (tdc1(t)) / net assets (t-1)
Payout = 1 if dvc > 0 or repurchases > 0; 0 otherwise
Free Cash Flow = (EBITDA (ebitda(t)) - physical investment (capx(t))) / net assets (t-1)
Investment = (physical investment (capx(t)) / net assets (t-1)
Preferred Issuance = Use max(pstkr(t) - pstkr(t-1),0), max(pstk(t) - pstk(t-1),0), or zero,
in decreasing order of preference
Refinancing = 1 if sale of common stock (sstk less preferred issuance) / assets (at) > 0.05;
0 otherwise
Refinancing Size = sale of common stock / net assets where refinancing = 1
Repurchases = repurchases of common stock (prstkc less preferred repurchases (prstkpc))
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Figure A-1: Concavity and Optimality of the HJB Equation
Note: This figure displays in Panels A and B the concavity of the value function required for β ≥
λ(c)/(µ(1− τY )) to be the optimal solution and in Panels C and D the condition of full effort (et = 1)
to be the optimal incentive strategy as we discuss in Appendix B. Panels A and B show pww and the
sum βpww/2 + pcw with respect to w and c, respectively, across the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of
the marginal distribution of c and w, respectively. Panels C and D plot the value of the inequality that
must to positive to ensure that full effort is preferred to a policy in which agents shirk (et = 0). The
upper and lower 10 percent of the marginal distribution of w and c are dotted lines and the intermediate
10-90 percent are solid lines. The black dashed lines mark zero.
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= 1 + 𝜙








Figure A-2: Hypothetical Illustration of Alternative Setup
This figure hypothetically illustrates the refinancing decision and the state space of the alternative model
where managers are paid out of the firm’s cash holdings. The refinancing line is marked by the dashed
line. The state space is the solid line.
Appendix C
Chapter 3 Appendices
A Strategies and general MPE definition
In this appendix we formally define (i) the class of default and debt adjustment strategies and
(ii) the concepts of Subgame and Markov perfect equilibria.
Default and debt-adjustment strategies. Let I
t
denote the debt adjustment process.
As long as the firm faces a positive issuance cost β > 0, any debt adjustment process It whose
paths have intervals of continuity leads to an infinite accumulation of adjustment costs. Building
on this observation we define a default and adjustment strategy as a pair
s ≡ {τ
b
(s), I(s)} , (A1)
where τ
b
(s) is a stopping time that represents the time of default and I
t











where A(s) is a thin set whose elements represent the moments at which the firm restructures its
capital and At(s) ≥ −1 is a predictable process that represents the relative size of the adjustment
conditional on a restructuring at date t ≥ 0.
In most of the analysis, we will focus on Markov equilibria summarized by the variables Ft
and Yt that determine the cash flows of all stakeholders defined in equations (3.1) and (3.3).
Accordingly, a strategy is said to be Markovian if
A(s) = {t ≥ 0 : (Ft−, Yt) ∈ R}
τ
b




At(s) = 1{(Ft−,Yt )∈R}A (Ft−, Yt) (A4)








(F, Y ) ∈ R2+ : Y/F ∈ R̄
}
A (F, Y ) = a (Y/F ) (A5)
for some closed disjoint subsets D̄, R̄ of R+ and some function a = a(·|s) : R̄ → [−1,∞), then
we say that s is reduced Markovian. Throughout we denote by S0 the set of all default and
adjustment strategies, by M ⊂ S0 the subset of Markovian strategies, and by Mr ⊂ M the
subset of reduced Markovian strategies.
Markov Perfect Equilibrium. If creditors conjecture that the firm will use a ∈ S0 but















s− ds+ dIs(s), (A7)
where
δ(Fs , Ys) ≡ (1− τ)Ys − (ξ + c(1− τ))Fs (A8)
is the instantaneous cash flow to equity holders, p
s













is the counting process induced by the restructuring times of s. To formalize the notion of an



















The requirement that Λ(s) <∞ guarantees that all the expectations, and hence the value of all
claims, are well defined.
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Definition 4 (Subgame and Markov perfect equilibria). A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)







(s,a), t ≥ 0. (A11)
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) is a SPE in the class M ⊂ S of Markov strategies. A
Reduced Markov Perfect Equilibrium (rMPE) is a SPE in the class M
r
⊂ S of reduced Markov
strategies.
The definition formalizes that in a subgame perfect equilibrium shareholders do not have
incentive to deviate from the strategy a that creditors conjecture when pricing the bond. For ease
of notation, in the main text we use the label MPE to denote both Markov and reduced-Markov
perfect equilibria.
Lemma 14 in the Online Appendix, a version of the one-shot deviation principle, provides
a characterization of SPEs in terms of a stochastic control problem in which the controlled
process is two dimensional, (Yt , Ft). Corollary 3 in the Online Appendix provides an alternative







B Propositions and proofs
Proposition 7 (Leverage ratchet effect). If a feasible strategy a ∈ S is a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium, then the debt adjustment process I
t
(a) is non decreasing.
Proof. Assume that a ∈ M is a MPE in which P [{s ∈ A(a) : dIs(a) < 0}] 6= 0. To show












Standard results in the theory of Skorokhod reflection problems (see, e.g., Kruk, Lehoczky,













Using these properties, we show in Lemma 15 in the Online Appendix that â ∈ S defines a
feasible deviation and it remains to show that this deviation is profitable.
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If bondholders conjecture that the firm will use a strategy a ∈ S0 but shareholders instead





























1{s<t} is the counting process induced by the strategy s that keeps track
of the debt restructuring time up to time t. Denote by p(F, Y ) = p(F, Y |a) the bond price
function induced by the assumed Markov perfect equilibrium and by c̄ ≡ c(1− τ) + ξ the after



























































































(â)) is the difference between the face value processes associated with the




























Let ρ ≡ r+ξ. Since the process e−ρtp(Ft(a), Yt)+
∫ t
0
e−ρs(c+ξ) ds is by construction a martingale
on the stochastic interval [0, τ
b









) dt− (c+ ξ)dt+ dMt (A17)
for some local martingale Mt and therefore
d(e−rtp (Ft(a), Yt)) = e
−rt (ξp (Ft−(a), Yt)− (c+ ξ)) dt+ e−rtdMt. (A18)
Substituting this dynamics into equation (A15) we obtain















and the desired result now follows from Lemma 16 in the Online Appendix and the fact that Gt
is non positive by construction.
184
Proposition 8 (MPE characterization). A strategy a ∈M
r
∩ S is an rMPE if and only if the


























) = δ(1, y
t
) is the instantaneous cash flow defined in equation (3.17), T denotes the set of













In particular, if a is an MPE then (i) the induced scaled equity value is nonnegative, nonde-
creasing, convex, and differentiable at all points where e(y|a) = max{φ(y|a), 0}, and (ii) there
exists a constant 0 ≤ y
b
(a) <∞ such that e(y|a) = 0 = max{φ(y|a), 0} at all points y ≤ y
b
(a).









































and F̄t = e
−ξtF0. Equation (A20) can equivalently be written as follows


























ψ(y|a) ≡ φ(y|a)+ − ê(y). (A26)
To see that equation (A20) is equivalent to (A24) it suffices to observe that the no-action equity












for all stopping times ζ ∈ T . Setting θ ≡ 0 in (A20) shows that the equity value function is
nonnegative. On the other hand, we have that ψ(y|a) is convex as the supremum of a family
of affine functions and it thus follows from Alvarez et al. (2003, Theorem 5) and Lamberton,
Zervos, et al. (2013, Corollary 7.5) that v(y) ≡ e(y|a)− ê(y) is differentiable at all points of the
set
{y ≥ 0 : v(y|a) = ψ(y|a)} = {y ≥ 0 : e(y|a) = φ(y|a)+}. (A28)
Since the function ê(y) is linear this in turn implies that e(y|a) is also convex and differentiable
at all points of this set.
Finally note that since e(y|a) ≥ ê(y) we have e(y|a) > 0 for all sufficiently large y and
thus D
r
(a) 6= R+. Let yb(a) ≡ sup{y ≥ 0 : y ∈ Dr (a)}. Since the scaled equity value
function is nonnegative and not identically zero, then yb(a) <∞ and e′+(z|a) > 0 at some point
z > yb(a). Together with the convexity proved above, this implies that the scaled equity value
is nondecreasing and it follows by continuity that e(y|a) = 0 ≥ φ(y|a)+ for all y ≤ yb(a).
Corollary 2 (Restructuring). If a ∈M
r





where Φ(y, z|a) is defined in equation (A22) and Ir (a) ≡ R+ \ D̄(a)∪R̄(a) denotes the inaction













for all points in the restructuring region, y ∈ R̄(a).
Proof. If y ∈ R̄(a) lies then it follows from equation (A20) that
e(y|a) ≥ φ(y|a)+ = sup
z≥0
Φ(y, z|a)+ (A32)
and from equation (A11) in the Online Appendix that










Combining the two equations shows that we have
R̄(a) ⊆ {y ≥ 0 : e(y|a) = φ(y|a) ≥ 0}
Y(y) ∈ Z = argmax
z≥0
Φ (y, z|a) , (A34)
and the first part will follow if we can show that the maximizer is unique and lies in I
r
(a).
Suppose to the contrary that y ∈ R̄(a) is such that
sup
z≥0
Φ(y, z|a) = Φ(y, z∗|a). (A35)
for some z∗ /∈ I
r
(a). If z∗ ∈ D̄(a) then it follows from (A34) that we have
e(y|a) = Φ(y, z∗|a) = −βy < 0, (A36)
which contradicts the nonnegativity of the scaled equity value function. On the other hand, if
z∗ ∈ R̄(a) then

























= Φ(y,Y(z∗))− βy < Φ(y,Y(z∗)), (A37)
where the third equality follows from equation (A11) in the Online Appendix, the fifth equality
follows from the no jump condition p(z∗|a) = p(Y(z∗)|a), and the inequality follows from the
strict positivity of the fixed cost. This contradicts the fact that e(y|a) = φ(y|a) over R̄(a) and
thus establishes that Z ⊆ I
r
(a). To complete the proof, observe that
e(y|a) = φ(y|a) = sup
z∈Ir (a)
Φ(y, z|a) (A38)
is differentiable at all points of R̄(a) as a result of equation (A34) and Proposition 8, and apply
Milgrom and Segal (2002, Corollary 4.iii)).
The following proposition provides necessary condition for an MPE in barrier strategies:
Proposition 9 (Necessary conditions for barrier-strategy MPE). Assume that the barrier strat-




,Y(y)) is an MPE. Then the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Default boundary: y
b






and Π given in equation (3.15).
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(ii) Limited liability: e(y|a) = max{φ(y|a), 0} = 0 for y ∈ (0, y
b
], where φ(y|a) is the equity
continuation value defined in equation (A22).
(iii) Equity valuation in the restructuring region: e(y|a) = max{φ(y|a), 0} > 0 for y ∈ [y
u
,∞).







|a) = 0. (A39)









p(Y(y)|a)− βy, y ≥ y
u
(A40)
e′(y|a) = e(Y(y)|a) + p(Y(y)|a)
Y(y)
− β, y ≥ yu . (A41)














, y ≥ y
u
. (A42)
Proof of (i) If a is an MPE with y
b
(a) > y0, then e(y|a) = 0 < e0(y) for all y ∈ (y0, yb(a))
which contradicts equation (A11) of the Online Appendix.
Proof of (ii) If a ∈ B is an MPE then it follows from Proposition 8 and the definition of the
strategy that we have e(y|a) = 0 ≥ φ(y|a)+ for all y ≤ y
b
(a).
Proof of (iv) Since by definition e(y|a) = 0 for all y ≤ y
b
(a) it follows from Proposition 8
that e(y|a) = φ(y|a)+ = 0 over that region. Hence, the scaled equity value function is differen-
tiable at all points x ≤ y
b
(a) and the desired result follows by noting that e′−(y|a) = 0 at any
such point.
Proof of (iii) Since by definition e(y|a) = Φ(y,Y(y)|a) ≤ φ(y|a) for y ≥ y
u
(a) it follows
from Proposition 8 that we have
0 ≤ e(y|a) = Φ(y,Y(y)|a) = φ(y|a), y ≥ yu(a). (A43)
To see that the inequality is strict note that due to Item (iv) the scaled equity value function









(a)) > 0, (A44)
where the strict inequality follows from Item (i) and the definition of the no-issuance default
threshold. The above inequality implies that we have e(y|a) > 0 in a right neighborhood of
y
b




Proof of (vi) This follows directly from Corollary 2.
Proof of (v) Since e(y|a) = φ(y|a) > 0 for all y ≥ y
u
(a) by Item (iii) it follows from
Proposition 8 that the scaled equity value function, and thus also φ(y|a), is differentiable at all
points y ≥ y
u
(a). On the other hand, by Item (vi) we have that Y(y) is the unique maximizer
of the function z 7→ Φ(y, z|a) over the compact set Ir (a) and the validity of (A41) now follows
from Milgrom and Segal (2002, Corollary 4) and (3.26).
Proposition 10 (Properties of equity in an MPE). Assume that a is a barrier strategy such
that δ(y
b
(a)) < 0 and that satisfies conditions (i) and (iv) of Proposition 9. Then






(ii) e(y|a) ≥ e0(y) for all y ≤ yu if and only if yb ≤ y0 , where y0 ≡ yb,Leland and e0(y) ≡
e
Leland
(y) defined in equations (3.45) and (3.47), respectively.
Proof of (i) Since e(y|a) solves (3.24) subject to value matching and smooth pasting at the
default boundary the uniqueness of the solution to second order differential equations implies





















Therefore, e(y|a) is convex on the interval [0, y
u
(a)) and the remaining claims in the statement









(a)) > 0, (A46)
we must have min{e, e′}(y|a) > 0 in a right neighborhood of y
b
(a) and thus over the whole
interval since the scaled equity value is convex.
Proof of (ii) The necessity of the condition is clear since in its absence e(y|a) = 0 < e
0
(y)
for all y ≤ (y0 , yb(a)). Now assume that yb(a) ≤ y0 . If yu(a) ≤ y0 then the result follows from
Item i) since e
0
(y) = 0 on [0, y
0




. Proceeding as in the
first part of the proof shows that
w(x) = e(y|a)− e0(y) = Me(a)xΘ + 1{x>y0}N̄(a)x
Π, x ∈ [y0 , yu(a)), (A47)
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(a)] and the thesis
follows by observing that w(y0) = e(y0|a) ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
By construction we have that
p(y|a) = p(Y(y)|a), y ≥ yu
e(y|a) = Φ(y,Y(y)|a) = sup
z∈[xb,yu ]
Φ(y, z|a), y ≥ y
u
(A50)
and, since the scaled equity value function is differentiable at y
u
, we deduce from Proposition
10.i) that the function e(y|a) is globally convex, non decreasing, and strictly positive on the
interval [y
b
,∞). A direct calculation using the above expressions shows that
Φ(y, z|a) = Φ(y,Y(z)|a)− βy < Φ(y,Y(y)|a), z ≥ y
u
(A51)
and the first claim follows by observing that Φ(y, z|a) = −yβ for all z ≤ y
b
. Now, since the
function e(y|a) is convex it follows from Proposition 12 in the Online Appendix that a is an
equilibrium if and only if the convex function
v(y) ≡ e(y|a)− ê(y) (A52)
is a weak solution to the HJB equation (A76). On the interval [0, y
b




)dy ≤ δ(y0)dy < 0, (A53)
so that v(y) is a weak solution on that interval if and only if equation (3.35) holds for all x ≤ xb.
On the interval (xb, yu) we have that Ov(dy) ≡ 0 and it follows that v(y) is a weak solution on




v(y) = e(y|a)− ê(y) = Φ(y,Y(y)|a)− ê(y) = ψ(y|a) (A54)
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for all y ∈ [y
u
,∞) and it follows that v(y) is a weak solution on that interval if and only if the
restriction of the measure
Ov(dy) = Oe(dy|a) +Oê(dy) = Oe(dy|a) + δ(y)dy (A55)
to that interval is non positive. To complete the proof we now provide an expression for this
measure. First observe that as a result of Condition (A42) and Milgrom and Segal (2002,
Corollary 4) we have that
e(y|a) = Φ(y,Y(y)|a) = sup
z∈[xb,yu ]
Φ(y, z|a) (A56)
is continuously differentiable at all points of [y
u
,∞) and satisfies
e′(y|a) = s(Y(y)|a)− β = s(y|a) = 1
y
(e(y|a) + p(Y(y)|a)) , y ≥ y
u
, (A57)
where the last two equalities equality follow from (A50) and
s(y|a) ≡ 1
y
(e(y|a) + p(y|a)) , (A58)
denotes the enterprise value of the firm per unit of cash flow. Since e(y|a) is convex, Y(y) is
continuous on x ≥ yu , and p(y|a) is continuous on [0, yu ] we have this derivative is continuous
as well as non decreasing and, therefore, absolutely continuous. Combining this property with
equation (A57) we obtain
e′′(dy|a) = s′(y|a)dy = 1
y
(e′(y|a) + p′(y|a)− s(y|a)) dy = 1
y
p′(y|a)dy. (A59)
Using equations (A57) and (A59), it follows that the non positivity of equation (A55) is equiv-
alent to the supermartingale condition in equation (3.39):
0 ≥ δ(y)− (r − µ) e(y|a) + (µ+ ξ) p(y|a) + 1
2
σ2y p′(y|a)




When F = 0, the value of equity given restructuring amount F̂ is:
E(0, Y ) = E(F̂ , Y ) + P (F̂ , Y )− βY = F̂ (e(ŷ) + p(ŷ)− βŷ) , (A61)
where, for ease of notation, we have suppressed the dependence of the debt and equity value on










This implies that choosing the best restructuring amount F̂ (or, equivalently ŷ) determines the


























The above condition implies that the equity value in the limit for y →∞ is
e(y) = sup
z










From equation (A64), at the point y =∞, the equity value is






where Y(y) = argmaxz∈[yb,yu] Φ∞(y, z). For the measure (A55) to be non positive we need
Le(y)− (r + ξ)e(y) + δ(y) ≤ 0, for y →∞. (A66)

























and e′′(y) = 0. (A69)
Substituting equations (A69) in equation (A66) we obtain
δ(y)− (r − µ)e(y) ≤ 0, y →∞. (A70)
Proof of Proposition 5






), debt satisfies the ODE (3.10) subject to the boundary con-
ditions (3.54)–(3.55), while equity satisfies the ODE (3.24), subject to the boundary conditions















, ŷ). Since sharehold-
ers cannot commit to a default threshold y
b
before issuing debt, y
b
is determined by the smooth
pasting condition e′(y
b
) = 0. In contrast, commitment to future restructuring implies that the
restructuring threshold y
u
and target ŷ is determined by the first-order conditions (3.51).
192
Proof of Corollary 1
To identify the limiting case β → 0, we consider a Taylor series expansion around the point














Therefore, as β → 0 the upper boundary condition for debt in equation (3.55) can be written
as p′(y
u
) = 0, which is condition (3.58). Similarly, setting β → 0 in the equity boundary
condition (3.59) and considering a Taylor series expansion around the point ε ≡ y
u



























≈ (1 + ε) (e(yu)− yue′(yu)ε) + ε (p(yu)− yup′(yu)ε) + o(ε2). (A72)
Simplifying and ignoring terms of order o(ε2) we obtain that as β → 0 condition (3.57) converges
to condition (3.59).
Proof of Proposition 6
It is convenient to express asset values in terms of the prices of two other securities: one that
pays e−ξ(τb−t) the first time y
b




, and one that pays e−ξ(τu−t)
the first time y
u








































































equity value when the firm chooses not to issue new debt in the future (i.e., yu = ∞) and to





























where ê(y) is defined in equation (3.28) and y
0
is given in equation (3.45). We can then write
the claim to equity as:
e(yt |a) = e0(yt |yb) + πu(yt)
[
e(yu |a)− e0(yu |yb)
]













































) reflects the present value of the claim







captures the present value for which equity could be sold for at y = yu .
Note that in equation (A75) the policy parameters (y
u
, ŷ) appear only in the term in square
brackets and that this term is independent of y
t
. Therefore, for a given y
b







































This implies that, for any given y
b
, and for all values of yt ∈ (yb , yu), equity values are maximized






)) determined from equations (A76)-
(A76). We note that e′(y
b
) is an increasing function of y
b







) < 0, implying that the limited liability condition is not satisfied. In
contrast, for values of y
b
above the optimal value, e′(y
b
) > 0.
Note that if e′(y
b











) by lowering the default boundary by a small amount εy
b
> 0, that is,
e′(y
b
) > 0 ⇒ e(yt |yb(1− ε)) > e(yt |yb) for all yt , (A77)




< 0. Furthermore, Lemma 19 in the
Online Appendix shows that when y
b
is chosen to satisfy the smooth pasting condition, the
equity claim is increasing and convex in y.
Therefore it follows that the optimal policy with commitment, which is identified by imposing
the smooth pasting condition e′(y
b
) = 0, and the first order conditions in equation (3.51), is in
fact the global optimal barrier policy subject to limited liability.
Appendix D
Chapter 3 Online Appendices
This Online Appendix contains additional results needed for the formal characterization of a
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE).
A Existence of MPE: Auxiliary results














+ 1{θt(s)<τb (s)} e
−r(θt(s)−t)
(
Eθt(s)(a,a) + pθt(s)(a)∆Iθt(s)(s)− βYθt(s)
)]
, (A2)
where the stopping time
θt(s) ≡ inf {s ≥ t : s ∈ A(s)} = inf {s ≥ t : dIs(s) 6= 0} (A3)
denotes the time of the first restructuring prescribed by the strategy s ∈ S on or after an arbitrary
date t ≥ 0.
Proof. Assume that a ∈ S is a SPE, let s ∈ S and consider for each fixed starting point t ≥ 0
the one-shot deviation st obtained by following s until τb(s) ∧ θt(s) and then reverting to a.


































Eθt(s)(a,a) + pθt(s)(a)∆Iθt(s)(s)− βYθt(s)
)]
(A7)
and the necessity of (A1) follows from the arbitrariness of s ∈ S. To establish the converse
assume that a ∈ S satisfies (A1). Since never restructuring and defaulting at the first time that
the cash flow becomes negative is feasible we have that E
t
(a,a) ≥ 0 at all times. Using this













) ds+ ps(a)dIs(s)− βYs dNs(s))
]
(A8)
where θn,t(s) is the time of the nth restructuring after t ≥ 0. let Zn,t denote the random
variable inside the conditional expectation. Since the bond price is bounded and δ(F, Y ) is a








e−rs ((Fs + Ys) ds+ (|∆Is(s)|+ Ys) dNs(s)) (A9)
for some deterministic function C0(t) > 0 and it follows from (A10) that the right hand side
has finite expectation. Letting the number of restructuring rounds n→∞ and appealing to the
























and the desired result now follows from (A14).
Corollary 3. A default and adjustment strategy a ∈ S is a SPE if and only if the scaled equity













(1 +Aθt(s)(s))eθt(s)(a) + pθt(s)(a)Aθt(s)(s)− βyθt(s)−
)]
(A11)
with the discount rate ρ = r + ξ and the cash flow function δ(y) ≡ δ(1, y).
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, for all s ∈ [t, θt(s)), (A12)
and therefore






















eθt(s)(a) + pθt(s)(a)Aθt(s)(s)− βyθt(s)−
)
(A16)
where the second equality follows from the definition of At(s) ≥ −1 as the relative size of the
debt adjustment.
Lemma 15. The strategy â considered in Proposition 7 is feasible, that is, â ∈ S.
Proof. Using equations (A13) we deduce that the deviation â satisfies dNt(â) ≤ dNt(a) as
well as |∆Ft(â)| ≤ |∆Ft(a)|. To see this, note that the face value â jumps only if the face value
a jumps to a new maximum. Therefore, either dN(a) = 1 and dN(â) = 0 or dN(a) = dN(â),
and by the same token either |∆F
t
(a)| > 0 and ∆F
t
(â) = 0 or |∆F
t
(a)| > 0 and ∆F
t
(â) > 0





(â)− Ft−(â) ≤ Ft(â)− Ft−(a) (A17)





(â) by construction and the two face values processes are reset to a common




























































































where the first inequality follows from (A13b), that is,




Combining (A19) and (A24) then shows that Λ(â) ≤ C0Λ(a) for some C0 > 0 and the desired
result follows.







that appears in equation (A19) of Proposition 7 has expected value zero.






= e−rtξpt(a)dt− e−rt(c+ ξ)dt+ e−rtdMt (A27)
and





= e−rtξGtp(a)dt− e−rtGt(c+ ξ)dt+ e−rtGt−dMt
+ e−rtpt−(a)[−ξGtdt+ dIt(a)− dIt(â)]
= e−rtGt−dMt − e−rtGt(c+ ξ)dt+ e−rtpt−(a)[dIt(a)− dIt(â)] (A29)
198
where the first equality follows from the fact that G and p have neither common jumps nor
common exposure to the BM. Integrating over [0, θ], with θ ≡ τ
b
(a) ∧ t and recalling that














(c+ ξ) ds− ps(a)(dIt(a)− dIt(â))) (A30)
where the last equality follows from the no jump condition. Using the definition of Ut in











and it thus follows from the uniform boundedness of the bond price process, the non positivity































where the first equality follows by noting that, since Ft(a) ≤ Ft(â), Gt ≤ 0 and therefore
p(e−rt|Gt|) = −p(e−rtGt) (A33)
= e−rt((r + ξ)Gtdt− dIt(a) + dIt(â)) (A34)
and
e−rT |GT | =
∫ T
0
e−rt((r + ξ)Gtdt− dIt(a) + dIt(â)) (A35)
Substituting into the first inequality in equation (A32) gives the stated equality. To prove the
second inequality in (A32) note that
(r − c)Gt ≤ |r − c||Ft(a)− Ft(â)| ≤ |r − c|(Ft(a) + Ft(â)). (A36)
Using equation (A25)
|dIt(a)− dIt(â)| − (dIt(a)− dIt(â)) (A37)
= 1{dNt(â)=0}|dIt(a)| ≤ |dIt(a)| (A38)
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≤ C2 (Λ(a) + Λ(â)) <∞ (A39)
for some constant C2 > 0 where the second inequality follows from the fact that a and â are
both feasible by Lemma 15. This shows that the local martingale Ut is a uniformly integrable
martingale and the desired result follows.
The following lemma shows that the search for Markov equilibria is equivalent to solving a
recursive optimal stopping problem.
Lemma 17. A Markovian strategy a ∈M∩S is a MPE if and only if the induced equity value
function satisfies











subject to (3.1) and the uncontrolled dynamics
dF̄t = −ξF̄tdt (A41)
where the reward function is defined by
R(F, Y |a) ≡ sup
G∈R+
{E(G, Y |a) + (G− F ) p(G, Y |a)− βY } (A42)
and T denotes the set of stopping times.
Proof of necessity. Assume that a ∈M∩ S is a MPE and denote by
R(F, Y,G|a) ≡ E(G, Y |a) + (G− F ) p(G, Y |a)− βY (A43)
the objective function on the right hand side of (A42). Since (τ
b
(a), θ0(a)) are stopping times
it follows from (A42) and Lemma 14 that














































To establish the reverse inequality let
Rn(F, Y |a) ≡ sup
0≤G≤n
R(F, Y,G|a) (A49)
and consider the sequence (sn)
∞
n=1 of one shot deviations defined by
θ0(sn) ≡ σ + 1{Rn(F̄σ,Yσ|a)≤0}∞, (A50)
τ
b













where σ is an arbitrary but fixed stopping time, and qσ denotes the Markov shift operator. It is
easily seen that sn ∈ S is a feasible deviation for each n ≥ 1. Therefore, it follows from Lemma
14 and the specification of sn that we have
















Letting n → ∞ on both sides and invoking the monotone convergence theorem to justify the
interchange of limit and expectation then gives







and the result follows by taking the supremum over σ ∈ T .
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Proof of sufficiency. Assume that a ∈ M ∩ S satisfies (A40) and let s ∈ S be fixed.
Because τ
b






















































and the required result now follows from Lemma 14, the arbitrariness of s ∈ S and the definition
of the function R(F, Y,G|a).
Lemma 18. Barrier strategies are feasible, that is, B ⊆ S.




) forms a Markov process we have
that Λ(a) = Λ(F0, Y0) for some (possibly infinite) function Λ : R2+ → R∪ {∞} that satisfies the
boundary conditions
Λ(F, Y ) = 0, (F, Y ) ∈ D(a), (A63)












, (F, Y ) ∈ R(a). (A64)
On the other hand, a standard calculation using Girsanov’s theorem and the law of iterated
expectations shows that
Λ(F, Y ) = λ(y)Y, (F, Y ) ∈ R+\(D ∪R)(a) (A65)
for some function λ : R+ → R ∪ {∞} that satisfies














with H,G : R+ → R+ uniformly bounded and such that
min{G(y), 1−H(y)} > 0, y ∈ Ir (a) ≡ (yb(a), yu(a)). (A67)
202














is finite and the desired result now follows from (A67) since the point Y(y
u
(a)) lies by assumption
in the set I
r
(a).
Lemma 19. The equity value eSP(y|a) corresponding to a barrier strategy a = (yb , yu , ŷ) in
which y
b
is chosen to satisfy the smooth pasting condition e′(y
b
) = 0 is increasing and convex
in y.
Proof. Let us define Γ(a) as
Γ(a) = e(yu |a)− e0(yu |yb). (A69)
where e0(y|yb) is defined in equation (A75). Combining equations (A75) and (A69), we can














Because pu(yt |a) is positive for all values of yt ∈ (yb , yu), equation (A70) shows that if Γ(a) is




, ŷ) is higher than the







Differentiating equation (A70) we find:
e′(y
b




























(1−Π) + Π. (A72)
If y
b
satisfies the smooth pasting condition, e′(y
b















(1− τ)(K(y0 , yb)− 1)yb
Θ−Π
. (A73)
Then, combining equations (A73)), (A75), (A70), and (A73)), we find that the equity value




) = 0 is













































This implies that, for an exogenously specified (ŷ, yu), when the boundary yb satisfies the smooth-
pasting condition, the value of equity eSP(yt |a) is independent of both (yu , ŷ). Twice differenti-








) we find, that for all y
t
,































































implying that the the equity function is increasing and convex for all y.
A.1 The HJB equation
To formally characterize the MPE in the presence of debt issuance we rely on a generalization of
the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to handle possibly non-differentiable functions.
In this general setting we will be looking for solutions of the HJB equation in the distributional
sense or weak solutions (Crandall and Lions (1983)).
If v : R+ → R is a convex function then its one sided derivatives v′±(y) are nondecreasing
functions of finite variation, and its second distributional derivative is a positive measure that
we denote by v′′(dy). Consider now the measure




Lamberton, Zervos, et al. (2013) show that the solution to (A20) or, equivalently, (A24) is
intimately related to the set of functions that solve the HJB equation
max {Ov(y), ψ(y|a)− v(y)} = 0 (A76)
in the distributional sense. To make this result precise we start by formally defining the type of
weak solutions we are interested in.
Definition 5. A function v : (0,∞)→ R is a solution to (A76) in the sense of distributions if
it is convex and such that
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i) v(y) ≥ ψ(y|a) for all y ≥ 0
ii) Ov(dy) is a non positive measure on R+
iii) Ov(dy) does not charge the set {y ≥ 0 : v(y) > ψ(y|a)}
Proposition 11 (HJB characterization). a ∈Mr ∩ S is a rMPE if and only if
v(y) ≡ e(y|a)− ê(y) (A77)
solves (A76) in the sense of distributions subject to the boundary conditions
lim sup
y↓0





y−Θv(y) = lim sup
y↑∞
y−Θψ(y|a) <∞, (A79)
where Π < 0 and Θ > 1 are given in equations (3.15) and (3.14).
Proof This follows from Proposition 8 and Lamberton, Zervos, et al. (2013, Theorems 6.3|4)
using the fact that in our case the state space is the positive real line with inaccessible boundaries
and the reward function is convex and thus continuous.
The next proposition provides a characterization of the equity value in a MPE in barrier
strategies as a weak solution of the HJB equation.
Proposition 12. A barrier strategy is a rMPE if and only if the induced equity value function
e(y|a) is a solution to (A76) in the sense of distributions.
Proof. Combining Corollary 2, and the characterization of bond and equity values in equa-
tions (3.13) and (3.27), respectively, we deduce that there exists a constant k > 0 such that
|e(y|a)| ∨ |φ(y|a)| ≤ k (1 + |y|) , y ≥ 0. (A80)





y−Θf(y) = 0, for f ∈ {e(·|a), φ(·|a)+}. (A81)
This shows that the boundary conditions (A78) and (A79) hold for any barrier strategy and the
desired result now follows from Proposition 11.
